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
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France, England and European Democracy

1215–1915

A Historical Survey of the Principles Underlying the Entente Cordiale

By

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PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION

THE alliance of England and France against Germany is more than a powerful factor in today's struggle, it is one of the great events of universal history. For the first time two countries, both makers of civilization, are united in an intimate bond which, apart from the questions of common defence and pooling of material resources, is fast bringing about a communion of minds and hearts. In the interest of peace and the progress of civilization this alliance ought to last, and last it will if the English and French learn to know and understand each other.

This book is a modest contribution to the understanding of matters concerning England in the past and in the present, these matters being considered only in their bearing on actual events and only in as far as they forecast and explain these events. An attempt has been made to show through just what sequence of causes—historical, psychological, and moral—Great Britain was led in 1914–1915 to take her stand on the side of right, liberty, and humanity. These causes are not occasional and superficial; they are fundamental and essential. Their effect will survive the crisis which has suddenly given them their full significance and efficacy. It is precisely these causes which allow us to augur well of the future.

There has been no desire here to write a book bristling with notes and references. Only known facts are used in the text; from these facts an effort has been made

to deduce a few leading ideas. An appeal has been made to those readers who, believing in the logical sequence of human actions, attempt to connect current events with their distant sources, and who, starting with the given facts of the history of institutions and customs, make an effort to understand such events. There is no purpose here, nor pretension, other than that of drawing the reader's attention to a classification of facts and to a clear statement of ideas.

PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

FRANCE and England have not been exempt from wrong-doing in the past; but they have learned the lessons of experience and have submitted to the guidance of their better selves. Today they have forsworn ambition and conquest; they are striving to uphold certain lasting principles, born of groping endeavour, fostered slowly through the ages and matured in the light of their genius. English liberty and French equality constitute the bases of all national greatness in the present and of all international progress in the future. Peaceful countries both of them, England and France are now stemming with the wall of their dead . . . the most savage onrush ever recorded in order to insure independence and security to the nations of the earth.

France and England were predestined to be the defenders of international justice, for the benefit of mankind. While safe-guarding their own existence, together with the principles they represent in history, they have given protection to small nations, maintained the inviolability of treaties and furthered the dawning *entente* among peoples.

In the settlement of this much desired consummation, the United States may be called upon to play a part commensurate with the magnitude of its power and the nobleness of its idealism. When it is no longer a matter of fighting, the United States may abandon its reluctance to participate in world-politics and may decide to cast

in its lot with the Allies for the sake of peace, justice, and humanity.

The review of French and English history which I here attempt to present, as setting forth the deeper causes of the indissoluble union of spiritual forces on either side of the Channel, exemplifies values, that, in my thought, are equally illustrative of America's true traditions and, as I hope, prophetic of her future policy. For this reason, I dare trust this study may not come altogether amiss at the present time. If this book succeeds in arresting the attention of American readers, it will be in no small degree owing to the exact, sober, and pithy translation of Dr. Leslie Turner of the University of Paris and of the University of California.

CH. CESTRE.

DEPOT OF THE 39TH REGT. INFANTRY,
DIEPPE, 1916.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

THE author of this book, M. Charles Cestre, is not unknown in the United States. M. Cestre, *docteur ès lettres* (*d'état*) of the University of Paris and now professor of English at the University of Bordeaux, is also a graduate of an American university—the University of Harvard. He has been contributing to the more serious publications of France, England, and the United States for many years. He is a scholarly exponent of Anglo-Saxon thought as well as of *l'esprit français*. Many of us have not forgotten his interesting study of Bernard Shaw. Others will recall with pleasure his masterly work on *La Revolution Française et les Poètes Anglais*. His latest book—*L'Angleterre et la Guerre*—a work recently crowned by the French Academy of Political and Moral Sciences, is a comprehensive and able survey of the fundamental elements of French and English culture, with their relation to the War, from the thirteenth century down to the present day. In the translator's opinion, limited and personal as it must needs be, no better book on this subject has been written in either language. The translator considers it an honour to have secured the right of translation.

It may be well, however, for the benefit of those who prefer to have some idea of a book before reading it, to attempt to outline the contents, scope, and leading ideas of M. Cestre's study. A glance at the table of contents

shows us that the author's chief concern is with the more significant and only definitely admitted facts of French and English history and with their relation to the present War. These salient events, covering seven centuries of history, enable the author, and with him the reader, to discern what is most constant in the evolution of the two peoples. This historical "constant," recognizable under its varying forms across the centuries, ultimately leads us to a full understanding of the fundamental idea—*l'idée maîtresse*—of the book. It may be stated as follows. England is the mother of liberty; France is the mother of equality; the English idea of liberty reaches France and is partial cause of the French Revolution; France becomes the evangelist—*le flambeau*—of liberty; henceforth the more limited and traditional English liberty and the more absolute and ideal French liberty draw slowly together; reciprocally, the French idea of equality reaches England; England progresses towards democracy and devotes much of her energy to social reform. The same interchange and reconciliation is to be observed elsewhere: England is individualist, realist, idealist, and rationalist in greater or lesser degree than France; in the nineteenth century these differences tend to disappear. Similarly, the two nations, despite certain misunderstandings come to hold about the same opinion concerning the balance of power and the principle of nationalities. Again, in the matter of character, a similar progress towards a common ideal is to be noted. Thus the two nations starting centuries ago from the opposite extremities A and C of an

acute angle A B C approach each other slowly across the vicissitudes of intermittent conflict and misunderstanding and finally meet at the point B—the *Entente Cordiale*. This point B, then, represents the

conciliation of the two points of view, their final union in a single ideal and the starting point of an eventual progress along a common line BX—the "resultant"—figuring the modified "content" of the two branches. But this "content"—liberty, equality, individualism capable of solidarity, idealistic realism, with an extension of the "Rights of Man" to the "Rights of Nations"—is about equivalent to the "content" of democracy and still more so to the "content" of social democracy. What then is the author's fundamental idea? Simply this: to draw our attention towards the salient points in the history of Democracy, that is the slow but sure infiltration of democratic principles from the upper to the middle and finally to the lower strata of society.

This compendium of Democracy is, moreover, thrown in relief against a background of what is not democratic. Here the author enters upon the War. Democracy is engaged in a struggle for existence. Starting shortly after Kant and Goethe when German thought was in harmony with the universal conscience of mankind, growing stronger with Fichte and Hegel, divergent forces have been operating in Germany, until finally the breach has become impassable. Headed, like England and France, towards the democratic point "B" Germany has swerved in her course and now lies outside the circle of democratic Europe; and therein lies the pity of it all. The Germany of Kant and Goethe, spiritual member of the great European family, has been led astray; she has been taught that she is the ruling member of that family, because naturally superior, and that the other members must accept her creed of "state-ism" based on force, of organization imposed from above, of soulless mechanism and of *Kultur* without liberty, that, in short, they must accept what would be the

negation of their histories and the history of Democracy, or perish.

There are other interesting *exposés* in the work of M. Cestre. His convincing analysis of Democracy is supported by studies of Carlyle, of John Stuart Mill, of Matthew Arnold, and others which are as profound in philosophical penetration as they are concise and limpid in form. M. Cestre is, in fact, an authority on the progress of English thought in the nineteenth century. Of France herself, of the *meaning* of France the author is perhaps over-reticent. It is true that the contribution of France to Democracy is very clearly indicated; is, indeed, a capital feature of the book. But French equality, French social justice, French national and international Democracy (*droits des peuples*), French intelligence and moderation, French idealism, generosity, and humanity, and above all France's sincerity—her demonstrated willingness to surrender all, even her life if need be, in the defence of these great principles—this part of the democratic "content" has been somewhat sacrificed to the analysis of the other part. And perhaps, after all, such was the author's purpose; for it must not be forgotten that he is writing for a public insufficiently acquainted with Great Britain's contribution to Democracy and civilization.

It is possible that the book will meet with severe criticism. However that may be, it is the translator's sincere belief that M. Cestre's study will be found interesting and valuable. As for the translation much more severe criticism is expected. *Traduttore, traditore.* Translating is always a more or less dangerous matter. For the revision of certain difficult passages and other valuable suggestions my warmest thanks are due to my colleagues of the University of California: Mr. A. Boyd, Professor H. E. Cory, Professor B. P. Kurtz, Mr. G. R. MacMinn, Mr.

W. W. Lyman (Celtic) of the department of English; Mr. G. Boas of the department of Public Speaking and Professor R. Schevill of the department of Romanic Languages.

Leslie Morton Turner.

Berkeley, California,
January, 1917.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction: Why England Is our Ally

THE War of 1914, or the War of Nations, affords us constant proof of a changed order of things in the world. The reason why political differences in England and in France disappeared in the hour of supreme decision, to give place to the union of all parties—to the "Union Sacrée"—is that each Parliament understood that the defence of the mother country involved the stupendous task of preparing a new code of right and wrong in Europe. The reason why, in the plains of Champagne, in the trenches of the Aisne, and on the hills of Verdun, the French army has fought and is fighting hour by hour with unparalleled valour and why the young men of England have hastened to join the colours, and will continue to do so without legal obligations,[1] is that French and English soldiers know that in fighting for their country, they are fighting for the progress of to-

[1] The final resorting of England to conscription, after twenty-two months' fighting, will be treated in the last chapter.

morrow and for a saner humanity finally cleansed of a plague that was fast consuming it.

History has known but one war of the nature of the present one—the War of 1792, which was, even as far back as that, a war for liberty. The noble and unselfish enthusiasm of the French Revolution, however, was too intemperate to remain master of itself; it broke out too soon in a Europe ill-prepared to accept it. Since then, time, which has made France wiser, has also enlightened Europe—I mean those nations of Europe worthy of understanding a form of patriotism which does not exclude humanity. And so it comes to pass that these humane and pacific people must rise, regretfully but firmly, against an odious attempt to monopolize their territories and to enslave their souls.

Now, if this war is to leave us better off and to assure the peace of Europe for some time to come (I dare not say forever), it must involve no conquest. (I am not discussing necessary restitutions.) Under such a condition this great struggle will subserve its true end, which is, according to the stern law of human concerns, to establish good through evil and to hasten through fire and blood the dawn of a new era. The allied nations, old in the matter of experience but young in their idealism and generosity, have learned a good deal these last twenty years at the sight of Germany gone mad, a helot-type amongst nations, intoxicated with power and pride. They have submitted to a severe self-examination. They have grown stronger in their determination to avoid former errors. They have been impressed with their mission, which is to transfer certain principles appealing to reason from the field of ideas into the field of facts, in the hope that justice may really become the basis of intercourse between states, just as it is between individuals; that mutual tolerance and good understanding

may be established through respect for liberty fidelity, to pledges and contracts, honesty in word and deed, moderation in thought and limitation of desire.

England and France are the first-born of Europe. They have passed the age of ill-governed passions. Their vitality, which has remained whole (and whose force surprises those who thought it spent), no longer finds vent in ambition to conquer, but applies itself reasonably and nobly to the solution of internal and external problems, taking care to conciliate their own interests with the destiny of mankind. No doubt they have locked in combat in the past, but they have done so in a spirit of chivalry which has left behind only a recollection of fair dealing and an admiration for courage; they have passed through periods of error which they have expiated in suffering or redeemed through acts of reparation. Let us not be astonished that nations, like individuals, learn moderation only through the stern lessons of facts. At least, what France and England have learned, has not been in vain. Formed as they were in the hard school of long history, strong today in prudence and decision, they have forgotten their quarrels and are now united for the purpose of curbing the appetite of a covetous nation overinflated with her own importance and misled by the favours of fortune.

The fact that Europe was stifling under a burden of armaments must be laid to the charge of Germany, made one as she was through conquest and organized for future conquest. The threat levelled against all nations refusing to enter the sphere of "Germanism" was extended to the peoples of the Far East. The promises of a happier future, the seemingly natural fruits of progress, were belied. That the civilized world was heartily weary of this coercion is shown by the fact that the civilized world rose in revolt against this last provocation, against

this last act of supreme madness committed by the "Duplice" in kindling an appalling conflagration for a mere quarrel of influence. The vigorous action of Russia, the heroic steadfastness of Belgium and Servia, the intervention of Japan, the rallying of Italy, the growing manifestation of neutral opinion, all of this shows, as does the unshaken determination of England and France, that what is at stake is a universally important cause whose influence reaches beyond the interests directly concerned, and whose issue will have an immediate bearing on the future of humanity.

Now in this immense conflict it is England and France who are in the highest degree the champions of liberalism and humanity. It is fitting then to inquire just what in England's past, in her recent history, and in the permanent sentiments which quicken her people, may explain her present attitude. Why is England our ally? What are the causes, remote or immediate, which induced her to break a peace maintained at the expense of important concessions and with all the patience compatible with the responsibility of her position in the world? To what extent did her convictions and interests bring about the decision? How can recent events, as well as the political and moral history of the English people, explain the abatement of party quarrels, the postponement of burning questions, and the co-operation of all classes and groups in the common work of national defence? Does not the magnificent volunteer movement in Great Britain and in the colonies demonstrate that the appeal of a strong sentiment and a worthy ideal was heard throughout British lands, in just the same way as the call which aroused the enthusiasm and indignation of all Frenchmen? While it is true, that for a time, a certain placidity was noticeable with some, and with others a certain repugnance to the idea of sacrificing local differences or interests to

the common safety, it must not be forgotten that a nation protected for centuries against aggression, thanks to her natural defences, does not easily forego the illusion of her security, and that, furthermore, English imagination, judging from English testimony, is very slow to move. The lukewarm, however, as well as the dissidents, who were never numerous, soon rallied. And now an entire race is up in arms for the defence of its traditions and hopes, for the defence of its honour and *raison d'être* in the world. For England and for ourselves it is not a question of an episode in military history, nor even of a struggle for existence, it is one of those solemn hours of serious and impressive import in which a crisis in the life of a nation coincides with a crisis in the history of mankind. In inquiring why England is our ally, in analysing the moral and material causes which have determined her intervention, we shall be better situated to understand the common ideal uniting us; we shall see the designs of Germany appear in a more sombre and more tragic light—Germany momentarily stricken with a folly of pride and spoil and slaughter.

Is it fitting to invoke moral causes at a time when the din of arms rings harsh and merciless? It is only too true that force is the passion of the hour, but in one of the two camps, at least, force is subservient to the principle which the better part of mankind has, from time immemorial, placed above the triumphs of violence. Even in the days that are upon us, when the struggle, still indecisive, allows our enemies to boast of a semblance of success, a certain anxiety is astir in the world, in non-warring countries, which goes to show that Right has conserved its supreme authority. . . . Two groups of nations are locked in battle. On one side, let us grant the argument, there exist virtues, if the word be taken in its Latin sense of "virile qualities"; but these virtues

are of a grim sort, inspired by selfishness, rapacity, and the appetite for power; primitive virtues if you will, exercised only within the limits of the tribe, but transformed, outside of the tribe, into cynical duplicity and sanguinary violence. On the other side we must undoubtedly concede errors and shortcomings, but these have not killed generosity nor stifled the newborn hope of the twentieth century, which aims to conciliate love of country with goodwill toward men, worship of a national ideal with sympathy for other civilizations, and necessary selfishness with abnegation, the condition *sine qua non* of justice. No doubt the definite conversion of the Allies to the cause of Right is of recent date; the threat held over them by the common enemy has been partly responsible for this. The law of history teaches, however, that at each stage of progress Right is begotten of stern facts, and that human dignity emerges but slowly indeed from animal nature. Paltry interests and evil passions yield to disinterested and righteous sentiments only under the shock of some violent and appalling commotion. Nations moderate their ambitions and forego conquest only after having endured the deceptions and sufferings of disastrous wars. The wisdom of the Allies is formed in part of such prudential moderation. In the case of England and France, however, there is something more. In the course of their history they have both nourished sentiments and formed notions which have become the bases of private and public law wherever justice reigns within a social group. After centuries of slow evolution, the moment is approaching when it will also be possible to have these principles admitted, if not applied, outside these groups, in the intercourse of nations. Such a progress in the status of Right can be accomplished only through a profound transformation in the status of fact. The cataclysm in which we are

participating is one of these formidable convulsions whence mankind emerges regenerated.

. . . . . .

Let us state at the outset without any circumlocution that England is defending her interests. These are legitimate interests, however, due to the daring of her sailors, the labour of her colonists, the enterprise of her manufacturers, and the successes of her merchants dependent upon honesty and good faith. Her patrimony consists not only of her European territory, but also of an immense empire composed of autonomous colonies and dependent possessions, hewn out of the rough material of continents; of commercial patronage secured under every latitude; and finally of naval supremacy, protecting her coasts, colonies, and trade. Established in the most favoured regions of our planet, consolidated in her possessions, thanks to a tenacity and vigilance which have enabled her to draw profit from the faults, weariness, or negligence of others, protected against malevolent intervention by a series of posts guarding the ocean crossways, England cannot and will not allow herself to be threatened within her sphere of influence or to be molested along the great thoroughfares of navigation. Questions of an imperial, naval, and commercial order are the objects of her constant preoccupation. Can she, without concern, permit at her very door the growth of an immense high-sea fleet, yearly more formidable, justified neither by the necessity of defending a vast stretch of seacoast, nor by the need of protecting numerous dependencies, and manifestly destined to fall upon the British fleet some fine morning, to reduce it to nought, and thus to bring about the ruin of England's commerce and the conquest of her colonies? As to her trade, for which, during centuries, she has patiently established markets in the five parts of the world, is not that also a vital ne-

cessity for her? Within her own narrow territory arable land is reduced to a limited surface, farms have long since given place to factories, and farm labourers have become working-men; can she do otherwise than take umbrage at new-comers who are trying not to supplement British production where opportunities are afforded, but to overthrow it brutally by any and every means? A nation is not only powerful because of its possessions at home, but just as much so because of its priority of colonization on certain continents, the security of its communications and frontiers, and its supremacy in certain markets. A nation has not merely provinces to lose, it may also lose the prestige which guarantees commercial success, the demand of strong markets which favour business, and the certainty of peace which adds value to prosperity.

The English are realists enough not to have been indifferent to the dangers to which the German ambition exposed them. "Realism" does not necessarily mean sordid selfishness. The English are realists because they are accustomed to take facts calmly into account, even when these facts play havoc with their feelings, baffle their conjectures, and belie their hopes. There is a form of reality with them—either psychological, economical, or historical—which constitutes the necessary substratum of all national doctrines and aspirations. Is it enough for a country to desire liberty in order to possess it? Must it not forearm against causes of trouble at home and against measures of oppression abroad? Similarly, is it enough to be firmly attached to peace in order to be certain of enjoying it? Assuredly not! The causes of conflict must be put aside, defence against aggression must be organized. Economic activity admits of competition, but pronounces its own doom if it ignores or tolerates manœuvres which tend to stifle it. However admirable, however desirable, the régime of Right may

be in international relations, prudence demands that Right be founded on the guarantees of force. Is it sufficient to be loyal to one's word, respectful of treaties, resolved to satisfy legitimate claims, and be firm in the purpose of avoiding provocation? By no means; it is also necessary to forestall the encroachments of cupidity and knavery, and to keep close watch over operations of craft and covetousness. Legitimate distrust, indispensable force, resources both ample and available, such are the factors of English national life, and the English with their sense of reality have taken good care not to neglect them. Naturally they have made use of these factors with a view to their interests.

We shall have to ask ourselves, moreover, what was the attitude of England in the presence of the economic ambitions of Germany and the changes introduced in the direction of German policy by William II after the disgrace of Bismarck. Could England remain indifferent to the industrial and commercial struggle undertaken against her, sometimes by means of sudden additions to the protective tariff, or by state premiums, and sometimes by means of clamorous advertising or inferior counterfeiting of British products? Could England see, without alarm, the situation of her merchant service, so long unrivalled in the interocean carrying trade, compromised by the artificial development of the German fleet subsidized by the government? With her first line fleet serving as a rampart for the protection of her European frontiers and colonial possessions, could she have remained unconcerned at the formidable and persistently accelerated growth of the German naval programme, soon to be augmented by the projected construction of an aërial squadron? Could she do otherwise than be alarmed at the more and more evident purpose of Germany to outdistance her or to supplant her on the points

of the globe where she had established herself . . . in Africa, in Asia, or in Oceania? With England it was not a question of preventing Germany from having "her place in the sun," it was a question of not allowing herself to be elbowed out of positions acquired and consolidated at the sword's point, built up by toil and good administration, and enriched by English capital. . . . So much, then, for what concerns the interests of England; such are the imperative motives of a nation essentially *réaliste*. I shall give the matter the attention demanded by its importance.

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Now England, realist as she is, has never fallen at any stage of her history to the lower levels of materialism. While it is true that nations without nobility and moral vigour become degraded when in touch with material interests, it is also true that magnanimous nations who wish to direct their destiny toward higher planes learn a great deal from the contact of material things without ever falling under their dominion. A nation, like an individual, is worthy of esteem only when capable of lofty aspirations. Such a nation, while yielding to the lessons of experience, borrows therefrom the constitutive elements of right and liberty. The national sentiments concerned, if of a noble quality, animate the spiritual being with the desire for what is just, and little by little, at the price no doubt of gropings and errors, achieve progress in the sense of respect for one's neighbour. The national thought, if of a generous kind, illuminates the intelligence with the light of what is true, and by slow degrees, with the reservations due to incessant correction, takes body in the healthy conception of an ideal. Now there exists a sort of intemperate idealism which rushes inconsiderately towards an inaccessible prospect: to just such an ideal the French were committed for a

time; a century of misfortune has made them wiser and has taught them to profit by the teachings of reality. Then again there exists a timid idealism: to this the English have long lent an ear. Diverting their attention through instinctive prudence from the concepts of reason, they have applied themselves to conceiving the good involved in facts and the good arising out of facts through slow growth, perceived rather by the moral sense than by the intellect. And thus they have turned their steps slowly towards what is better, tarrying, at times, too long at the intermediary stages with momentary haltings too, and backslidings, but without ever losing the faculty of learning anew and checking themselves on the verge of error. During the last century they have constantly progressed—sometimes through the leadership of their writers, at others through the impulse of the national conscience, and at times, to a certain extent, we may say, under the influence of French thought—towards a more intrepid and bounteous form of idealism. In such sort that England, advancing in the direction of rationalism, without losing her instinctive respect for reality, and France, advancing in the direction of realism, without abandoning her innate attachment to reason, have met midway and have been able to understand each other, to purpose following the same ends, and to commune over the same ideal at a time when necessity obliges them to combine their available forces in order to save the common achievement of civilization.

What is this achievement of civilization in so far as England's own share is concerned? The testimony of our philosophers of the eighteenth century, of our political theorists of the Revolution, of our *doctrinaires* of 1830, of our sociologists of today, gives answer: this achievement is the foundation of liberty. We shall then follow the continuity of the spirit of liberty across the vicissitudes

of the political history of England to the time when Liberty under its typically English form found expression in the work of Burke, author of the *Speech on Conciliation with America* and *Reflections on the Revolution in France.* Then we shall follow the evolution of the idea of Liberty under the influence of the principles of the French Revolution revised by the English sense of things, practical, traditional, and moral. Is Liberty a right or a "good" which a man acquires only under the condition of making himself worthy of it through disciplined conduct, through respect for duty towards himself and others, through prudence in the application of new ideas, and through a just submission to the principle of competency and to the principle of authority? What are the relations of the individual to the State? Does the ever-increasing intervention of the State in private affairs, in the shape of laws of protection, of regulation and redressing of inequalities, operate in such a way that the moral independence of the individual is diminished because of it? Is there a tendency to reduce our consciences to a common level by the very means which are used to better material conditions, or, on the contrary, does social progress respect the traditional substratum of liberty, which means the respect of individual differences? We shall pose these questions just as the English have done in the course of the changes of recent history. In noting how the English have answered them, in the sense of more personal independence, of freer criticism, and of variety in the expression of opinions and aspirations, we shall show what an abyss there really is between English as well as French individualism and German "Stateism."

Now civil liberty as it exists within democratic nations (and the English nation, under an ægis of royalty not intervening in political affairs, is really a democracy) conciliates desire for personal independence with respect

for the liberty of others. It follows from this that liberty-loving and democratic countries are the ones which, through extension of this respect from individuals to collective bodies, are the best fitted to understand the right of nationalities to existence and to the free development of their destinies. Just as their conception of civil society reposes on a belief in the eminent dignity of the person and on confidence in the harmony resulting from diversity, so their conception of the society of nations reposes on respect for the particular genius of races and on sympathy for national ideals. England and France through natural generosity and deliberate conviction are the defenders of nationalities and the champions of a pacific Europe in which each ethnical and historical group should be able to develop, according to its traditions and aspirations, for the happiness of each and the welfare of all. Here again the two great liberal nations find themselves naturally united against the unheard-of pretensions and insupportable tyranny of Germanism.

The first condition of free national development, within the bounds of mutual tolerance and acceptance of necessary restriction, is an approximate equality, in importance and strength between the great Powers, tending to establish within the material order counterweights, which are both the principles and the symbols of the spiritual balance required by the conscience of modern nations. As is often the case in human affairs, the policy which reason would sanction today as an element of right was first prompted by interest as a measure of prudence. This is the very policy which Richelieu pursued under the name of *balance égale* between the great nations; it is this policy which England has constantly put into effect since existing as a unified nation, conscious of her rôle in the world, in virtue of her time-honoured principle of the "balance of power." I shall show how concern for

this principle of balance of power has guided her in the darkest hours of her history and how this constant preoccupation which has determined her most noteworthy interventions in continental affairs still directs her today. This very line of conduct with which M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, in a speech at the Reichstag, charged her as a provocation and as the most overwhelming proof of her responsibility for the war, is, on the contrary, a title of honour, by which she demonstrates in most signal fashion, that she understands how to conciliate national interest with her concern for the salvation of Europe and the peace of the world.

The principle of balance of power, however important and worthy in itself, is furthermore closely related to the physical and geographical order which ought to preside in the establishment of the map of Europe. England is progressing towards the international application of the doctrine of liberty; she understands her particular work to be that of protecting nationalities considered as collective personalities, who have won the right to exist, thanks to their natural qualities and noble bearing in history. Nor has she gained this generous notion in a flash. Just as with other nations (ourselves, for instance, we are grieved to confess), she had allowed herself to be blinded by ambition, influenced by resentment, and carried away by movements of impatience. And this is not to be wondered at, since the conscience of a collective body is slow to awaken; a nation must submit to the long lesson of experience and even the ordeal of misfortune, to be able to conceive disinterestedness and justice. It is only very recently in our twentieth century, still so young, that the potent voice of right has reached the ears of those nations worthy of interpreting the call. It is but yesterday, to mention only one instance, that France and England decided to treat inferior races in their colonies

with due respect for their quality of human beings, to respect the traditions, liberties, and forms of government of conquered peoples and to prefer a protectorate form of rule to a sheer appropriation. France and England, at least, enjoy the merit of having shown themselves accessible to the progress of justice, while other nations have remained obstinately and barbarously closed to it. In following such a policy, our friends and ourselves have earned this honour: the light of generosity and humanity has penetrated our mission of great nations destined to protect weak and infant peoples. My office will be to try to find out how England has progressed towards a more and more liberal and even higher conception of her duty to her dependents and how this disinterestedness, applied to those with whom she is more closely in touch, has led her, like ourselves, to undertake the protection of oppressed or menaced European nations. There is an immediate link between the liberal policy which England adopted first towards the Dominions, then towards Ireland, lastly towards South Africa and India, and the aid which she is bringing to Belgium and Servia today, which she will bring to Poland, to the Balkanic peoples, to Syria and Armenia tomorrow. In a word, whether at home or abroad, near at hand or far from her shores, with nations who are wards and nations who are martyrs, the mission that England is fulfilling is the mission of liberty.

For the English, the idea of liberty is closely connected with respect for that inward dignity of the person which they call "character." National self-government and personal self-government—these two things seem to them to rest upon the same basis, that is to say, upon scrupulous obedience to unwritten law, unfailing attachment of nations to honour and of individuals to virtue. And so character must be counted among the forces of

idealism which led the English to place themselves stoutly and generously on the side of right. The moral sense is a national quality and greatness of the English people. Ever since the days that Englishmen and Frenchmen as noble adversaries in the plains of France were in the habit of observing the same chivalrous ideal, the English have held to the honourable title of *gentilhomme*, transformed into gentleman. With us, the Renaissance and refined society have transformed the "valiant knight" into the "polite" man, the man of good breeding *qui ne se pique de rien* (who does not boast)—he who, avoiding both the narrowness of the pedant and the passion of the fanatic, sets a pattern of generosity and refinement acquired in the school of great thinkers, of good taste which is the poise of the mind, and of rectitude which is the poise of the will. With the English, less inclined to reflection than to action, the gentleman is the man of good family, who does not fall beneath himself and who, fortified by his conscience and by the opinion of all that counts in the nation, bends his will to the noble things of human nature, to that which makes mind superior to matter, truthfulness superior to success, and well-doing superior to well-being. How intolerable to the moral dignity of the English, or what only concerns us here, the better class of English, must have been the base counterfeit of ethics which has taken root in Germany during the last half-century! The Germans are not unacquainted with truthfulness, but *deutsche Treue* is operative only within the pale of *Deutschtum;* beyond the pale, it is lawful, indeed, it is a glorious thing for an officer to act as a spy; for an employee to intercept commercial secrets or for a chancellor to tear up treaties. Nor are the Germans incapable of honesty, but here again it is a German brand of probity applicable only to German society, to the German Fatherland, and to German public wealth, in other

terms a systematized and sublimated form of selfishness, a sort of heroic glorification of the German Ego.

English moral energy is of quite a different type. I do not deny (and the English would ill-judge my doing so) that their system of ethics cannot coincide with their interests. I have stated so already and cannot repeat it too often: the English are realists, who know the texture of the human mind too well to entertain the belief that disinterestedness and sacrifice can long subsist alone. But they possess the discretion of directing their interest in a sense compatible with nobility of sentiment and conduct; their ambition is not aggressive; their system of competition is not disloyal; when a conflict arises between immediate gain and honour, they are wise enough to prefer honour; when, through momentary blindness they have strayed into some dubious affair, they are sufficiently wise to recognize their error and to set it to rights. This is not the place to insist upon the shortcomings of the English conscience. The traditional misunderstanding between England and France led us in former times to exaggerate English imperfections and to consider them apart. What nation has not experienced moments of collective aberration? Where is the people proof against the inevitable discovery of defects which are the ransom of their qualities? Furthermore the English are not lacking in severe critics, occasionally very bitter indeed, who, sometimes, striking a note of indignation like Carlyle, or a note of irony like Matthew Arnold, and like Bernard Shaw wielding at times the redoubtable arm of ridicule, assail fallacies with violence and abate the velleity of pride. When a nation criticizes itself, it is safe. The Germans would not be in the position they are in today, if they had not lost their critical sense. But as far back as 1830 they exiled Heinrich Heine.

My rôle will be in particular to discover, among the

recent expressions of thought, the elements of the English moral ideal which are in harmony with our own. That this people has not always succeeded in rising to the heights of its ideal, let us not be surprised; what really matters is the fact that at critical moments the best in the nation triumphs over the less noble influences. We have proof of this today. English customs, English methods of education, and movements of opinion, the bearing of the nation in prosperity or misfortune, will also furnish us valuable indications. Even the very attitude of the Dominions and the conduct of dependent peoples will enlighten us as to the esteem and respect in which English rectitude is held. Having clearly made out what the term duty signifies to this people, we shall grasp the full significance of the magnificent movement of voluntary enlistment of which England furnishes us the spectacle today, and shall measure the error of the Germans at the beginning of the war, when passing judgment on the English contingents, they spoke disdainfully of "that despicable little army of mercenaries."

The last element of moral force which makes England worthy of fighting the good fight in the struggle for civilization is her moderation. Side by side with the spirit of liberty and the sentiment of duty there is to be noticed in England the exercise of a keen sense of the fitness of things which has marked her history with the regular development of which she is so justly proud, and which guarantees her people a solid happiness without exaltation or discouragement, without infatuation or deception, and without excessive ambition or painful renunciation. English ponderation, being a natural quality and a spontaneous product of the circumstances which favour her national development, becomes more self-conscious day by day and thrives more and more through a better understanding of the conditions of modern life. But

what she gains in philosophic lucidity, in logic and co-ordination, in scientific precision, deprives her in no sense of her spontaneity and instinctive sureness. Her clear perception of life corresponds to the French quality of reasonableness, not as dependent on abstract reason, which is subject to intemperate enthusiasms, like those of 1792 and 1848 (only to cite happenings of long ago), but on concrete reason of a prudent and matured sort, attentive to the facts and promptings of experience, and true, nevertheless, to our classical traditions, to our talent for analysis, generalization, and clearness. How opposed English moderation and French reasonableness are to German metaphysics, argumentative, hazy, and uncertain of character, which sometimes loses itself in mystic transcendentalism and at others becomes the servant of material appetites and of the will of power, whose justification is found in the horrible theory of "cruelism"! German metaphysics, despite scientific claims, has been incapable of learning the great philosophic lesson of science, namely, that in earthly concerns men must forego the notion of the Absolute. The German mind is quite prepared to admit that history has evolved, that the aspect of civilization has constantly changed, that nations and policies and cultures have been in perpetual growth —but the German mind admits such evolution only in so far as Germany herself, or more precisely Germany's evil genius, Prussia, has evolved and grown. Today, the climax of the transformation is attained: Prussia is triumphant; Prussia has reached the human absolute, and there is no salvation for the world other than that of being absorbed by force into this absolute, that is to say, into this perfection of organization, of method, of power, and of cynicism.

Against this monstrous conception of the terrestrial Absolute, which is only an idolatry of the Germanic Ego

and an apotheosis of Bismarckian "corporalism," England and France set up the idea of the relativity of things in matters of government, political science, and national happiness. Truth comes to light only through the spontaneous development of national tradition and culture; progress is possible only through the diversity of aims and tendencies; peace can exist only through the balance of contrary forces; for each nation, happiness consists in the free pursuit of its ideals.

Although England and France have constantly reacted on each other, I propose pointing out, chiefly, the rôle of the former in the formation of the ideal of national and international life which we are both opposing to the German idea. Her instinct, narrower in certain directions, but surer in others, has fortunately guided her. It will be well worth while studying English practical philosophy to note how her moderation has led her to formulate, in the matter of doctrines, institutions, and the directing of public spirit, the great principle of liberty and its counterpart, the principle of compromise. Abroad, she has succeeded in reconciling patriotism and humanity, respect for law and recourse to force; at home, she has found a way of conciliating democracy and authority, individual and state rights, independence and discipline. With Russia and ourselves, England wishes to establish a society of nations within which an equal balance, both in the material and spiritual orders, shall be maintained for the welfare of all concerned, for the safeguard of each, and in view of lasting peace. That is why she is fighting today on the territory of invaded France and on what remains of Belgium soil; that is why she will combat tomorrow in the North Sea and in the battles of the air, and why she will fight on to the bitter end for a cause which we both consider sacred.

CHAPTER II

England, Guardian of the Balance of Power in Europe

ENGLAND, like France, is combating for her existence. She is combating so as not to lose her place as a great nation nor to forfeit the moral heritage bequeathed by the past generations of her race. A nation grown old in years, possessed of national unity for centuries, impelled by powerful vital forces, and endowed with that particular faculty of noble races which furthers the parallel development of moral and material existence, England has fought valiantly (as she always has in the great crises of her history) to defend her independence and her personality. Since the days of William the Conqueror, she has suffered no invasion: she is essentially an unconquered nation. She owes this privilege, no doubt, to her situation; but she owes it also to her policy.

I should like to show, by a rapid survey of her history, that it was England who instituted the principle of balance of power and caused it to prevail in Europe. No nation has shown more continuity in her purposes. While pursuing her own particular aims for her defence, for increase of power, or for all the ideas which her moral and political evolution had given birth to, at the same time she has served, unconsciously at first and then deliberately, the cause of liberty among European

nations and upheld the right of each to exist without submitting to the supremacy of any other.

Today, France and England are the two great liberal and pacific nations who are waging war because they are forced to do so in order to safeguard the spiritual victories painfully won over violence and injustice. Before arriving at mutual understanding and esteem, and before fighting side by side for an ideal of which each has created a part, these nations have attacked each other furiously in the past. Today we may recall these conflicts, which were noble and chivalrous in character, with the assurance that there is no trace of them other than the equal admiration of the two adversaries engaged. While this retrospective view may show us that England was led, in certain cases, to be inimical to France, owing to political prudence or anxiety to defend her situation in Europe, let us remember that it is not so much our place here to judge as to understand. . . . These wars took place at a time when Europe was in a permanent state of conflict. The contemporary sentiment with regard to war was not what ours is today.

History does not repeat itself; it is a perpetual renewal. While, on the one hand, our patriotism is linked to the past, on the other, our idealism hastens towards the future. Piety and hope may be reconciled; a broad interpretation of history is helpful in this respect. History, judged in the light of the progress of facts and ideas, becomes a collection of experiences from which we may draw both reason for pride and subject for meditation. We are far enough removed from Louis XIV and from Napoleon to be able to recognize France's debt to them and to declare that some acts of theirs must never be repeated.

Since the sixteenth century, England has contributed powerfully in establishing one of the principles from which

the Allies derive their moral force at this hour. On two occasions, she has upheld this principle against France, owing to circumstances which forced her to do so. But it so happened that, in protecting herself, she favoured the establishment of European equity. This review of the past will not be without effect in enabling us to understand the strength of determination, the promptness of sacrifice, and the sincerity of which she is giving proof today in her effort to save once more the principles of balance of power and national liberty in Europe. From the persistence of her resolution in the past we shall be able to estimate the solidity and worth of her co-operation in the war of today.

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What Talleyrand said of England's foreign policy has often been repeated: "England is guided by her interests only." That depends on the meaning of the terms employed. If the expression means that England has never concluded an alliance nor undertaken a war, without deriving profit therefrom, that she has always taken advantage of the faults and perplexities of her rivals, then the expression is true enough; England is a staunch partisan of this method. A nation can depend only on herself, that is to say on her firmness and vigilance, for the extension and consolidation of her power; it is not sympathy which should determine an alliance, but the alliance which should determine sympathy; in no case should infatuation or enthusiasm prevail against the rules of political conduct marked out by history and by circumstances. France would have succeeded, on more than one occasion, if she had drawn her inspiration from this spirit. England adheres to realism; her statesmen have exercised practical wisdom and have been upheld by the self-possession of the nation. But if it is said that, for England, a realistic policy signifies, as it does for Germany,

a policy of base interest prosecuted by all and every means, such as violation of treaties and war by treachery, then the assertion is supremely unjust. In the present conflict, the dignified attitude of England, who declined the bargain by which Germany sought to purchase her neutrality, and who furnished assistance to Belgium and France without reserve, is a decisive refutation of such an interpretation.

Now the British are not idealists in the same way that the French have been for a considerable time; they do not easily conceive enthusiasm for abstract principles, superior to facts and interests, such as those which led the French to shed their blood on the battlefields of Europe out of sheer enthusiasm and for glory. But the English practise a noble sort of moral idealism, which inspires their individual conduct, permeates their customs, furnishes them with literary themes, and, more and more, with the progress of the public conscience, imposes its principles on the collective acts of the nation. This moral idealism is closely related to the facts of life, of which it is, so to speak, the expansion. It does not transform reality, it refines it; it adds a character of imposing solemnity to the lessons of history and experience. One feels that it is begotten, little by little, of the triumph of rectitude and generosity without theories and without attempts at systematization.

In international intercourse, precepts rather than principles imposed themselves upon her statesmen, and then upon public opinion in proportion as it won more authority in the government of the country. England has thus adopted, with regard to the great questions dominating the destinies of Europe, a definite attitude, quite empirical at first, but progressively more self-conscious, which, without neglecting her interests, proclaims her adherence to liberal ideas and her growing

respect for moral forces in the intercourse between nations.

Since her disappointments in the Hundred Years' War, England has abandoned all ambition for conquest in Europe. In the course of this interminable strife, she became conscious of her personality as a nation, and came into sharp collision with French patriotism. After the War of the Roses, whose outcome was the overthrow of feudalism and the consummation of the national unity, and after the Reform, ready to mark the country with its particular imprint and to reveal its moral energies, English nationality was definitely constituted. Within the nation, the spirit of free criticism, favoured by protestantism, facilitated the development of the spirit of liberty and prepared the series of conflicts which finally resulted in constitutional monarchy. Abroad, the necessity of establishing herself while in the act of resisting, led England to hinder the development of certain over-aggressive States and to defend others whose existence was in danger. Out of this conflict against the powerful and intervention in favour of the feeble was formed a foreign policy inspired, no doubt, by just concern for national interests, but often, as well, and more and more so, by instinctive attachment to liberty, to religious tolerance, and to the independence of nationalities. Separated from Europe by her geographical situation, drawn towards distant continents by her destiny as a maritime and colonial Power, England was brought to act as arbiter of European conflicts, being especially preoccupied with the necessity of not allowing, near by, the aggrandizement of too powerful a nation capable of subjugating the others and threatening herself. She appointed herself guardian of the balance of power in Europe. That is precisely her historical significance; that is the starting-point of the eminent part she has

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played in European politics and in the formation of the European turn of mind.

Now a just balance of power is the indispensable basis of law. From the approximative equality of the forces engaged is born the desire for peace through mutual abstention from violence and respect for treaties. Humanity may thus tend towards a higher form of justice through the parallel advance of material and moral forces. . . . If it be possible, on the morrow of this war of nations, to entertain the hope of seeing a closer harmony among nations, as the consequence of a better distribution of the forces in the world, then England, through her realism and idealism intimately united, will have largely contributed thereto.

It was at the end of the sixteenth century, under the great Elizabeth, that England, unified at last, swept along on the tide of economic prosperity, and filled with buoyant faith and ardent patriotism, played for the first time, the great part of guardian of the liberties of Europe against a nation overbearing and dangerous. The Spain of Philip II, rich with the spoils of the New World, proud of the audacious expeditions of her Cortez and her Pizarro, and strong with the rude energy of her people, source of a hardy race of soldiers and sailors, the Spain of Philip II was extending her sovereign rule over an empire "on which the sun never set." But Philip II was not satisfied with merely reigning; he thought it incumbent on him to exercise despotic control over his people and over their consciences. At a time when the spirit of liberty had already created spiritual needs and national aspirations, he declared himself the champion of absolutism and orthodoxy. Throughout his possessions, he established a régime of bloody executions to overthrow attempts at political independence or religious emancipa-

tion; abroad, he intervened everywhere with a view to the triumph of his fierce desire for "unification." The Inquisition set up a reign of terror in Italy and Spain; the cruel Duke of Alba stained Holland with blood; private agents upheld the Guises and the League in France; other emissaries prepared the formidable Thirty Years' War in Germany. England alone escaped the enterprises and intrigues of the King of Spain.

An English army went to the assistance of Holland. Among the leaders was one of the noblest representatives of the Renaissance and the Reform in England, Sir Philip Sidney, as admirable in his voluntary submission to legitimate authority as he was in spirit and in moral worth, —a truly noble figure of new times who perished in the struggle. His death carries with it a symbolical value; it confers the value of an ideal on a conflict in which were clearly asserted, already, the principles essential to the progress of European thought.

It was on the high sea that the quarrel of the two great rival nations was decided; a naval battle settled the question of their influence on the continent, of their colonial and maritime power, and also of the predominance of one of the two conceptions of life and of society. The Spanish ships with broad flanks and lofty poops—sea-giants that struck the nations with admiration and awe—assembled, at the mouth of the Tagus, in the form of a formidable Armada, which set sail in the month of August, 1588, toward the shores of Great Britain. This fleet of more than a hundred ships-of-the-line carried 2500 cannons, 8000 sailors, and 20,000 soldiers. In the English Channel, it fell in with the English fleet, inferior in number but composed of small nimble ships, high-rigged, and commanded by the famous Captains Hawkins, Frobisher, and Drake, who had won renown from their intrepid expeditions into unknown seas. The English

ships, taking advantage of the wind and the current, separated their heavier opponents, fell upon them one after another, firing two shots to the enemy's one, pressing in boldly to close quarters and boarding, and succeeded finally in capturing, sinking, or driving off the terrible Armada. A tempest completed the destruction. England had ruined an enemy opposed to the development of her colonial empire, averted religious oppression, saved the independence of the Low Countries, and delivered Europe from the bondage that threatened her.

Already, England felt surging within her those internal forces which, after military victory, were destined to win her civic victory, and, through the Revolution of 1648, open a broad way to the institutions of liberty. At the same time the Low Countries entered upon the most brilliant period of their prosperity, defending the independence of their religion and founding a federal republic. The defeat of the Armada, while striking a fatal blow at the supremacy of Spain, at the same time marked the dawn of political and religious liberty and, already, established the principle of nationalities. Of course, these ideas did not appear clearly to those responsible for discovering them thus for the first time; several centuries were to come and go, many a revolution and many a war must take place before they could sink very deeply into the conscience of nations; but England brought them to light when she guaranteed the principle of balance of power in Europe.

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It was the turn of France in the seventeenth century to harbour ambitions of universal supremacy and to awaken the suspicions of England by her bold policy and her encroachments. Against the France of Louis XIV, the English nation rose tenacious and resolute, despite the weakness of the House of Stuart. Richelieu had

accomplished the great work of French unity and had applied himself to extending the territory of our country as far as its natural frontiers. But he put a curb to the national ambition by recognizing the principle of "equal balance" among nations. Continuing his policy, Louis XIV, during the first half of his reign, completed the task of the great cardinal and filled the French monarchy with an incomparable lustre. It was not long, however, before he allowed himself to be carried away by a sort of exaltation of power. His wars of conquest, in the midst of peace, stirred up abroad an obstinate resistance of which England was the moving spirit.

Charles II of England, in pursuit of absolute power, stood in need of Louis XIV's support to re-establish the House of Stuart on the basis of its former prerogatives. Accordingly, he used his skill during the whole reign, secretly to favour the policy of the "Grand Monarch" in return for enormous subsidies. His people, however, instinctively loyal to the traditional policy and historical rôle of England, exerted, on several occasions, such a pressure on the King that he did not believe it prudent to resist. When Louis XIV invaded Flanders in 1688, public opinion forced Charles to enter a coalition formed between Holland, England, and Sweden. This was the Triple Alliance which obliged France to sign the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

This alliance did not prevent Charles, soon after, from lending Louis the assistance of the English fleet and of an expeditionary corps for the purpose of invading Holland, who was to be punished for her opposition to political and religious absolutism. Once again the English people intervened, struggling with all the constitutional means in their power to get the King to recall the English forces. The King yielded, and, by way of reparation, felt obliged to offer the hand of Princess Mary, his niece, a possible

heiress to the crown of England, to Prince William of Orange, Staatholder and hero of the independence of the United Provinces. This step was to have most serious consequences, since it resulted, twelve years later, in giving the crown of England to this same William of Orange and in putting into his hands the united forces of Great Britain and the Low Countries against France.

The admiration and legitimate pride which we Frenchmen feel for the creative vitality of our race in the seventeenth century, for the talent of our statesmen and military leaders, for the splendour of our arts and literature—all of this must not make us forget that if the France of today is able to invoke the Right of Nations against certain odious designs aimed at her and at Europe, it is largely due to the unflinching resistance that England opposed to the supremacy of Louis XIV in favour of the balance of power and the independence of nations in Europe.

Cold, resolute, cautious, and sober, William, like his grandfather William the Silent, concealed a strong will under a frail exterior. This faculty enabled him to employ diplomatic skill or armed force according to circumstances. He took the lead in a European coalition called the Grand Alliance which united in a single purpose Sweden, the House of Austria, the principalities of Germany, Savoy and Spain, with Holland and England. Despite the extreme valour of our generals and our troops, despite the untiring resourcefulness of the King himself, the splendour of the reign drew rapidly to a close.

William III beat the French in Ireland and held them in check at Steinkirk and at Neerwinden, giving ground only after having exhausted them. Louis XIV won victories of such sort that they prepared his ruin. At sea, Admiral Russell crushed the French fleet and burned the best ships that had gone aground at La Hougue.

In Holland, William retook the fortress of Namur which Louis XIV himself had taken by storm three years previously. On the eve of his death, the King of England confided the direction of the war to Marlborough, whose value he had learned to appreciate despite the smallness of his character. It was this general who dealt the conquering monarchy the fatal blow from which it never recovered, at the battle of Hochstädt (which the English call Blenheim) in 1704. After this repulse, Ramillies and Malplaquet, whatever honour is due to French valour, were only fields of useless slaughter. Denain, it is true, saved France from invasion. But Louis XIV's dream of universal supremacy was definitely ended. Popular gayety in ridiculing Marlborough in song, after the French fashion, did better than take vengeance for our misfortunes; it marked in the memory of posterity the general and the nation who had fought successfully against an aggressive phase of the development of France.

These recollections are painful; they are not without their lesson. The France of today, definitely cured of the spirit of conquest, is in a position both to honour the *Grand Siècle* and to recognize the importance of England's part in the formation of the balance of power in Europe.

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Less than a century later, the powerful vitality of our race led us onward once more to the conquest of the world. The eruption of energy stirred up by the French Revolution and the militant faith developed therein by the doctrine of Reason exalted the military spirit in France. The reply to the insult of the monarchs of Europe was Valmy and Jemmapes. Under the influence, however, of circumstances perhaps inevitable, the war of defence degenerated into a war of conquest. And so, France found herself face to face with an irreducible enemy,

ready for any sacrifice, deaf to all proposals of settlement, unshaken even in defeat; that enemy was England.

At first, England viewed without displeasure the efforts of France to free herself from absolutism incompatible with the progress of the new ideas and aspirations of the nation. England prided herself, not without reason, upon having prepared, through the work of thinkers and through precedent, the awakening of a people with whom, despite bitter conflict, she maintained close intellectual intercourse and whose brilliant qualities she prized. Unfortunately the English democrats expressed overnoisily their enthusiasm for the universal principles of the "Rights of Man" in justification of their own pretensions and their agitation for reform. This attitude of the London reformers, together with the initial acts of violence of the Paris populace, gave rise to the first doubts in the mind of the established middle-classes who were directing affairs. The statesman, Edmund Burke, raised a cry of alarm in his *Reflections* and denounced, often in violent and unjust terms, the profound disagreement separating genuine English political thought from the doctrines of the Revolution.

English liberty had been established progressively through the slow growth of ideas and institutions, and two conservative revolutions had not unduly hastened the course of things. This liberty admitted none but prudent changes reconcilable with tradition and justified by the moral progress of those who were to receive its benefits; it was made for the use of the middle-class oligarchy, haughty but conscious of its responsibilities, which, far from arrogating abusive privileges, took the people's cause in hand and found a way of anticipating legitimate reforms. There was a considerable distance between this well-poised and temperate liberty, respectful of the monarchy and the Established Church, attached to social

differences founded on the double basis of heredity and property, and the subversive doctrine of armed revolt and democratic equality and fraternity. It is true that the interpretation of English liberty given by Burke did not satisfy all his compatriots. While he insisted on the principles of stability and conservation, other minds bolder than his insisted on the principles of progress and transformation which the political history of England authorized no less evidently. Not only democrats of the radical reform school, but representatives of the Whig party, like Fox, declared themselves convinced admirers of the Revolution. The Government, under Pitt's leadership, remained impartial in presence of the two currents of opinion, recognizing the right of France to alter the constitution to her own liking, and above all anxious to preserve peace, out of respect for the liberty of neighbouring States and in the interest of the industrial and commercial activity of the country. England, in fact, thanks to the early adoption of machinery in her manufactories, to the development of her merchant marine, and to the extension of her colonial empire, had become the first commercial and producing nation of the world, and henceforth, as today, placed orderly prosperity and peace among her most serious preoccupations. Consequently, to the vehement excitation of Burke and to the violent appeals of those who wanted England forced into the monarchical coalition, Pitt replied as follows: "This country intends persevering in the neutrality observed up to the present respecting the intestine dissensions of France and will never deviate therefrom unless this latter country obliges England to arm in her own defence."

The Revolution, moreover, true to the great rôle of founder of a new order of things, endeavoured to prepare a way for fraternity among nations in much the same way as it was preparing equality among citizens. The Con-

stituent Assembly declared: "The French nation refuses to undertake any war in view of conquests." While reorganizing the army, the same Assembly was careful to create, alongside of the "regulars," the "national guard," destined to forestall any encroachment of the military over the civil power. Despite these wise measures, five years later, the necessity of protecting the country against foreign invasion awoke the warlike instinct slumbering in the hearts of the French. A still more serious change took place: the revolutionary ideas became absolute and tyrannical. What Burke had forecast, actually happened. The Revolution, instead of taking counsel of experience and gradually progressing towards tolerance and order, through a just apprehension of the relative in political affairs, held more and more closely, under the sting of war and danger, to the universal and abstract character of its doctrines. The extreme party, carried away by passion, conceived a new form of patriotism, made up of military faith and fervent proselytism. They undertook to liberate the world—a generous but chimerical design, which was bound to drag the Revolution down towards military despotism.

The Convention issued the decree of November 19, 1792, which promised "assistance and fraternity" to all peoples in revolt against absolute government; and the decree of December 15th, which proclaimed "liberty and sovereign power for all peoples on whose soil the Revolution had carried or was to carry her arms." This meant, for all governments, a threat that wherever the tri-colour was to float a blaze of revolt would be kindled. In England, a small group of democrats, already in existence before 1789, were encouraged to new hopes by the events in France. Political clubs were founded on the model of the Paris clubs, with whom they started a correspondence. Addresses of congratulations were sent to the

Convention, who returned official answers and admitted English delegates to their sittings. As soon as these facts were known, loyal and conservative England almost unanimously became hostile to the French Revolution. Pitt was compelled to take exceptional measures and to begin arming against France.

The danger of civil strife, in England (as one sees today), was more imaginary than real. The radical-democrats were a mere handful, without strength or credit. Nor did there exist between the French and the English notion of liberty the impassable gulf which Burke imagined. Time has brought together the two doctrines, which, through mutual quickening and tempering, have since furnished the world with the essential elements of political and social progress: one has bred the prudence, that fosters continuity and discipline, the other, the daring that drives out selfishness and routine. Had the two nations understood each other earlier, the course of the Revolution and of European history might have been changed. The Revolution, freed from the warlike spirit, would not, perhaps, have sown hatred abroad. . . . Idle conjectures! The Revolution drifted into the Empire and the Empire rushed headlong forwards to the conquest of Europe.

From that day, England rose against the Revolution and the Empire as she had risen against the monarchy of Philip II and of Louis XIV, and for the same reasons. Burke reminded his countrymen of their historical rôle and national duty: England was to become again, as she had been in the past, the rampart of Europe and the rampart of the independence of nations. "The great resource of Europe is England: not at all an England detached from the rest of the world and playing at the game of naval power (for naval power would be a mere game if all its resources were drained and all power, whatever its nature, had become precarious), but an England

who considers herself an incorporate part of Europe, an England who sympathizing with the happiness and the distress of nations, considers that nothing of human interest is alien to her." What Burke says here is an anticipated protest against what was to be called in the nineteenth century the policy of "splendid isolation."

One of the main causes which were to throw England into the struggle, was the question of the independence of the Low Countries. Favourably situated, owing to her insular position, England would lose the advantage of having no frontier states at all, if she allowed a great power to settle opposite her and to organize against her the naval bases of the North Sea. The Belgian coast commands the mouth of the Thames and threatens London. That is what Napoleon expressed in the famous formula: "Antwerp is a pistol aimed at the heart of England." In declaring herself guardian of the independence of the Low Countries, England was to be led to conceive the principle of the *buffer-state* and of the neutrality of small states; parallel with the defence of her interests, she was about to establish the guaranties of the balance of power in Europe, one of the essential conditions of peace. Not that she formed at that time the notion of European equity: the great conflict of ideas and forces which, continuing twenty-two years, from 1793 to 1815, succeeded in fixing its principles only very obscurely. The terrible war of today, even if it causes some progress in the notion of international justice, as we hope it shall, will no doubt be yet insufficient to establish it definitely. Nevertheless, in the measure in which it is possible to extricate from the mass of facts, after the smashing blow dealt by each dire cataclysm, some small portion of rational truth, it can be said that, from 1793 to 1815, England, by the vigour and the prudence of her national discernment, contributed to establish the material conditions whence

will emerge some day an effective doctrine of right. If the great nations ever agree to limit their ambitions in order to secure the blessings of concord and peace, the respected neutrality of small states will be the first article of the international code of the future. In repeatedly guaranteeing the independence of Belgium against plans of conquests entertained by great military powers, England has established a state of fact which announces a state of law.

When, after Jemmapes, the Convention annexed Belgium, war with England had become inevitable. England was the moving spirit of the coalitions which, falling apart and reorganizing according to fluctuations to which she was a stranger, could always return to her as to an immutable centre. The Convention and the Directory found her everywhere barring their passage. Napoleon exhausted his genius and the offensive force of one of the finest armies of the time in trying to loosen the bonds forged by her hand. The most brilliant successes of the conqueror of Europe did no more than strengthen his enemy in the determination to resist. Whereas the King of Prussia is seen to abandon the strife in 1795 and negotiate in 1805; and while the Czar Paul I suffers himself to be drawn into a plan for partitioning Europe, in 1800, and his successor into a scheme for cutting up the Turkish Empire, in 1807, England negotiates at Amiens in 1802 only to recruit her strength for a time, and then, soon after, to resume the struggle without mercy. . . . For the monarchs of Europe, the war against Napoleon was only an expedient of dynastic character or the execution of a political plan: for England, it was a national conflict in which, along with her existence, she was defending her traditions and the future of Europe.

From 1795 to 1798, the radical group of the Whig party, through their mouthpieces Fox and Sheridan, set

up a cry against the war. But the invasion of Switzerland by the armies of the Directory, the appropriation of the treasure of Berne, the violation, by decree of annexation, March 22, 1798, of that very "Helvetic liberty" which, in the eyes of idealists, was the symbol of the republican idea, reduced to nought the last resistance of the opposition. The war, become the *great war*, rallied the patriotism of the whole nation, furnished motives of inspiration to poets lately strong admirers of France the emancipator, and was maintained with unanimous courage, despite the death of Pitt, despite the advent of the Whigs to power, despite financial difficulties, the misery of the lower classes, and the suffering caused by the continental blockade. In the rare moments of hesitation on the part of the Government, or of slackness in the management of military affairs, indignant voices were raised to proclaim the necessity of persevering to the end: in 1796, Burke denounced an attempt at negotiations in his pamphlet on "Regicide Peace"; the poet Wordsworth stigmatized the weakness of Wellesley who, in 1808, by the convention of Cintra, in Portugal, allowed Junot to escape with ten thousand French troops.

It was England who struck the heaviest blows at the military fortune of Napoleon. It is enough to recall the defence of Saint-Jean-d'Acre by Sir Sidney Smith, and Nelson's victory at Aboukir, which put an end to the expedition in Egypt; Trafalgar which broke, alas! the maritime power of France; Vimeria, Vittoria, and Salamanca in the Iberian Peninsula, which shook the prestige of the imperial arms and hastened the final catastrophe. Finally the conqueror of Napoleon's marshals in Spain beat the Emperor himself at Waterloo. Just as Russell and Marlborough had made the *Grand Alliance* efficient against Louis XIV, so Nelson and Wellington were the executors of the European coalition against France. For

the third time England had saved Europe from the domination of a military power whose force had increased to the point of becoming a permanent danger to all; for the third time she had defended the right of nations to exist and to fulfil their national destiny; for the third time she had brought about the triumph of the principle of balance of power in Europe.

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This rapid review of the history of the last three centuries has not been unprofitable if it has rendered intelligible England's part in today's events. England is associated with Russia, Italy, and France to defend, against a new adversary, a hundred years after the dénouement of the Napoleonic *épopée*, the conceptions and principles of which she has constituted herself the historical guardian.

The German Imperial Chancellor, when pronouncing a speech at the opening of the second session of the Reichstag, December 3, 1914, found it prudent to abandon the attitude of violent boasting which he had assumed on August 4th and to cease clamouring in the face of the world: "Might above Right." He sought to captivate the sympathies of the neutral States in trying to prove the innocence of Germany, reduced to defending herself against the unjustifiable aggression of Europe. He threw the responsibilities of the war partly upon Russia and France but especially upon England. "The Cabinet of London could have rendered the war impossible. . . ." England, who held in her hands the possibilities of peace, wanted war, because her traditional policy is to declare herself the enemy of any power prosperous enough and strong enough to cause her suspicion.

"The Triple Entente is the work of England, destined to serve the well-known principle of the balance of power,

which signifies, in plain German, that the principle observed for centuries in the English policy of opposing the strongest continental power ought to find its most solid support in the Triple Entente. . . . The general run of thought in England has developed in the course of years into this political principle, as solid as an indisputable dogma, that the rôle of *arbiter mundi* belongs to Great Britain, that she could assume and fulfil this rôle only by means of an incontestable naval supremacy and by the balance of continental forces. England was ready, it is true, to come to terms with us on certain points; but the first and supreme principle of her policy subsisted, namely, that Germany must be held in check in the free development of her energies by the balance of power. . . ."

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg concluded: England ought to have gone to war with Germany and wanted to do so. This sophism might be called skilful, had the Chancellor been able to prove two things: 1st, that "the political principle, solid as an indisputable dogma," of the balance of power is a doctrine of aggression; 2d, that the principle "of the free development of the energies of Germany" is a pacific doctrine unmixed with disturbing factors. In the absence of this proof there remain history and facts. Now, although history does record, on England's part, a certain number of aggressions, this is certainly not the case in the circumstances in which she was led to undertake the defence of threatened nationalities and to save Europe, while saving herself, from the violent and tyrannical domination of a power momentarily misled by immoderate ambition, whether that power were Spain, France, or even, with all due deference to the Chancellor, Germany herself. The facts, moreover, show that, in these latter years, England has multiplied her attempts to come to an understanding with Germany on the subject of limitation of naval armaments and that,

at the last moment, she pressed her efforts of conciliation to the extreme limit. Finally, it results from the same evidence of facts, for any mind not biased by Germany's inordinate self-esteem, that the "free development of the energies" of this people signified the humiliation of Russia, the absorption of Belgium and Holland, the dismemberment of France with the annexation of her colonies, and commercial war with England by all and every means, until the continued increase of Germany's naval construction should enable her to crush the English fleet and to complete her free growth by the germanizing of the British Colonial Empire.

It was against this danger—without mentioning higher reasons of honour and right—that England rose, not through treachery and not without provocation, but to reply to the odious invasion of Belgium, premeditated in time of peace and undertaken in defiance of treaties.

Far-reaching historical causes acquit England of the accusation brought against her by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, through a false interpretation of the essential principle of English foreign policy. We shall understand, by the analysis of more recent historical causes, how England, after having been long mistaken as to the intentions of Germany, but finally compelled by facts and in her own defence, was obliged, along with other nations threatened, to prepare herself to defend the balance of power in Europe as the fundamental condition of Peace.

CHAPTER III

England and the Movement of Nationalities

WITH the Revolution and the Wars of the Empire, the Europe of former times came to a close. With the edge of the sword and some few strokes of the pen, Napoleon demolished the territorial unities constituting the old Kingdoms. He, who proclaimed himself the representative of the French people, assembled the nations into homogeneous groups, according to language, race, and customs, in an Occident newly constructed. Just as England had had a "maker of kings," so Europe had had in Napoleon a "maker of nations." Poland enjoyed a decade of existence once more. The Germanic Confederation made the German people conscious of its unity. The constitution of the Kingdom of Italy allured the *Risorgimento*. Even the Servian nation was, for a time, a sovereign power in the province of Illyria. An immense ferment of national aspirations, the first consequence of which was the fall of Napoleonic domination, stirred Europe to the depths. The great civilizing idea, borne onward in the wake of the Imperial Eagles and imposed by force, caused a rebound of force. The Congress of Vienna threw Europe, clarified by French thought, back into its former chaos. But the peoples of Europe hunted and penned up like cattle at the show, kept their hearts warm with the longing for life which had for a time inspired them. The history of the nineteenth cen-

tury is made up largely of the efforts of nationalities to liberate and reconstitute themselves. The principle of nationalities, principle of good and evil like all collective forces, becomes the great lever of European history. With the minor peoples, this principle is often a force of progress and justice. With the great nations, it does not always justify the end by the means. . . . Late in the century the national unity of Germany, realized by fraud and violence under the whip of Prussia, threatens to become the source of the direst calamities that Europe has ever endured.

Lapse of time and the light of facts permit us today to weigh and understand this principle of nationalities. It appears to us of great importace through its origin, in which both France and England have had their share. From 1793 to 1815, England set before the world an example of ardent, indomitable patriotism, fostered not only by instinctive love for the land of her ancestors,—united, rich, and glorious, but also by conscious love for her institutions of liberty. Revolutionary France brought to the world that powerful enthusiasm which strikes the mind and excites imitation. Through her influence, the word "patriot" meant one who both defends national independence and who combats for the sovereignty of the people. The magnificent *Fête de la Fédération* in which the *Députés* of all the provinces, including Alsace and Lorraine, assembled together freely and solemnly to swear allegiance to "la France nouvelle," set up the symbol of the unity of a nation moved both by what is most spontaneous and most consciously willed within the sentiment of solidarity.

The noblest idealism, however, may err. The Empire coming after the Revolution is an illustration. France, at least, atoned for her error in the course of the nineteenth century by favouring the general movement of

national emancipation, which she sincerely believed to be tending in the direction of the happiness of nations and the peace of the world. She found herself acting with England, so that, on several occasions, it was possible to believe the two great liberal nations destined to co-operate in the regeneration of Europe. Their union, however, was only intermittent, and their action, whether simultaneous or separate, was not always judicious. The reasons are that the nineteenth century, despite its generous impulses, was crossed by too many antagonistic currents, influenced by too many contrary forces, and dominated by too many heritages of the past to permit of its being a period of solid and lasting reconstruction. The main lines of direction which it is possible to disengage today from the confused history of the century, appeared to the eyes of contemporaries as broken lines, interrupted by obstacles and thrown out of their course by forces of which they did not grasp the full significance. They understood neither the full value of the principle of nationalities, nor the many dangerous consequences which might result therefrom in some cases. Indeed, the problems which, it seems to us now, should be solved by the complete application of the principle, were not then mature. Prejudices, passions, and the heavy political and diplomatic heritage of preceding centuries hindered the solutions which will be imposed tomorrow by the force of things and by the natural action of the progress of ideas.

Before understanding clearly her own thought, before judging correctly her true interests and disengaging with certainty the given axioms of the European situation, England, uncertain in her attitude, has often hesitated between contrary motives. Sometimes the principle of the balance of power interrupts the play of her sympathies for the nationalities struggling for their inde-

pendence. Sometimes her time-honoured mistrust, in a manner "atavic" so to speak, thwarts her disinterested impulses. At times the feeling of her force, and the desire of asserting it, incites her to words or movements of defiance under cover of liberalism. Sometimes, on the contrary, her liberal inclinations prompt her to assume a sort of pacific obstinacy. Sometimes, again, a popular statesman, owing to the authority of his talent, of his success, and the "representative" character of his thoughts and sentiments, takes the people along at the mercy of his policy. And at times public opinion imposes its will for action or inaction on the Government.

While it is true that the foreign policy of England in the nineteenth century is marked with fluctuations occasionally disconcerting, let us reflect upon the state of confusion characterizing the interests and forces in action at that time and, also, upon the novelty of the problems demanding solution. Not less than a century, and nothing short of fear, suffering, and bloodshed, were necessary to bring order out of this chaos. . . . I shall attempt to show that, in the midst of these uncertainties, English egoism (one of the forces of a vigorous nation) has never been aggressive, unjust, and base, as in the case of the two Germanic Empires, destined as they were to furnish the spectacle of the self-seeking instinct in its worst form. Moreover, egoism in England was only one of the motives for action, counterbalanced and often dominated as it was by a chivalrous and generous or, at least, always prudent and opportune liberalism which was only waiting for the maturity of years, the test of facts, and the stimulus of certain currents of thought in order to develop into an idealism resembling our own. The history of England, in the nineteenth century, marks the stages of a conversion. Have we not, we who are French, passed through similar vicissitudes? Are we not also converts? What a

distance separates us from the era of revolutions and wars which closed the *Année Terrible!* England united to France in 1914 by a community of ideas, emotions, and hopes is about as different from "Victorian England" as the France of the Third Republic from the France of the Second Empire. New factors of the highest importance have intervened in the life of the two nations, and have resulted in drawing them closer together. The two liberal nations have met on the highway of their evolution, while a reverse evolution has led Germany farther and farther from the liberty, individualism, and "humanism" of Europe. Even in the hours of misunderstanding and abandonment (which were cruel for us) there was no intellectual or moral gulf between England and France. In the midst of our divergences certain sympathies existed and grew apace, and these, at the sudden revelation of common danger, have enlightened our minds and united our hearts.

That, from 1815 to 1870, the two countries often cooperated in view of aims that were equally cherished; that, even when England stood aloof and gave evidence of indifference, mistrust, and hostility, facts and appearances seemed to justify her, and, that even then dissident voices were raised in defence of the contrary attitude; and consequently that, with us or without us, England's temper evolved so as to become capable of sharing, in all sincerity, the indignation and firm resolve which are common to both countries today . . . such are the results which will be made clear, I hope, from the following study.

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The Revolution, which, through its excess and imprudence, had at first determined in England a movement of reaction culminating at times in the violence of a White Terror, stimulated, after 1815, the revival and progress of

liberal ideas. Not only did the impetus given by the Revolution bring about the Electoral Reform of 1832, but it was also the Revolution which awakened, among the liberals once more in power, a feeling of sympathy for the nationalities struggling for their independence. The Liberals of 1832 were Whigs, that is to say, leaders of the important land-owning families and representatives of the great manufacturing class, and hence men attached to the traditions of the country, to the national spirit, and to the prerogatives of the directing oligarchy. Their manner of understanding the awakening of nationalities (which the people at large shared with them) was not at all a parallel to the French. Their initiatives, which sometimes remained in suspense in presence of obstacles, no doubt insurmountable under the then existing conditions, were not wont to lose sight of English interests. They frequently failed to foresee ultimate consequences, which, for that matter, also escaped the perspicacity of the French. Later developments in the history of nations alone could reveal such consequences. English idealism, however, did not err through lack of generosity, and, although differing in essence from French idealism, possessed a good deal in common with it.

The cause of Hellenic independence was the first for which England and France united. The sentiments inspired by the return to antiquity—what is called neo-Hellenism—strengthened the sentiments inspired by the French Revolution, thus arousing a powerful current of sympathy for the Greeks. The great Minister Canning, restorer of English liberalism, shook the power of the Holy Alliance and prepared the movement of liberation. In impassioned stanzas the poets Byron and Shelley expressed their admiration for the sacred land of Greece, the mother of liberty, and their ardent hope of seeing her ultimately delivered from an odious bondage. Byron

atoned for the faults of his life in going to meet a glorious death under the walls of Missolonghi. Finally, at Navarino, in 1827, the English and French fleets, operating in concert, struck the final blow against Turkish domination.

The Revolution of 1830 had its rebound in Belgium, whose people, forcibly placed by the treaties of Vienna under the Dutch domination, rose in revolt and conquered their independence with the armed aid of England and France. Generously France relinquished the long-fostered hope of reaching her natural boundaries and, in accord with England, made the Powers recognize the autonomy of Belgium, henceforth protected against the vicissitudes from which she had so long suffered by a convention of neutrality thought to be effective. In 1870, Napoleon III readily respected the treaty to which France had put her signature. In 1914, the Imperial Chancellor of Germany contemptuously discarded as a "scrap of paper" the juridical act which Prussia had recognized, trampled Belgian autonomy under foot, and treated the Belgian nation with the unqualified cruelty which calls for retribution today. England and France, after having founded Belgium, will deliver her tomorrow from the hands of her invaders and executioners and will obtain full and complete reparation for her. Through these Powers the principle of nationalities, asserted in 1831, will be definitely and solemnly re-established.

The movement of ideas in France and the political agitation which preceded the Revolution of 1848 had their recoil in Italy. That country, which was reduced to being, according to Metternich's cruel formula, "only a geographical expression," aspired to political unity in keeping with the glorious memories of the Roman Republic, with the common worship of Dante, the splendour of the Italian Renaissance, still a living recollection, and the moral, literary, and artistic kinship of a people of the

same language, hopes, and desires. . . . England had long been an admirer of Italy. She had voluntarily sought Italian culture in the sixteenth century. Shakespeare had borrowed from her several of his most stirring and glowing themes. Spenser had imitated Ariosto and Tasso. Milton had studied the language. More recently, the romantic poets had journeyed to this land of sunshine, luxuriant vegetation, and magnificent memories as to some promised land. The Liberal Government, whose department of Foreign Affairs was directed by Palmerston, could not fail to be interested in the double movement of political emancipation and national independence eloquently expressed by the spokesmen of the *Risorgimento*. Pope Pius IX, who inaugurated the constitutional movement in his own States, made known to the English Government his desire "of having the aid of a person of quality and experience capable of assisting him with his advice and of procuring him at the same time the moral support of England." A Whig of good family was sent to Rome with the supplementary mission of visiting Turin and Florence en route "for the purpose of strengthening the authority of the Constitutional Government in Italy."

The insurrection, which soon broke out, did not succeed. It was not till ten years later that the Kingdom of Sardinia, after having gained the active friendship of France and England on the battlefields of the Crimea, was able to resume the struggle. The victories of Magenta and of Solferino, won by the French armies who had hastened to the aid of the Sardinians, stripped Austria of the province of Lombardy. In England, the general elections were taking place at this moment: questions of home policy were much less at stake than the shaping of the foreign policy, to wit:—whether the Liberals who were in favour of the Italian Revolution would carry the day

against the Conservatives in favour of Austria. Victory remained in the hands of the Liberals. Palmerston reassumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs; sympathy for Italy manifested itself with enthusiasm. But this sympathy was platonic, for England, whose scant military resources had just been exhausted by the Crimean War, was incapable of engaging in another campaign. Soon, however, events shaped themselves in such a way that England had the opportunity of serving young Italy and winning her lasting gratitude, at the very time when France, despite sacrifices and bloodshed, was on the point of losing it.

It is well known that Napoleon III did not follow up the advantage which the victory of Solferino gave him. The sensitiveness of the man responsible for the *2 Décembre* had been deeply stirred, it is said, at the spectacle of the battlefield. Furthermore, a stronger reason was that Prussia threatened to intervene and was mobilizing on the banks of the Rhine. Victor-Emmanuel had to be satisfied with Milan, Venitia remaining in the hands of the Austrians. The deception of the Italians was very marked: their gratitude was to be all the greater for those who would permit them to complete the work of national unity. In bringing about the desired result, England played an important part, and, on this occasion, reaped the benefit of lasting Italian friendship, as strong today as then. In the negotiations which followed the Peace of Villafranca, European diplomacy was principally concerned with the following question: should the Central States of Italy, including a part of the Papal territory, be allowed to unite with Piedmont. Austria was opposed to the proposition; Napoleon III, with the idea of treating the Catholic party in France with circumspection, was ill-disposed toward it. In England, the Queen and the Prince Consort were in sympathy with

the dispossessed monarchy. It was under these circumstances that Lord Russell, Prime Minister, and Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary, received the powerful support of Gladstone for their pro-Italian policy. Up to that time, Gladstone had been sitting on the Conservative benches where his talent and fire and the generosity of his spirit had brought him into public notice. It is highly probable that his enthusiasm for the liberty of nations determined his conversion to liberalism. In fact his conversion had already begun. . . . A year before, having been sent as special commissioner to the Ionian Islands, an English Protectorate since 1815, now demanding liberation and union to Greece, Gladstone had returned a convert to the cause of Ionian emancipation and had won the Parliament over to his opinion despite violent opposition. In 1859, in order to defend Italian unity, he transferred his political allegiance and accepted a portfolio in the Russell Cabinet, inaugurating by this act a long career of liberal idealism. The Cabinet, thus reinforced, insisted, through its diplomatic channels, upon the right of the Italian people to settle its destinies for itself, and finally won the day. Then, when France asked England to oppose, through the action of their united fleets, the passage of Garibaldi and the Thousand from Sicily to the Kingdom of Naples, England refused. The expedition took place, succeeded, and allowed Victor-Emmanuel to assemble into a single group all of the principalities of Italy, except Venitia and Rome. How, in 1866, Prussia allowed Italy to complete her task of national unification, and thus gain her goodwill and alliance later on, I shall merely recall as a passing note.

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Two other attempts at national enfranchisement which, encountering insuperable obstacles, were doomed to failure, were watched with a kindly eye by Palmerston's

government and with ardent sympathy by the English people: these were the attempts of Hungary and Poland. In the two cases, differences of opinion in Parliament and the gravity of the risks to be encountered confined English goodwill to acts of simple manifestation. The pressure of reality brought English idealism under its stern law, as it had done under similar circumstances in the case of French idealism despite its strong inclination to acknowledge the independence of Poland.

In 1849 the Hungarians had succeeded in loosening the Austrian yoke. The composite monarchy of the Hapsburgs was threatened with disintegration. When Russia intervened for the purpose of re-establishing the Emperor-King's absolute power and of crushing a revolutionary movement likely to set so bad an example, England was filled with indignation. The patriot Kossuth arrived in London where he was acclaimed as a hero. Kossuth had a magnificent bearing and brilliant oratorical powers. He had studied English in the works of Shakespeare, and it was in Shakespeare's language, so powerful in its expressive concentration and so stirring for English ears, that he addressed his audiences. The Austrian Ambassador at London remonstrated with the Government. . . . Palmerston, as a man, had a decided leaning towards the national assertive spirit and was very sensitive as well to the manifestations of popular sentiment. As a Cabinet Minister, he had to concern himself with the consequences of over-significant demonstrations in which the Government might have appeared to participate. Kossuth had solicited an official audience. The Prime Minister, Lord Russell, intervened when Palmerston, in a moment of generous, but inconsiderate sympathy, was on the point of yielding. The audience was refused.

Little by little the popular enthusiasm subsided.

Kossuth fell into obscurity again. England, however, did everything that was consistent with the prudence necessary for maintaining peace. Several thousands of Hungarian patriots had succeeded in fleeing and in finding refuge in Turkey. They were threatened with terrible reprisals. Austria and Russia, conjointly, exacted from Turkey the surrender of the rebels. The energetic intervention of England saved them.

England, ill-prepared for a military campaign owing to the insufficiency of her land forces, had hesitated about attacking a continental Power well-nigh inaccessible from the sea. When, four years later, in her dispute with Russia, she did pursue her warlike purpose to the extreme limit, it was because her traditional hostility towards despotism was, on that occasion, in harmony with the need of defending her vital interests. Those two conditions must be fulfilled before a nation, whose destinies are wisely directed, may be allowed to engage in the perilous adventure of a decision by arms. Just the same, as J. S. Mill wrote after the Crimean War, had England resolutely opposed Russian intervention against Hungary, she would have fought under more favourable conditions against the conquering autocracy of the Czar and would have furthered the progress of liberal ideas more effectually. Let us add that Hungary, as a free and liberal country, would not, perhaps, have been, as she is today, swept away by the imperialistic folly of Germanism, nor would she have furnished the sorry spectacle of a nation, but recently freed, bent upon enslaving another.

The Poles, in 1862–63, gave proof of admirable courage in their struggle against Russia to get her to respect the Constitution which had been granted them by the Treaty of Vienna. The wooded parts of Poland became just so many centres of guerrilla warfare which a considerable

armed force and cruel measures of oppression failed to suppress. Prussia favoured the action of Russia by allowing the right of pursuit on her territory. Was Europe going to allow the crushing of valorous Poland, who was so nobly defending the rights of her people to live free and independent? The Polish patriots continued the struggle without weakness, despite the sufferings endured and the terrible gaps made in their ranks, in the hope of foreign intervention. Napoleon III proposed common action with England. In Parliament, speeches full of ardent sympathy were pronounced by orators of all parties. Liberals and Conservatives were united in a common spirit of admiration for the insurgents and of indignation for the oppressors; differences of opinion disappeared beneath the unanimous enthusiasm for the noblest of causes, the cause of nationalities and liberty.

It seemed that England had a definite reason for intervening since she had signed the Treaty of Vienna with the clause conferring the benefit of a constitution on Poland. Lord Russell went as far as to write a note, in conjunction with France, which drew the attention of the Russian Government to six points deemed necessary to bring about the pacification of the country: amnesty, national representation, Polish administrators, liberty of conscience, admission of Polish as the official language, and regulation of military service. The sending of this note seemed to be the forerunner of an ultimatum: France and England were waiting anxiously, when it was suddenly made known that the Anglo-French understanding was at an end. The Poles were left to their unhappy fate. . . . What had happened?

We know today that it was Lord Palmerston who was responsible for the failure of the intervention project. Despite the recent co-operation of the French and English armies in the Crimean War, Lord Palmerston had con-

ceived a certain mistrust for Napoleon III, and, whether his reasons were true or false, feared to engage England in a common action with France which might have tied his hands for the future. This failure to intervene in favour of Poland is closely related to the question of England's attitude towards the Second Empire . . . a question which I am now ready to discuss.

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A complex and confused epoch, an epoch of great national movements and of serious political upheavals, an epoch still in close touch with the long struggle of twenty-two years which had transformed Europe into an immense battlefield, the nineteenth century is singularly influenced by forces working in opposite directions: desires for peace which announce the future and warlike aspirations which recall the past. In England, contrary forces determine sudden and strange fluctuations of opinion. In France, revolutions break forth, then order is re-established in the wake of lassitude and submission. During whole periods, the peaceful enterprises of industry, of commerce and the arts, hold the attention, then, of a sudden, crises arise wherein the latent energies of the *grande épopée* are awakened. These fluctuations taking place within both countries, complicate and sometimes embroil their relations. Let us not be surprised that exterior variations correspond to these interior changes. It is also true, on the other hand, that, despite faults and prejudices on either side, something always remained as a possible basis of understanding: the underlying currents of thought, the common but perhaps ignored body of ideals, and the forces of vigorous and healthy reason necessary for the eventual reconstruction of the union.

England greeted sympathetically the accession of the Monarchy of July, which seemed destined to put an end to revolutionary agitation in giving France a government

in which the progressive and conservative forces counterbalanced each other advantageously as in the English Constitution. The English oligarchy directing affairs considered the French *bourgeoisie* selected by the *cens* (electoral qualifications) as both a liberal and well-poised class, similar to itself, with which an understanding might be arrived at. It was under Louis-Philippe that the *Entente Cordiale* was inaugurated—the *Entente Cordiale* which was destined, after so many dissensions, to reappear in 1904 for the salvation of Europe. A long period of good feeling and goodwill seemed to have begun, when, in 1840, a storm-cloud crossed the atmosphere of peace. The Khedive of Egypt, Mehemet-Ali, thanks to his military and administrative qualities, had succeeded in becoming practically independent of the decadent suzerainty of Constantinople. His armies had entered Syria; his fleet held the sea; he was on the road to complete independence and a career of conquest. England and Russia became anxious. These two great Powers, united for a while against Napoleon, had become rivals again after the fall of the Empire, owing to the Asiatic and Oriental questions. Their jealousy could not allow Egypt, the key of Asia, to establish herself as an independent power and perhaps in the near future as a conquering power. Both had interests in maintaining, at least temporarily, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This jealous interest led them to co-operate against a common danger; Austria and Prussia joined them and Mehemet-Ali was threatened both by land and sea.

France considered herself, traditionally, as the defender of Egypt; the coalition not only hurt her interests, but had been constituted without her being warned. She felt deeply offended about the matter; it was the occasion all over the country for the awakening of the warlike spirit. Louis-Philippe and Guizot, leaders with pacific

tendencies, avoided war; but a keen dissatisfaction lurked in the advanced party. Through some strange error, this advanced party placed the republican ideal and the warlike ideal on the same high level of veneration. Royalty of the bourgeois type appeared commonplace and colourless in the light of Napoleonic glory. Viewed from this distance, the Empire was to be remembered for what it embodied of the democratic order of things and for the lustre it had shed on France, in the hour of its splendid successes. The Government itself had imprudently furthered the awakening by bringing home from Saint Helena the ashes of the Emperor. Once set on foot, the movement continued irresistibly. For a while it was possible to consider France as having become a danger for Europe once more.

The first and most serious counterstroke of this agitation was a menacing explosion of patriotic fury in Germany. Hatred of France, which Fichte had imparted to the youth of the universities on the morrow of the battle of Jena, took possession of the entire nation once again. Schneckenbürger composed *Die Wacht am Rhein* which flew from mouth to mouth as the rally song of German patriotism. It is to this epoch that one may ascribe the moral union of Germany, hitherto divided, as well as the aggressive spirit which permeated henceforth her aspirations for unity, and the worship of militarism which was soon to drive the whole country into the arms of Prussia.

Another, though less violent, counterstroke made itself felt in England. But in this country of free opinion and liberal institutions, where peace ideals and humanitarian doctrines were already at work, and where militarism was hated, the warlike spirit never reached a dangerous pitch. It was the Whigs, and, among them especially the restless, buoyant personality of Palmerston

that represented bellicose tendencies. The Whigs had made the Great War their war, and liked to pose as the liberators of nations. They were proud to claim for England, in the eyes of the other peoples freed from the Napoleonic yoke, the glory of having founded English liberty and of having rejuvenated and perfected it by the Reform Bill in 1832. In the muscular, eupeptic, strong-willed Englishman, there is a vein of authoritativeness and pugnacity, which expresses itself at certain periods of prosperity and national prestige in the form of imperious collective pride. This outflow of national pride was not yet tempered, as it is today, by the advance of rational idealism and the parallel decline (which has been very noticeable in the last fifteen years) of British insularity. The Whigs represented the haughty, rather domineering traditions of England lording it over Europe. Palmerston used to assert, in the ringing tones of the country squire, that he was well-fed, ruddy-faced, tanned with hunting and that "man is a fighting and quarrelling animal." It is he and his party who resorted to brow-beating and surly-speaking towards France—France, who was neither quite innocent nor so guilty as they accused her of being.

On the contrary the Tories, through a spirit of opposition, represented for a certain time the appeasing and restraining forces—until, later on, the Liberals having become pacific, the Tories assumed once more an imperious and imperialistic tone. In 1840, the progressive fraction of the Conservative party having risen to power, Sir Robert Peel, its leader, pronounced certain words of peace. "The time has perhaps come," said he, "when the European Powers ought to reduce their military forces. The veritable interest of Europe is to consummate some common understanding in such a way as to permit each country to diminish its armaments, which belong to a

state of war rather than to a state of peace." In 1851 the Grand International Exhibition of London took place. Thanks to the efforts of Prince Albert, a mild and thoughtful man, the Exhibition authorities convoked a Peace Congress in the Capital. The plan did not meet the approbation of Palmerston: he declared that it "did violence to the insular spirit of the nation and savoured of humanitarianism." This Peace Congress was destined, in effect, to usher in, despite the intention of its authors, a long period of war, in which France henceforth under the direction of Napoleon III was going to play one of the leading parts and in which England was going to be implicated on one occasion.

The conflict in which England took part was the Crimean War, in which she fought side by side with France. It was a long sanguinary war wherein the lack of organization often put the combatants to a terrible test. England, at the instigation of Palmerston, was the real author responsible for this conflict in which she decided to engage, partly through liberal idealism and partly to defend the balance of power in Europe. Russia, especially since her intervention against the Hungarian insurrection, represented, in the eyes of the English Liberals the fortress of despotism. Furthermore, the apparent design of Nicolas to assume the protection of the Christians of the Orient in order to weaken Turkey and to usurp her place in Europe, could not leave England indifferent in the matter. Did Russia really threaten to play the part of a conquering invader in Europe? Or was England too prompt to take alarm through fear of having too powerful a rival in the Orient and in Asia? It is a difficult matter to decide. At any rate, Napoleon allowed himself to be drawn into the war easily enough, feeling as he did that his position on the throne could be consolidated only if he succeeded in dazzling the French by his military

successes and by the illusion of former glories. The victory of the Allies did not benefit the principle of nationalities in the Balkans as much as it should have done; moreover, the rancour of Russia was soon going to serve the designs of Prussia who was already preparing in silence.

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The alliance for common action in the Crimea was only a short episode in the Franco-English relations under the Second Empire. Taken all in all, the restoration of imperialism in France marked the beginning of a period in which England distrusted our purposes. The recollection of the Napoleonic danger was still too fresh in the minds of those on the other side of the Channel, to allow the renewed cult of the Emperor, personified in his descendant, to arise without alarm. The history of England during the next eighteen years (1854–1872) is to be characterized by a series of panics, followed by short periods of appeasement.

As early as 1852, Palmerston entered upon a campaign in favour of an increase in armaments. He pronounced the famous saying: "The application of steam to navigation has thrown a bridge across the Channel." According to him, England was no longer safe from invasion: she ought to forearm. The result was that the Cabinet had a law passed for the strengthening of the militia and the increase of the fleet. . . . In 1859, the Peace of Villafranca, which guaranteed us the possession of Savoy and Nice, irritated England. It was not so much the fact of this slight aggrandizement which disturbed that country as the project of a policy of conquest, whose revival seemed noticeable in France and which, it was imagined, would surely not be limited to these modest acquisitions. Right or wrong, Napoleon III was supposed to harbour the Ma-

chiavellian scheme of having Sardinia ceded to him in exchange for his consent to the completion of Italian unity. Even the discontent of the Italian patriots, frustrated at the moment in which they believed their hope realized, reacted painfully on the English sentiment. And so the Liberals and Conservatives were seen to unite for the purpose of demanding guarantees against the "overchannel" neighbour, suspected of occult designs. It was in vain that the voice of the radical and free-trader Cobden, desirous of concluding a commercial treaty with France, sought to calm the agitation: throughout the whole country the volunteer movement was well launched as well as the formation of rifle corps destined to become one of the aspects of the defensive organization of England.

The commercial treaty, signed in 1860, did not end the alarmist agitation. In that year the naval budget was increased twenty-five millions. Yet like the preceding panics, this one only resulted in strengthening the defences of England. France never had to fear an actual attack launched from over the Channel. Nevertheless, this distrust of French imperialism had considerable influence in determining England's attitude in the grave events which were to characterize the end of the reign of Napoleon III.

It was this hostile reserve, maintained especially by Palmerston, which prevented the concerted intervention of France and England in favour of Poland in 1863. . . . A year later the affair of the Danish dukedoms exploded. England out of instinctive sympathy for the small states molested by the big one was in favour of Denmark. Napoleon III, partly irritated at the recent refusal of England at the time of the Polish crises and partly carried away by a spirit of naïve sentimentality to favour German unity even against his own interests, supported the plans of Prussia and Austria to unite Schleswig-Holstein to the

Germanic Confederation by force. Duped on a former occasion by Bismarck, Napoleon III was to be duped again more seriously on the morrow of Sadowa. The Iron Chancellor had succeeded in isolating France; there was nothing else to be done but to take her in the snare and then to crush her.

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The imposture of the Ems dispatch is well known. What is less so, is the no less odious treachery by which Bismarck secured the neutrality of England in the impending aggression. Relying on the sympathy which Queen Victoria, born of a German mother, brought up in the German fashion and married to a prince of Saxe-Coburg, professed for Germany, Bismarck succeeded in persuading the English Ministry of the perfect innocence of his intentions, while at the same time, skilfully exciting English fears in regard to Napoleon III's supposed designs of aggrandizement. In one particular he touched a very sensitive cord in representing the Emperor as ambitious of acquiring Belgium. To support his accusation, a proof was necessary: it did not take him very long to obtain it. In the course of the negotiations which he pretended to pursue with our Ambassador at Berlin, Benedetti, the conversation happened to turn one day upon the advantages which France might gain from an alliance with Prussia. It has since been learned how far such a scheme was removed from his thoughts, and what a clumsy enticement he held out to our representative. It is the business of diplomats, however, to discuss matters. Benedetti talked—an excellent idea in itself: but he was also foolish enough to write. Bismarck, in an engaging tone which he knew how to assume to cajole his victims, requested Benedetti, at a convenient turn in the conversation, to take up a pen and write down under his dictation, certain purely hypothetical propositions,

presented as perhaps possible but scarcely probable assumptions, of a problem whose solution was not discernible. Among others these propositions postulated the occupation of Belgium by France. Scarcely had this rough draft been drawn up, when Bismarck declared, with a good-natured laugh, that it was a mere whim of his, a diplomatic game, of which it would be wiser not to speak any more. Then he threw the thing into the paper basket. . . . It was carefully picked out later . . . and this was the document, in Benedetti's writing, which was presented to Gladstone to get him to deliver France into the claws of Prussia.

Gladstone, the new leader of English liberalism since the death of Palmerston, was as well-poised, thoughtful, and pacific as his predecessor had been combative, mischief-making, and bustling. His policy was made up of economy, of democratic reforms, of justice with regard to Ireland, and of measures in favour of industrial and commercial prosperity. It is conceivable that the distrust which he noticed in England with regard to France and which Napoleon had not been able to dissipate, together with his desire for non-intervention and the supposed proof produced by Bismarck, should have deterred him from coming to our assistance. He hastened to shut himself up in the attitude which he had defined himself as the most profitable for England, that which he expressed by the formula of "splendid isolation."

The English Government was quite unable, in 1870, to perceive the German peril. We must not be surprised at it. France herself had become aware of it only when it was too late to escape. Prophetic voices, notwithstanding, had been raised long before Bismarck and King William had formed the project of throwing the hatred of France as a bait to Germany engaged in the labour of unity. As early as 1831, Edgar Quinet, who knew Ger-

many well, had revealed, in an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* the surprising change which had come over the country. Germany was no longer the land of fancy, of metaphysics and patriarchal customs; she was seized with a violent thirst for action; the ancient splendours of the contemplative life had paled in the harsh light of the rising hope of unity!

It is especially in Prussia [added he] that the old-time impartiality and political cosmopolitanism have given place to an irritable and choleric nationalism. It is in Prussia that the popular party first made peace with the authority in power. Effectively, this government is giving Germany today what she is most eager to have, namely, action, actual, tangible life, and social initiative. The government is satisfying, beyond all measure, her sudden infatuation for power and material force. . . . Hence at this hour the North is occupied in making Prussia its instrument. Yes, if Prussia were allowed to have her way, the North would drive her slowly from behind to the murder of the ancient Kingdom of France.

Thus, forty years before the catastrophe of 1870, E. Quinet foresaw the coming threat and how it was to be realized. He alone, among the idealists, was a keen enough observer and clear-sighted enough to understand that the principle of nationalities, if out of harmony with the liberal and humanitarian spirit of the English Constitution and the French Revolution and if, on the other hand, exploited by the despotism of a militaristic State, would become a danger for Europe and the very idea of liberty. After the Danish affair and after Sadowa, he reiterated his warnings; and he was no longer alone in sounding the alarm. Louis Blanc (*Six Ans d'Histoire Anglaise*) foresaw the peril, not alone for France but for England also. . . .

In comparison with the gigantic struggles [he writes] which armed Germany would be in a condition to provoke and sustain, the wars of the French Revolution and of the Empire would appear no more than child's play. . . . Germany organized militarily and provided with a fleet would be nearer universal domination than France ever was.

Nevertheless, Napoleon III, sentimental and short-sighted, ambitious and pusillanimous, allowed himself to be duped by Bismarck, neglecting to prepare himself for the more and more inevitable shock and playing his hand heavily by alternate strokes of diplomacy and intimidation. The conflict exploded. Prussia seemed to play the *beau rôle*. England saw only the superficial aspect of things and allowed us to be crushed, being too absorbed in her own affairs to try to fathom the reality under the surface of things. Gladstone published anonymously in the *Edinburgh Review* an article on Happy England, belted with the silver sash of the seas. In his eyes, as in those of the majority of his countrymen, we bore the blemish of imperialism which signified denial of liberty and also ambition or at least a tendency towards conquering ambition. Carlyle, with the austere fanaticism of a Puritan, in his famous letter to the *Times* (November 11, 1870) expressed the opinion of those who considered Paris as the Modern Babylon, the home of vice and the haunt of anarchy. "They believe themselves to be the *Christ* of nations. Let them ask themselves whether there might not be a *Cartouche* among the nations. . . . Anarchical France is receiving her first and severe lesson. . . ." Bismarck, the saintly hypocrite, had cunningly monopolized the principle of nationalities for the benefit of Germany. German science, taking advantage of its prestige, imposed on English scholars with the theory of races, in whose name it claimed Alsace-Lorraine, as if a common body of sentiment, attachment

to the same laws and customs, sympathy in ideas and aspirations did not constitute stronger bonds than language and even blood-ties.

England, however, was not entirely indifferent. The philosopher, John Stuart Mill, pointed out to his country the means of rendering the war impossible, namely, by declaring her determination to intervene against the first of the two adversaries who should begin hostilities. Under the weight of this threat, it is probable, that neither one nor the other would have dared to attack. The sociologist and idealist Frederic Harrison published in December, 1870, a series of letters in the *Pall Mall Gazette* which showed an extraordinary perspicacity in the interpretation of the facts actually realized today, and in the anticipation of their distant effects. The threatened annexation of our provinces caused him to transfer his sympathies, first attached to Germany, to the side of France. He understood that this spoliation was an outrage against the rights of people whose just cause could be redeemed only at the price of sanguinary conflict. "Once again we see the folly of the Treaty of Vienna, of the pact which sold nations under the auctioneer's hammer, like a herd of cattle! . . ." And in what spirit was this crime perpetrated!

The Prussians encourage the hatred of the populations annexed. It is sauce to the joy of their triumph. . . . The historical and ethnological researches of their professors are only a sinister joke intended for those whose chains they rivet. They seem to say to them with heavy irony: Patience, brothers, it's all for your good, we'll give you back a mother-country. . . . This cold cruelty [continues Mr. Harrison] confirms and explains the sanguinary atrocities which had dishonoured the victories of Germany; it reveals a deep-rooted and shocking mental characteristic of this people. The most insatiable and implacable ambition must be expected of them

in the future. A régime of force at home, that is to say, despotism; a régime of force abroad, that is to say, conquering imperialism; no less must be anticipated.[1] Not content to put a formidable army on foot, Germany will want to construct a powerful fleet and will aim at the domination of the world. What will become in that case of England? Here we are, alone in Europe. Despite our jealousies and quarrels, France and ourselves have long worked together for the good of the world. Once France is reduced to impotency, England will become a little island burdened with the heavy responsibilities of immense over-sea possessions. With Prussia, with Bismarck, with the military autocracy and a semi-feudal aristocracy, we can have nothing in common. . . . We have remained still while our ancient and natural ally was enduring her Austerlitz. Let us hope that the future does not reserve a Jena for us.[2]

These sentiments with regard to France are those which all England experiences today. Thirty years of patient effort on our part have been necessary, thirty years consecrated to the definite establishment of self-government, to the sustained development of our industrial and commercial activity, of our colonial domain, and of our military power, to regain the esteem and confidence of England. Necessary, too, was the German peril rising suddenly to enlighten the English as to their veritable interests and real sympathies. A preparation of several centuries has suddenly produced its fruits.

In view of our purpose here, what is important to retain

[1] Mr. Frederic Harrison, at the age of eighty-four, is a witness today of the events which he had partly foreseen in the sombre days of the humiliation and spoliation of France. In a spirit just as penetrating and with a pen just as alert as ever, he wrote, in 1913, a "Warning" which announced what was bound to come (*English Review*, January, 1913). He adjured England to be mindful of preparedness, not for the conquest, but for the peace of the world.

[2] See in Chap. X. the eloquent *Ode* written in 1870 by the poet and novelist, George Meredith, in honour of France.

of this general review of Anglo-French relations in the nineteenth century is the fact that, despite impetuous and impatient movements or moments of blindness on either side: 1st, England and France have experienced several periods of mutual understanding of peace and of commercial concord; 2d, that they have been united on several occasions in thought and sentiment for generous causes dominated by the great principles of the independence and the liberty of nations; 3d, that, despite phases of coolness, distrust, or rivalry, nothing of an irreparable nature has passed between them, nothing which excites hatred or kills reciprocal esteem. They have progressed, across the uncertainties of an especially stormy century, by different roads, towards the same ideal of liberty, of social justice, and of international justice, that is to say towards the ideal of civilization. They were destined to meet each other on the way and unite: today their alliance rests on deep-laid foundations. The most solid unions are those which are formed slowly, through the gradual development of affinities disclosed little by little which reach their full fruition over the most serious obstacles.

CHAPTER IV

From the "Splendid Isolation" to the "Entente Cordiale." (1870-1904)

EIGHTEEN hundred and seventy is a painful date in our history; but it is also a memorable one for it closes an era of agitation, of thoughtlessness, and of insufficiently justified confidence in ourselves. From this time on, a new period discloses itself, a period of stability, of patient effort towards reconstruction, social, intellectual, and moral progress, and of repair in our military forces—not with any aggressive purpose, but with the object of guarding against all danger from without and of some day being able, in a Europe finally won over to the idea of justice, to rely, for the maintenance of right, on our own strength. Since 1870 we have been a pacific people. Our colonial enterprises, in which the energy of the race and its talent for administration have been so brilliantly revealed, have not been directed against any Power whatsoever. In Europe all fair-minded nations have recognized the dignity and honesty of our foreign policy which has not only challenged no one, but has, more than once, been frankly conciliatory. We have been one of the first great European nations to set an example of moderation, of respect for the rights of others, and of attachment to peace; in other words, one of the first to exhibit that new sense of international morality, upon which the laws of tomorrow will depend for their observance.

England, who ranges her forces with ours today on the same ground of national and international law, has joined us in this cause also. By temperament she is less accessible to idealism than we are. For many years she has shown very little enthusiasm for *general* plans which take a vast and rationalized view of the future; she has been building history stone by stone, guided by her sense of balance; and when, at times, she has seemed to pause in her task, it has been to contemplate the finished parts of the structure rather than those which pointed to future developments. Rational idealism is making progress in England, but we are witnessing today the first great step towards its positive assertion as one of the incontestable forces of national action. Over the practical and literal English mind, facts have always had more dominion than anything else. Now the fact of German rapacity and brutality, which so cruelly impressed us, was on the whole without effect on England in 1870. She distrusted us; she believed in our supposed plans of aggrandizement; she disapproved of the levity with which we had seemed to provoke the conflict. Hence she believed herself justified in assuming the rôle of an impartial spectator. She witnessed catastrophes like the crushing of France and the sudden growth of Prussianized Germany without understanding their significance. Until the hour when the reality of the German peril finally became obvious to her, the policy of England was determined by traditional attitudes, traditional forces, and by the influence of an acquired momentum in a traditional direction. From 1870 to 1900, she remained what she had been in the course of the nineteenth century, subject to the same fluctuations, and inspired by the same motives. Let us recall to mind what these directing influences were.

Taken all in all, English collective action, in the nine-

teenth century, was dominated by national instinct. Of the two generators of action among nations and individuals, intuition, which is a combination of sentiment and prejudice, takes precedence over reason, which is the product of reflection and of convictions that are based on principles. It is true that towards 1820 there appeared an English school of reasoners, the utilitarian radicals, theorists of the industrial and commercial régime, who directed their efforts towards economic liberty, free contracts, and free trade. Their influence was powerfully felt in the regulation of the productive industries, of relations between masters and workmen, of commercial legislation, and of the competitive system. This school was inclined towards peace. With the exception of a few commercial treaties, the problems of foreign policy almost entirely escaped their notice. Palmerston, the man who embodied the foreign policy of the time, was a Whig, attached to the strictly insular tradition and to ideas equally confined, hostile by temperament and education to rationalism, loyal to the national idea, and, though giving frequent evidence of generous sentiment, liberal from tradition and natural nobleness rather than from principle.

The England of the nineteenth century embraces in one and the same creed, patriotism and the love of liberty. The two sentiments harmonize with and mutually fortify each other with a certain emphasis among the Tories on the necessity of maintaining and increasing the national forces, and with a strong pride, among the Liberals, in national liberty, both sides being ready, however, to take action as occasion demanded in the support of national prestige or of the dictates of the spirit of liberty. In both cases, instinct asserted itself, whether it was the instinct which causes a vigorous being to struggle for broader and fuller conditions of existence, or the moral

instinct which determines a man of noble spirit and of pride in his past to safeguard his personality and to make its influence felt around him. This national instinct was not unlikely to be defensive, as for instance when, on several occasions, it determined popular action in favour of an increase in armament. It could also be assertive, as for example when it aroused an ardent and at times an effective sympathy in favour of nationalities, and once in 1853, when it evoked vigour and decision sufficient to force England to take up arms against Russia in the name of the threatened balance of power in Europe and of imperilled liberty. Finally, we shall see that it could become expansive and imperialistic, as in 1876, when it was directed once more against Russia on the score of the Eastern question, and on several occasions, from 1876 to 1902, when in colonial questions it was frequently opposed to the progress of French expansion.

During the first part of this period, the prejudices of the past, coupled with fresh alarms often exaggerated, kept this misunderstanding with France thoroughly alive, and favoured by a sort of inevitable reaction the benevolent illusions with regard to Germany. But during the whole period we have the revelation of a new Germany, whose menace is destined to shift the centre of gravity of British interests, and create new sympathies in England, favourable to France and favourable to the growth in English thought of the latent forces of rational idealism.

It is at this vital moment that the work of secular preparation, the effect of which has been hindered by prejudices and a false statement of the problems to be solved, bears its full fruition, through a reaction against the moral and historical scandal of militarism, of German militarism and Machiavellism. England and France dis-

cover each other, recognize their respective virtues and common generosity and unite for the deliverance of Europe by peaceful means as long as these are possible, but by war when war becomes an inevitable necessity.

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After 1870, as before, England at first remained faithful to the policy which, with few exceptions, had been the constant rule for her exterior relations, namely more or less direct co-operation with the States of Central Europe against France and Russia. Germany, although unified and enjoying the prestige of victory, still continued, under the skilful direction of Bismarck, to be moderate or at least dissimulating in her ambitions as a proud and acquisitive nation. To all outward appearance, she was aiming at nothing beyond continental supremacy, an aim which was not displeasing to England. Austria, definitely frustrated in her imperialistic claims, was exhausting herself in maintaining the cohesion of the heterogeneous peoples united by force under the sceptre of the Hapsburgs; her weakness deprived her of any chance of doing harm; even her desire for expansion in the Balkans served English plans, in opposing as it did the Slavic pressure. France, despite her reverses, continued to be the distrusted neighbour. She stood at the gates of the Channel, she was a great sea power, and, since the consolidation of her Algerian possessions, she was a great Mediterranean Power as well. Russia was the suspected neighbour at the frontiers of India, disturbing on account of the incessant growth of her population, her uninterrupted penetration of Asia, and her desire to open a way into the Mediterranean. Consequently, there was a tendency on the part of England, without abandoning her insular reserve, to favour the policy of Germany and Austria and to check the policy of France and Russia.

France, alone in Europe, devoted herself at first, with a perseverance and tenacity which astonished the world, to the reparation of her losses, to the strengthening of her productive forces and the reorganization of her army. In 1874, Bismarck, uneasy at our rapid recovery in vitality and power, made no secret of his intention to crush us once more, and this time we were to be left no hope of regeneration. England joined with Russia to prevent this iniquity. But her intervention did not augur a policy of permanent goodwill towards us. We continued to be her hereditary enemy; we were soon destined to become her colonial rival and a rival which must be prevented from acquiring power at her expense.

For a time, however, England's attention was absorbed by the threat of a Russian advance in the Balkans. The Liberals were out of office. The man who had assumed leadership of the conservative party was the famous writer and orator Disraeli, leader of society and favourite of the people, for he had succeeded in winning the esteem of the aristocracy by the elegance of his manners and the attachment of the people by his social reforms. The Queen was soon to recompense his services and talents with the title of Lord Beaconsfield. His home policy had served the purpose of assuring him a successful career; but his real passion was for foreign affairs. He represented national pride, without the dash of generous liberalism which Palmerston had introduced into it, and with an aggressive acumen which the Gladstone Cabinet, during its six years of power, had succeeded in lessening. The foreign policy of Palmerston had extended help to oppressed nationalities in a somewhat haphazard fashion and had shown itself to be meddle-muddling, that of Disraeli was "spirited" in the full sense of the word.

Certain well-known events furnished Disraeli with the opportunity of showing the vigour of his policy. A

series of horrible massacres of Christians had stained Bosnia and Bulgaria with blood. In reply to some tribal uprisings, the Sublime Porte had delivered a number of innocent village people to the cruelty of bands of cut-throats who had done their work with the zeal and exquisite barbarity for which Turkish domination has acquired a sinister notoriety. Austria had drawn up a Note in accord with Russia and the other Powers, to protest against the barbarism of the massacres and to exact reforms likely to alleviate the condition of the Christian population. If the Porte refused or procrastinated in its usual manner it was inevitable war. Russia made no secret of being ready to act. Disraeli, in the name of England, refused to sign the Memorandum. He seemed to see in it a renewal of the danger to meet which the Crimean War had been undertaken: England could not allow Russia to use disturbances in the Balkans as a pretext to enter Constantinople, get a footing in the Mediterranean, and become, more than ever, a menace to India. In the eyes of the Prime Minister, the Empire, over which England extended her power far and wide, ought to hold the first place in the solicitude of the country. All considerations—even those which appeared of capital importance to minds less blinded by militant realism—ought to give way before the great design of expansion. England, consequently, declared herself protectress of Turkey.

This attitude aroused the indignation of the Liberal opposition. The great Radical, John Bright, scarcely exaggerated when he spoke of the "rise in mass of the popular elements." Gladstone went everywhere, harangued excited crowds in monster meetings, and denounced the infamy of the Porte in a pamphlet which sold at the rate of ten thousand copies a day. The historian Freeman pronounced the famous sentence:

"Let India perish rather than Justice . . ." which nearly cost him the loss of the chair of Modern History at Oxford.

The yeast of Liberal enthusiasm was thus fermenting and active in the nation. The Russian victory of 1878, however, determined a reaction in favour of the instinct of conservation, and, soon afterwards, of the instinct of self-assertion. The moment was not ripe for the possible victory of moral idealism over a particular kind of suspicious and imperious patriotism. The ancient ambitions of Russia were on record to justify certain fears regarding her new enterprise. English opinion allowed itself to be swayed by one of those oscillations which operate in free countries: after the weakening of the foreign policy under the Liberal Government, a large proportion of the English people had reached the point of desiring the affirmation of the national power. A strong current of warlike aspirations was discernible. Thus under the influence of causes both of a domestic and foreign order, England entered a phase of imperialism which was to last twenty-five years.

After having constructed a barrier in the Congress of Berlin against the "Russian spectre," Disraeli prepared an era of conquering expansion in Africa and Asia. The Liberals who succeeded him, falling heirs, despite themselves, to a situation in which the honour and the interests of the nation were pledged, were obliged to sustain and even to encourage at times the progress of English arms. Then the leader of a new fraction of the Conservative party, the Imperialist Joseph Chamberlain, full of youthful ardour and strong hope for the future of the Anglo-Saxon race, assumed the direction of colonial affairs and pushed matters forward at a rapid but imprudent pace which was destined to bring about the painful complications of the Transvaal War. After that a movement of

reaction was to bring the country to a policy of prudence and patience, to moral and social idealism and peace.

During this period, France, after having repaired her disasters, developed her colonial policy with firmness and method. She clashed, at times sharply enough, with England who was ready to consider any settlement of a great Power in regions adjoining her possessions as an attack either on her acquired rights or on those about to be acquired. Germany, on the other hand, restrained by Bismarck, in a spirit of relative prudence, did not seem to be, at first, a dangerous rival. The old Chancellor, as long as he was in power, skilfully fostered English sympathies and cloaked by a series of diplomatic triumphs in the *manière douce* the first steps in German colonial expansion. With the accession of William II, however, the course of events changed rapidly. Just how the antagonism of England and Germany gradually revealed itself and why it ended finally in effecting a change in the sentiments and policy of our neighbour across the Straits, is the question with which we are chiefly concerned at present.

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The great transformation, one might say revolution, which has been accomplished in the relations of one state to another through the progress of science and its application to the means of communication, consists in the expansion of their ambition beyond continental frontiers and the multiplication of their points of contact in all latitudes or all waters. When Germany entered the competition for colonial possessions, she found England, Russia, and France already engaged in a course of action to which she was able to contribute nothing but a name, *Weltpolitik*, world policy. The Eastern question was to become the prelude to the Far-Eastern question: the "sick man's" empire was to prove not only the key of the

Mediterranean but also the gate of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

The direct cause of the revolution was the piercing of the Suez Canal, the daring conception of a French brain. Palmerston had ridiculed what he considered a presumptuous folly. But when the impossible had become a reality, England held herself ready to derive benefit from it. In 1875, Disraeli, noticing that the Khedive was in financial difficulties, redeemed the 176,000 shares of the Canal originally allotted to the Egyptian Government. Fresh financial troubles, followed by a massacre of the European Colony of Alexandria, induced Gladstone, in 1881, to take a decisive step towards the occupation of Egypt. Gladstone acted most reluctantly in the matter. He had offered a share in the enterprise to France and then to Italy, who had both refused. England had thus embarked on the enterprise alone, and was on the point of finding herself, by the obligations incident to her responsible position, involved in the conquest of the Upper-Nile and the Soudan, an arduous task to which Gladstone devoted himself without enthusiasm. His hesitations cost England the disaster of Khartoum and the death of Gordon.

These disasters only strengthened English determination. The Conservatives, reseated in power, gave a new and vigorous impulse to British imperialism. In every continent, English possessions were consolidated and extended. The Queen had already, in 1877, been proclaimed Empress of India, a new title symbolizing the power of England in Asia. India was protected against Russia, on the west, by the establishment of an English protectorate in Afghanistan (1879) and against France on the east by the annexation of Burmah. A revolt of the Zulus gave England the opportunity of establishing her suzerainty in the Transvaal, until the time when,

through pacific means, it was hoped, a more intimate union of the South African colonies might be brought about. In Central, Eastern, and Western Africa voyages of exploration, expeditions, raids, formal occupations broadened English territories everywhere or brought about the founding of new establishments. In China, every opportunity was turned to account with a view to pushing the advantages obtained in former wars, to obtaining the cession of ports with their *hinterland*, and to preparing the way for commercial penetration by railroads and navigable waterways. When it became evident that Russia was extending her plans as far as the Middle Empire, and that, while temporarily abandoning the partition of Turkey, she was contemplating the dismemberment of China, England approached the Power whose rapid progress in industry, armaments, and liberal institutions was every day making her more formidable in the Far East: in 1900–1902 she formed a defensive alliance with Japan.

During the last twenty years of the nineteenth century Russia and France, then, were the objects of English jealousy. London struggled foot by foot with us in every quarter where our arms progressed and where our administration consolidated our conquests. At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck and Lord Salisbury had seemed to give their tacit consent to our plan of pacifying Tunis. When, three years later, relying on this encouragement, we established ourselves at Tunis, the English Prime Minister, in accord with Italy, raised certain difficulties. In Egypt, despite the mistake made by our government in refusing to co-operate in the bombardment of Alexandria, we had financial interests and moral rights which England sought to hold in check. She always replied evasively to our notes reminding her of her promise to evacuate the country. Finally, the rivalry for the pos-

session of the Egyptian Soudan well-nigh brought on war at the time of the Fashoda incident in 1898. In Newfoundland the fisheries dispute, full two centuries old, seemed without solution. Fresh fields of conflict opened in Madagascar, in the New Hebrides, in Senegal, in Dahomey, in the Congo, in Siam, in Morocco. We found England sometimes contesting rights which we considered as thoroughly established, sometimes appearing at boundaries which we believed to be ours, at others combating our influence with princes or heads of tribes, and at others favouring the war contraband traffic to our detriment. It was only by virtue of sheer tenacity and energy that our statesmen established the colonial empire of France in spite of the obstacles set up at every turn in our road,—until the day when an altered aspect in European affairs opened the eyes of England and prepared the great turning-point destined to be called the *Entente Cordiale*.

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During the whole period through which the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian unfriendliness lasted, England kept up pleasant relations with Berlin, and, on several occasions, concluded arrangements which seemed more especially favourable to the Wilhelmstrasse. Although Bismarck had declared that Germany had no colonial aims and that her sole programme was to complete her unity and assure her position in Europe, nevertheless, the prosperity and the growing ambitions of the nation led her, towards 1880, to place herself in line for participation in the partition of Africa. Merchants of Bremen and Hamburg had established factories in Central West-Africa, near the Gold Coast and British Nigeria, in the south-west near Cape Colony, and on the east coast opposite the island of Zanzibar. They urged the Chancellor to assert the rights of Germans over these regions

and thus to lay the foundation of a growing colonial domain. Societies were formed; books, pamphlets, and press articles spread the idea among the public; in short one of those initial movements of Germanic power which was to be frequently renewed in the days to come. Bismarck allowed himself to be carried away by the current, fell in with the views of the colonial party, and adopted measures destined to realize its fondest desires.

Two English expeditions had permitted themselves to be forestalled, in the *hinterland* of the Togo and the Cameroun by the explorer Nachtigal. England acknowledged the principle of precedence and, in 1885 and 1886, accepted the accomplished fact. She manifested the same spirit of conciliation with regard to the other points of the African coast where, otherwise, there might have arisen serious ground for contestation. It is true that as soon as England suspected the designs of Berlin in Damaraland, in South-West Africa, she occupied Walfish Bay, the only natural port of the region. But in spite of this, Germany continued to progress and stretched her possessions as far as the Orange River, without England's raising any serious obstacle. At times things got to a dangerous pass; but all conflict was avoided. After President Kruger's visit to Europe in 1884, a project was elaborated between Germany and the Transvaal, for the purpose of uniting the Boer country to the German South-West Africa by a transcontinental railway across Bechuanaland: Gladstone had Bechuanaland occupied by the Cape Colony troops, and the railroad had to be abandoned. In Egyptian Soudan, where the revolt of the Mahdi had placed English domination in danger for a time, a German adventurer, known under the name of Emin Effendi, defeated a horde of Mahdists and installed himself as master in Equatoria. England interposed: four years later, in 1889, Stanley reached Equatoria and intimated

to Emin to quit the country. Another German adventurer, Doctor Peters, had set himself up in Ouganda, at the source of the Nile: as before, England would not tolerate his remaining there. These colonial difficulties did not alter the excellent relations between London and Berlin; the treaty of 1890 settled the African troubles amicably.

With England [said Bismarck] we are living on good terms; that England, with her assurance of supremacy on the seas, should feel some surprise at the sight of her land-rats of cousins putting to sea, is not astonishing; but we have enduring ties of friendship with England and the two countries are anxious to conserve them. (Speech made January 10, 1885.)

The colonial rivalries of England and Germany had been easily smoothed over because the two nations were on good terms in Europe. After the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck, foreseeing that the deception of Russia might some day draw her closer to France, concluded in 1879, the *Double Alliance* with Austria. The entry of Italy into the combination in 1882 gave rise to the *Triple Alliance* which was to bear with so great a weight on the destinies of Europe. From the first, England looked upon the *Triplice* with a favourable eye. France, kept on the alert on the frontier of the Vosges, would not be able to throw herself seriously into her colonial enterprises; Italy, on the other hand, sustained by her two powerful allies, would maintain the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. England saw in the new concentration of the kingdoms of Central Europe certain advantages for herself: she foresaw on their part no difficulty. She felt herself strong and rich and in the fulness of her growth; the goodwill which she hoped to inspire in the *Triple Alliance*, in exchange for her sympathy, was a guarantee against the European ambitions of the secular rivals, Russia and France, just as the power of her immense empire secured

her against their ambitions outside of Europe. She had no idea of joining the *Triplice*, because she meant to keep a free hand in order to conserve her advantageous position of *arbiter mundi* and because, having no designs on the continent, she had no need of anybody's direct assistance. Friendship served her interests better than alliance. The natural affinity which seemed to establish a moral union between peoples of Germanic origin was sufficient, she thought, to assure their co-operation. The conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1891 only had the effect of confirming her in her sympathies for the Central Powers.

The Near East was the theatre where the rivalry of influences of the two European groups came into collision. The Armenian massacres in 1894–96 rendered European intervention inevitable. London and Vienna believed the moment favourable for carrying into effect the dismemberment of Turkey. By a curious reversal of positions, it was Russia who supported the dogma of the intangibility of the Sultan's possessions. A plan of reforms under the Powers' guarantee was finally settled upon. Germany, who had stood aside from the conflict, won the secret sympathies of Turkey, without awakening the suspicions of England. Germany thus profited, against England herself, from the goodwill of Downing Street. The moment was not yet come for the disclosure of this double-dealing.

In exchange for the liberty which the Germans left the English in Egypt, the latter undertook to encourage them at our expense in Morocco. A soldier of fortune and an English journalist, MacLean and Harris, had enlisted the confidence of the Sultan of Fez. While prejudicing him against us, they pictured Germany to him in the light of a friend. Thanks to them the so-called scientific expeditions of Doctor Fischer were successfully carried

out and El Mokri was received in audience at Berlin (1888). In China, England, who was jealous enough of Russia's progress, accepted without protest the establishment of a German military and naval station at Kiao-Chau (1897). Yet that event was a fact of capital importance, a first decisive sign of Germany's new line of direction, since the disgrace of Bismarck and loud declarations of William II. It was the first affirmation of the *Weltpolitik*. Neither before nor after Kiao-Chau, however, was there any difficulty between the two governments: for England, the enemy was not Germany, but Russia. It was against Russia, three years later, that the Anglo-German agreement of 1900 concerning China was signed. Germany guaranteed the integrity of China threatened by the Russian pressure in Manchuria; England in return gave her consent to an expansion of German trading establishments and to the acquisition of navigation monopolies. Following this agreement, William II pronounced the Elberfeld speech in which he declared: "This understanding with the greatest of Germanic states outside of Germany will be in the future a powerful adjuvant for the common efforts of the two peoples on the world's market, where they will be able to carry on friendly competition without any hostile shock."

The year 1900 marks the climax of Anglo-German friendship. The relations of the two countries were so cordial that a few months before the Emperor's speech, Mr. Chamberlain had believed he could unbosom himself in public concerning a great project cherished by him and his friend Cecil Rhodes, the gold and diamond king of South Africa. The two leaders of imperialism professed faith in the qualities of energy of the Anglo-Saxons, who proved themselves thereby worthy scions of the Germanic stock, of the master and ruling race, destined to govern

the world. In a speech which he delivered at Leicester, November 30, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain spoke of the necessity of an alliance between England, Germany, and the United States, for the purpose of securing the peace of the world. This fond dream, it is true, aroused grave objections in all three countries.

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We have now come to the beginning of the Transvaal War. German opinion had suddenly become hostile to England. British aggression against a small people, itself a member of the Teutonic family, to whom the Kaiser, in a well-known telegram had formerly promised protection, and with whom Bismarck had treated in the unfortunate trans-African railroad affair, had suddenly caused the Germans to forget their racial affinities with their Saxon cousins and awakened them to the sense of an opposition of interests and ambitions that was daily growing more precise. German press commentaries were harsh. English opinion, stung to the quick, could not pardon them. Hostility on the part of the French was to be expected, the hostility of the Germans could not be supported without resentment. Was it the place of the Germans, whose war methods in 1870 had so often been atrocious, to manifest indignation? And was this the fruit of English perseverance and complacency during the last thirty years? . . . Under these circumstances not only was the Chamberlain project doomed to failure but Anglo-German relations became embittered!

It is about this date of 1900 that English policy veered sharply, changing the direction of its sympathies and friendships and transforming the conditions of the balance of power in Europe. For this decided change there were certain important, active causes. I have just mentioned the imprudent acrimony of the German press. The Transvaal War had still other effects on the

disposition of the national character. It revealed traces of weakness in the effective power of England, and gave birth to a lack of confidence in a people which had sometimes transgressed through over-assurance, but whose rectitude of judgment and practical sense rendered them prompt to appreciate the evidence in the case. About this time, Queen Victoria, grandmother of William II and strongly attached to German friendship, died. She was succeeded on the throne by King Edward VII, a friend of France, and determined from the earliest years of his reign to restore the splendour of the Crown by playing the part in foreign affairs which the Constitution conceded him. Finally, in France, the danger of Fashoda had brought about a change in the direction of the foreign policy which was becoming favourable to a reconciliation with England. These active causes precipitated events: but these events had been prepared long ago by certain deep-seated causes.

The economic rivalry, born between England and Germany on the day when the latter, unified, exalted by victory and stimulated by a new desire for enjoyment and riches, had embarked in the venture of industrial and commercial development . . . this rivalry increased and became acute when this development assumed colossal proportions, when all the forces and resources of the State were used in its services, and when the avowed goal was to attain the first rank among the producing and exporting nations. In 1884, Gladstone, speaking before the Birkenhead electors, was thinking of Germany; he intimated that there was no reason for fearing her: "I have seen," said he, "the force, riches, and power of our country increased beyond all expectation, almost beyond all imagination. . . . If the power of other European countries has increased, the growth of English power has been still greater." Notwithstanding, as early as

1885 a parliamentary committee was constituted with a view to tracing the causes of a certain diminution of the British lead in commercial and industrial affairs, revealed by statistics. This committee, through the voice of competent economists, expressed the first fears conceived in England with regard to the growing rival of the East: "The competition of Germany is becoming more and more severe. . . . The Germans are gaining ground on us, thanks to their superior knowledge of the markets, thanks to their desire to suit the taste of each customer, and their determination to set foot everywhere."

Statistics allowed this progress to be measured. Germany had become a great producer of coal. In 1870, in the basin of the Ruhr, 20,000,000 tons of coal were extracted; in 1900, 201,000,000 tons. Germany had become a great industrial nation. In 1870, the metallurgic foundries employed 170,000 workmen; in 1900, 800,000. Besides metallurgy, the weaving industries were developing. The chemical industry was becoming the first in the world.

Commerce was following the industrial development at the same rate; an immense network of railroads intersected the country and numerous maritime lines, subsidized by the State, put Germany in communication with the entire globe. In ten years, from 1890 to 1900, the exports had increased 1,200,000,000 marks. Certain ports, like Hamburg, had grown to astonishing proportions; the tonnage of ships entering and clearing from this port in 1900, was 76,000,000 tons against 10,000,000, in 1890. During the same period, English exports had remained stationary or had decreased.

England could scarcely ignore such symptoms. In 1897 a pamphlet introduced the famous phrase *Made in Germany*, which struck the popular imagination and went from mouth to mouth, but remained a formula for

banter instead of becoming a watchword or a battle-cry. The label required in Great Britain on objects imported from Germany, did not lower by a shilling the sum-total of German imports: the German commercial traveller, insinuating, jovial, admirably versed in the English tongue, triumphed in the British market as in other markets and sold German cutlery even in Sheffield. The reports of the English consular agents drew attention to the peril and enumerated the causes of economic prosperity on the other side of the Rhine: superior organization, training of workmen and employees for their task by means of excellent technical schools, instruction in languages and sending of experienced representatives to all countries, ease in adapting themselves to foreign taste, concentration of production in immense manufactories, extended use of machinery, a spirit of enterprise pushed to audacity and at times to the point of temerity. The following abuses, though they were not talked about officially, were the cause of a great deal of grumbling: unscrupulous operations such as noisy and charlatanical advertising, disloyal weapons such as the commercial spying system, intrigues to supplant the competitor, the concealment of poor quality under the guise of a known product.

The industrial and commercial superiority of England was battered . . . already to the point of tottering. There was a feeling of bitterness which left little place for the sympathy of former times. It was not only in commercial rivalry, however, that Germany engaged. She also entered into competition with England for the supremacy of the seas. After the accession of William II (1888), and especially after the disgrace of Bismarck (1890), Germany adopted the policy of great naval armaments. The German fleet, scarcely existing in 1870, composed only of thirteen armoured men-of-war at the

death of William I, grew with a rapidity which showed the will of the Emperor and his naval advisers to spare no effort or expense in equalling the number of unities, the tonnage, the artillery power, etc., of the English fleet. The naval law of 1898 decided that, in three years, eleven battle-ships without counting cruisers and smaller unities, should be constructed. Two years later, in 1900, a new law was passed to reinforce this programme and increased still more the number of units to be built. In 1920 the German fleet was to comprise 38 first-class battle-ships, 14 armoured cruisers, 38 protected cruisers, and 96 destroyers. For what purpose was this formidable fleet created?[1] "We are threatening no one," William II had declared, "our fleet is the sign of our power and the necessary defensive organ for the protection of our merchant marine." Despite these pacific declarations, England felt herself no longer safe and the traditional friendship for her trans-Rhenan cousin waxed cold.

In reality the creation of a powerful war fleet meant that the ambitions of Germany reached henceforth no longer to Europe alone but to the entire world. The fleet was the instrument of the new far-reaching designs of the colonial and world policy to which William II was

[1] Note by Translator: That is precisely the question which must be answered in order to answer this other question: who started the war? . . . With the most powerful army in Europe Germany was bidding strongly for the most powerful fleet also. These two things: the biggest army *plus* the biggest fleet, with the system of alliance in effect before the war, meant certain victory. There is a *plus* in that problem which cannot be eliminated and that *plus* is on the German side. . . . England with the most powerful fleet but practically *no* army stood much less chance of getting to Berlin than Germany did of getting to London. But England meant to have her land-fighting done by France and Russia? No . . . the early results of the war prove, if they prove anything, that without Italy and without Kitchener's army, France insufficiently prepared and Russia poorly organized would have probably suffered defeat, just as England would have suffered defeat in the long run, had it not been for the armies of France. No one knew this better than the German General Staff.

engaging his people. This new naval arm would serve to support abroad the system of intimidations and threats which the land forces served to support on the frontiers of the Vosges and on the Vistula. And thus in the neighbourhood of 1900, England could no longer entertain any illusion as to the country aimed at, or as to which would be the object of aggression on the first serious clash of interests.

Now, such divergences were already visible. Germany was allowing her designs on the East to show themselves. By holding her hand in the Armenian affair and by permitting London, Paris, Vienna, and Petrograd to protest against the massacres and impose the reparations and the guarantees, Germany had become *persona grata* with the Porte. She sent to Constantinople her best diplomats who obtained commercial advantages, government orders, navigation charters, and contracts for important public works. William II had nothing but flatteries for Abdul-Hamid. The crowning reward for these courtesies was the concession, in 1899, of the Bagdad Railroad, a transaction destined to put into German hands the most rapid line of communication between Europe and India. England showed her ill-humour by asserting her rights over the Sultanate of Koweit which was to be the terminus of the railroad. In China, England, who had facilitated the establishment of the Kiao-Chau station, expected in return the support of Germany against the Russian advance in Manchuria. But when, in 1901, she formally asked Berlin to unite with her to prevent the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese treaty which delivered Manchuria into the hands of Russian functionaries, Germany avoided the question and rendered all intervention impossible.

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These conflicts of views and interests, together with

the underlying causes of dissension, that is with the existing economic and maritime rivalry, and also with the active causes, that is with the entrance of new figures on the political stage, explain the great event of 1904, which, as we can see clearly today, was of capital importance and destined to save Europe from German tyranny: that event was the *Entente Cordiale*. King Edward had played a preponderant rôle in the Anglo-French reconciliation, but the new direction it gave to English policy was so much in accord with the veritable interests of the country and the national aspirations, that the *Entente Cordiale* immediately became popular. French ships and French sailors were acclaimed in the ports of Great Britain, government leaders exchanged visits, members of Parliament and municipalities of great towns met, sometimes on this side and sometimes on the other side of the Channel, in brilliant and enthusiastic receptions; characteristically enough the Frenchman became a popular and sympathetic figure in the music-halls. In a few months the differences which had divided France and England for years were settled by friendly arrangement. The respective rights of the fishermen of the two nations on the Newfoundland banks were defined. We became the undisputed possessors of Madagascar. Certain spheres of influence and a neutral zone were mapped out in Siam. England allowed us our liberty of action in Morocco and we recognized her suzerainty in Egypt. Equitable frontiers were outlined between the French and English possessions of West Africa. A *condominium* was established in the New Hebrides.

The Russo-Japanese War, which ended in 1905, cured Russia of her fondness for perilous adventures in distant countries and recalled her to a preoccupation with European affairs. Having recognized the error of an aggressive colonial policy, she was ready to guarantee, with England,

the integrity of the Chinese Empire, secured by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty in 1905. She understood the new *Entente* programme of action which, foregoing all conquest, was to be devoted in the two home countries to the pacific solution of the problems of liberty and social justice, in foreign countries, to the régime of equity among nations, and in distant continents to the education of infant peoples and to the productive improvement of uncultivated territories. Finally, in the centre of Europe, was there not a nation, full of power yet eager for more, rich but still unsatisfied, overflowing with force, exultant with pride, famished for new territories, *land hungry*, and as the last half-century might bear witness, a nation intent upon increasing and reincreasing its armies, its war material, its battle-fleet with designs in view whose clear meaning could be drawn not only from threats let fall, at times, from the mouth of its sovereign, but also from the horrible doctrine of force upheld by its professional warriors and statesmen? Should not these three great nations, converted to a sentiment of mutual conciliation and concord, unite in conscience or, at least in self-interest, to ward off the common danger?

England and France, disabused by the menace of common danger, looked at each other with eyes unobscured by the prejudices of times gone by, and straightway they understood! The reasons which we have for esteeming and loving England this book proposes to lay open to examination. The reasons which England has for esteeming and loving France, we have the right to enumerate briefly without false modesty. England, being a realist nation, has been in a position to appreciate the energy by the force of which we have surmounted our disasters. She has measured our vitality and strength by the importance of our colonial work and by the very resistance of which we have given proof when circumstances brought

us face to face with her. When in the Soudan, in obedience to orders received from London, Kitchener opposed Marchand's advance, we may be sure that he had a feeling of respect for this daring leader and for the enterprising people who dared follow their own course even at the risk of great danger. Englishmen respect us because in the past they proved us to be worthy adversaries, resolute and fair-minded like themselves. Such adversaries, after having tried each other's strength on the field and having held firm with equal valour, may very well meet each other at the end of the war and shake hands and thereafter entertain for each other no other feeling than that of admiration.

France, who knew how to win respect with her courage and spirit of enterprise, knew how to inspire confidence also. We criticise ourselves very severely in France and perhaps we should not regret doing so; England, however, since she has been observing us in a kindly spirit, is able to render us justice. She no longer thinks of us as a volatile and changeable nation inclined to let riot run loose in the street or unchain the dogs of war on the frontier. Today our civil virtues find their expression in our public virtues. The Republic has been accepted by all, has been firmly established, and has been organized with sufficient order and steadfastness of purpose to produce tangible and lasting results. The Republic has never lacked statesmen to direct the affairs of the country in its difficult passes. Despite party quarrels, its foreign policy has shown penetration, flexibility, and firmness, with a keen sense of the responsibilities of the hour and historical continuity. Its finances are among the most solid in the world. Its colonial administration, constantly progressing, has been able to solve numerous practical problems difficult to handle and, at the same time, has proved itself so humane that in all lands where peace

has been established by France, the people are happy. Its army has improved and grown to the point of becoming one of the most effective instruments of war in Europe and of giving pause to the formidable power of the German army. More and more, in political matters, French citizens temper with moderation and discipline their habits of liberty. The parties are organizing themselves, the spirit of association is developing, we are preparing with patience and foresight the reforms which avert revolution. Our national character, our national institutions, and our national vigour furnish henceforth guarantees capable of encouraging a serious and thoughtful people like the English to give us their friendship.

Reassured by this newly-acquired faculty in France to develop, within her borders, the rightful exercise of ordered liberty, our neighbours across the Channel have, in turn, shown themselves better able to appreciate and welcome French idealism. The two nations have recognized each other as makers of civilization by complementary qualities which ought to be united for the greater benefit of Europe. These moral causes no less than the political and economic causes have constituted the cement of the *Entente Cordiale*. As soon as the last material obstacles opposing its conclusion had fallen in 1904, the *Entente* was consolidated with enthusiasm.

It was the moment that Germany chose to try and intimidate England, whom she felt slipping away from her, France, who continued "to gaze on the blue line of the Vosges," and Russia, France's friend, already disabused of the Asiatic adventure, . . . by noisily affirming her pretensions in Morocco, and, soon after, by encouraging the encroachments of her ally Austria in the Balkans. From 1905 on, the foreign policy of England consists essentially in the tightening of her bonds of friendship with France, in the formation of bonds of

friendship with Russia, and in her constant efforts, carried to the limit of her power, to conserve friendly relations with Germany with due respect to her own independence and dignity. The history of these last ten years may be entitled: "How England worked for peace." That is the subject we are now going to enter upon.

CHAPTER V

What England Did to Maintain Peace. 1904-1914

IN 1904, England abandoned her tradition of "splendid isolation" and held out her hand to France. The *Entente Cordiale* was an insurance against the German menace, just as the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891 had been, but neither England nor France, any more than Russia, wanted to threaten Germany with a counter-menace or to assume a provocative attitude towards her. France aspired only to become free once more to fulfil her destiny as a civilizing and emancipating power, hoping that, in the distant future, the progress of the spirit of justice would secure to her the reparations that were legally her due. Russia, in the midst of an economic and political evolution, desired nothing further than a peace that would permit her to devote herself to domestic reforms. England, prudent now and liberal, preoccupied with the Irish problem as well as with social difficulties at home and ambitious of nothing beyond a pacific form of imperialism, wanted simply to preserve the *status quo* from any attempt at conquering hegemony. Her time-honoured policy of maintaining the balance of power had lost the haughty and troublesome character which it still had in 1853. Rational idealism was making constant progress in every sphere of English activity and particularly in that of her international politics; her

insular individualism was diminishing year by year, without any consequent diminution in the vigour of her originality and with an appreciable lessening of the distance which separated her from the progressive elements of continental thought. Indeed, what government or what ruler—except in the country which had cynically abjured humanity and promulgated the barbarous doctrine of force—would have engaged light-heartedly in a war which, by the destroying power of deadly engines, by its engagement of enormous masses of armed men, and by the clash of powerful coalitions, was bound to prove the most terrible of conflagrations.

Aided by her traditional talent for compromise and her determination to keep the peace, England laboured for ten years in a conciliating spirit, but without humiliation or backsliding, to save the *status quo* in Europe. This end she tried to attain by overtures and by concessions which she amplified and repeated until the hour when Germany's madness precipitated the conflict. She supplemented the *Entente Cordiale* with France by agreements with Italy (1903), with Spain (1904), and with Russia (1907). The *Triple Entente*, flanked by minor *ententes*, became the bulwark of peace in Europe. To the *Triple Alliance* which was in process of transforming itself practically into a purely Germanic coalition, she opposed a policy of counter action, and not one of encircling (Germany's pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding). The burning questions of Morocco, the Balkans, and the respective national spheres of influence in Asia Minor were given provisional solutions which might easily have been perfected and made permanent. The question of the limitation of armament and fleets might have been settled by private agreement and ratified by The Hague Conference. But it appeared that nothing could satisfy this all-engulfing Germanism except univer-

sal supremacy and the enslavement of nations. It was this spirit that willed the war. It was not England's fault that the irreparable act was not avoided.

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The Anglo-French agreement about Morocco in 1902, completed by the Mediterranean agreement between England, France, and Spain in 1904, was directed against no one and interfered with the interests of no nation. Concerning Morocco, we undertook to respect the independence of the Sultan and the political state of the country; we left the door open to international commerce. In consideration of our proximity to Algeria and of that colony's constant danger from anarchy in Morocco, the right was accorded us of merely helping the Maghzen to re-establish order and to exercise his effective authority over all the provinces of the Empire. This agreement, the first-fruit of the Anglo-French friendship, had the effect, however, of exciting the anger of Germany. The *Entente Cordiale*, although of an entirely pacific nature, had been greeted in Germany as a menace. To try and establish the balance of power on a friendly basis represented in the minds of our neighbours across the Rhine, an affront to German power; for, even at this stage, German power was unwilling to tolerate organization against the system of intimidation by which it meant to further its designs of aggrandizement in the world. It had decided that Morocco would be the point where it would establish a base on the Mediterranean Sea, and whence it would expand toward the Orient, overthrowing France in Algeria and then England in Egypt. From the time of the Anglo-French agreement on, the tone of the German press became aggressive and the Emperor seized every possible occasion to pronounce those warlike speeches of his, filled with phrases that rang as the clatter of steel,

designed to keep aflame the fever of chauvinism in Germany and to serve as a warning abroad.

On March 31, 1905, it was learned that the Kaiser had arrived in Tangiers on the steamer *Hamburg*, escorted by the cruiser *Frederick-Charles*, and had paid a visit to the uncle of the Sultan, on which occasion he had used the following significant words: "It is to the Sultan of Morocco, an independent sovereign, that I am paying this visit. . . ." A month later, the Prince of Bülow, Imperial Chancellor, proposed to the Powers the summoning of an international conference for the purpose of settling the question of reforms in Morocco. This was a direct thrust at France and an order, which to resist meant war. France was not prepared: the Foreign Secretary resigned and the Conference opened. Thanks to the firm support of England, to the goodwill of Italy, to the friendly intervention of the United States, and finally to the skill of our plenipotentiary, the issue of the Conference of Algeciras was contrary to the designs of Germany. Our situation in Morocco, under seal of the guarantees which we had furnished from the start to foreign commerce, was recognized by all the nations. The Conference had two fortunate results: 1, it asserted the value of the Anglo-French *entente*, which, as someone said, passed from a static to a dynamic state; 2, it was the occasion of the first of those conversations which were, a year later, to bring about the Anglo-Russian *entente* and thus render the *Triple Entente* a possibility.

Germany chafed with impatience and secretly prepared for new and more redoubtable interventions. Meanwhile she decided to hasten the growth of her fleet. It was in 1900, at the time when the Transvaal War had roused an ill-suppressed burst of anger in Germany, that the Reichstag had voted the first great "naval programme." In 1906, this programme was augmented. The former

naval budget of 185,000,000 Mk. jumped to 310,000,000. It was proposed to enlarge the Kiel Canal to give battleships of the dreadnought class access to it. The Anglo-German naval rivalry was fast approaching a crisis.

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England, however, without neglecting reasonable means of protection from the danger, was seeking to create an atmosphere of peace throughout Europe. She had attended the first Hague Conference convoked at the suggestion of the Czar of Russia in 1899, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Goschen, had declared to the Assembly that, although it was impossible to change the *relative* position of Great Britain, if the other Powers would agree to reduce their naval construction programme, England would fall in with the movement. England had also signed the first arbitration treaties, and had agreed to lay before an international tribunal the grave incident of Hull, when Russian warships on their way to the Pacific had fired upon a flotilla of English fishing smacks. In 1907, at the second Hague Conference, it was she who took the initiative in a new proposal for the reduction of armaments. As proof of good faith and to encourage other nations, the English Government had announced, in July, 1906, that the English naval construction programme would be reduced 25% for battle-ships, 60% for destroyers, and 33% for submarines—and that would be done despite the considerable increase in German naval construction during the same year.

The Emperor of Germany informed the British Ambassador that if the question of disarmament was put to the Conference, he would refuse to be represented there. King Edward's visit to Cronberg and the subsequent semi-official visit to Berlin made by the Secretary of War, Mr. Haldane, whose German sympathies were well

known, only resulted in a confirmation of William II's decision.

England, however, did not consider herself beaten. An article signed by the Prime Minister, Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, was printed in *The Nation* (March, 1907), renewing the English proposal. The Prince of Bülow replied, in the Reichstag, that "the Imperial Government could not take part in a discussion which, in his opinion, was not at all likely to lead to practical results, and which on the contrary entailed certain risks." (April, 1907.) All that England was able to accomplish at the Conference was to declare through her representative Sir E. Grey that she was ready to compare notes beforehand with any Power whatsoever regarding her naval budget estimates, in the hope that this exchange of information would lead to a reduction of expenses.

If, then, an international agreement should prove impossible, the way was left open for a private arrangement between the two nations. In the autumn of 1907, the Emperor visited England, and, in a speech at the Guildhall, expressed with warmth his sentiments of friendship for the English nation. But in the following year, at the instance of the German Admiralty a new naval law was voted, the law of 1908, which, by providing for the continuous construction of new battle-ships, guaranteed an automatic and constant rejuvenation of the German navy, and established a strong reserve composed of the older unities. The naval budget leaped from 310,000,000 to 445,000,000 Mk. It is true that Admiral von Tirpitz proclaimed from the tribune of the Reichstag, that "Germany was constructing her fleet against none"; he even added, speaking of England: "We do not want to compete with that naval power, nor dispute the supremacy of the seas with her."[1] But how could England

[1] German policy was a policy of duplicity which consisted in calming

possibly feel unconcerned about the matter? Naval supremacy is a question of life and death for her; let the superiority of her fleet diminish or disappear, and her colonial empire is not only at the mercy of an aggressor, but the country itself may be reduced to starvation. Yet England had no wish to engage in a maritime outbidding contest without having made another attempt to effect a settlement.

King Edward was once more the messenger of peace. He was accompanied on a visit to Berlin in 1908, by a member of the Cabinet, C. Hardinge, charged with the task of presenting the views of the Government. Both King and Minister met with the usual polite reception and courteous speeches, also with the accustomed obstinate rejection of overtures. There was nothing else for England to do but to take the measures which she had

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English alarm with fine words whenever an English proposal for settlement was advanced or whenever a new increase in the German naval programme made the German threat more glaringly evident. Von Bülow, in his book on *The German Policy* (French translation by M. Maurice Herbette, P. Lavauzelle, 1914), so studiously calculated to inspire confidence abroad in Germany's pacific intentions, unintentionally discloses the truth. "It was necessary," said he, while appreciating the policy of William II, "to show the German people how to obtain a *place in the sun*, a place to which it had a right and towards the securing of which all its efforts must be directed; but the sentiment of patriotism ought not to be permitted on the other hand to pass its proper bounds and irremediably derange our relations with England. . . . We should not allow ourselves to be dominated in our purposes and acts by a policy directed against England; but on the other hand, we ought not to place ourselves in a position of dependence on the English, with a view to winning their friendship. . . . As to that country's friendship, we could have won it only by sacrificing our plans of world policy; but, on the other hand, as enemies of England we could not without great difficulty have developed our commercial and maritime power to the point which it has finally attained." It is impossible to state more clearly (without confessing the insincerity of the protestations of goodwill) that it was really a matter of lulling the English lion to sleep until the hour when it would be possible to surprise him without defence.

deferred to the last moment, namely, to accelerate her naval construction. This she did in 1909 and 1910. At the same time the army was reorganized. The volunteers, who had been almost free of all official control until then, formed henceforth a "territorial army" destined to defend the native soil and whose strength was to be raised to three hundred thousand, with 196 batteries and a brigade of yeomanry for each division. The regular army, relieved of the duty of home defence, could deduct from its total strength an "expeditionary corps" of 166,000 men which could immediately be sent wherever the exigencies of England's *ententes* might require. These precautions were purely defensive; the door was by no means closed to new negotiations with Germany. The conciliatory intentions of the Liberal Government were made evident by the very way in which it proceeded to carry these reforms into effect and in its manner of increasing the naval armaments.

Mr. Asquith, feeling the need of quieting the apprehensions of the country, and, wishing at the same time to pursue his policy of conciliation and of peaceful overtures, proposed for 1909–10, the construction of four dreadnoughts to be ready in 1911, and, in principle, the building of four others which were to be put in dock only if their construction seemed necessary to the Government. These four *conditional* dreadnoughts were stipulated in view of the rapid increase of the German naval programme and indicated England's determination to conserve her acquired position, but left the Government of Berlin the alternative of moderating or putting a stop to the race for armament supremacy by tacit consent and without fresh negotiations. The formal proposals of settlement having failed, it was still hoped that a sentiment of prudence and good sense would prevail in the counsels of the Wilhelmstrasse; it was made

clear to Germany that any such movement would immediately be acknowledged by a reduction in the constructions provided for in the budget.

On the other hand, precautions were taken against a possible and sudden outbreak of German hostility by ordering a concentration of the High Seas Fleet in home waters. A new naval base was to be constructed at Rosyth, in the Firth of Forth, destined to play the same rôle in the North Sea as Portsmouth in the Channel. A naval arrangement with France was to entrust her with the defence of the Mediterranean and was to liberate a certain number of important unities for the reinforcement of the *Home Fleet.*

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These measures of prudence were not without value. Taking advantage of the revolution in Turkey, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was a great stir in Europe: the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, affirmed in 1856 and in 1878 by European congresses, was ignored. The corollary to that principle, namely, "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples," which was advantageous to the aspirations of the nationalities concerned and opposed a barrier to the antagonistic appetites of the Powers, also fell, through the foolhardy action of Baron d'Aerenthal. Servia, who cherished the hope of joining hands some day with her Slavic brothers of the Adriatic coast, was cruelly deceived.

The *Triple Entente* proposed the convocation of a European Congress. A few years earlier at a time when the Vienna Government, still moderate and pacific, manifested a relative independence of its powerful ally at Berlin and lent a willing ear to the suggestions of London, the idea of the Congress would have been accepted without demur. But it soon appeared that the conditions had changed. The Archduke François-Fer-

dinand had devised great plans for his country; he was now looking to Germany for support and protection. The ambitions of the two Germanic Empires were united for the purpose of mutual reinforcement and to emphasize by concerted measures the *Drang nach Osten*, the "push to the East," Germany with the Bagdad Railroad, and Austria by her territorial gains in the Balkans. Servia, extremely incensed, bristled with anger and made an appeal to Russia, her great Slavonic sister. But the Kaiser flashed the white of his sword and Russia yielded as France had yielded in 1905. The idea of the European Congress was abandoned. Some time afterwards, during a visit to Vienna, William II reminded his hosts in a fanfare of rhetoric, that he had come "in shining armour," to take his place beside his Germanic ally and to express his joy at seeing the union of the two peoples so intimately sealed. Through the fault of Austria and Germany, the Eastern question, along with the Moroccan question, was fast becoming a centre of latent conflict whence might burst some day the flame of a great conflagration.

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Until the last moment, England worked for peace, as far as it was possible for her to do so without jeopardizing the century-long inheritance bequeathed her by her ancestors and without abjuring the *ententes* with which she had linked her honour and her hope of preserving the balance of power in Europe.

The situation of the Liberal Cabinet was difficult. It was engaged, at home, in a titanic struggle for the democratic and social transformation of England and for the redress of English wrongs towards Ireland. The reform of the House of Lords, the legislation in favour of working men, the policy of social assistance, the establishment of a progressive tax and of new taxes on the land and

unearned riches, the disestablishment of the Welsh Church, the Irish Home Rule bill, raised against the Liberal party a block of Conservatives, owners and Unionists. Its heterogeneous majority was too precarious and too uncertain to allow of its running the risk of displeasing a single group. Now, among the groups whose votes were indispensable were the Radicals and the Labour party, both of which professed pacific opinions. These groups, feeling that the obstacle to peace came from the tension of English relations with Germany, believed, in their illusory idealism, that it would suffice to multiply the proofs of British goodwill and to hold out a friendly hand to the great nation beyond the Rhine, in order to dissipate the clouds fast gathering in the East. A thorough campaign was undertaken, through the press, by means of meetings and banquets, written addresses covered with hundreds of signatures, and friendly visits graced by high-sounding speeches, to maintain and affirm the kindly sentiments which were based on consanguinity. The Wilhelmstrasse pressed vigorously, if not always discreetly, on this fulcrum in the heart of English opinion and of the parliamentary parties themselves. The partisans of peace did not seem to notice that the names of committee presidents and the financial sponsors for the banquets and voyages had a German ring to them that was disguised by the title of *Sir*, a term that now signifies little more than financial success. They were astonished at times that the most enthusiastic declarations, the most cordial toasts exchanged on English or German soil, were followed by cold declarations from the responsible leaders of German policy. But when the first disagreeable impression had passed they soon forgot all about it, resuming their proceedings and nursing their fond hopes once more.

It is to the man who has directed the Foreign Office

since 1906, to the distinguished diplomatist, Sir E. Grey, that England is beholden for the fact that she was able to keep to a course both of moderation and firmness. Sir E. Grey, whose opinions place him on the side of democratic and social reform, is attached, as the representative of a great Whig family, to the old governmental traditions of English liberalism. He unites in his person that just proportion of idealism and realism which gives weight and lucidity to the best minds of England, this sanity of balance being made possible by the happy tradition of "compromise." His reputation of being a gentleman above all suspicion of insincerity lends great weight to his words whenever, within the limits of diplomatic usage, he takes upon himself to make, on some delicate point, a definite affirmation or negation. In the hours of greatest crises, when the Cabinet was staking its existence and the success of its domestic policy upon some point in its foreign policy, he was quick to find the right words for satisfying the pacifists and reassuring the alarmists. The synthesis he was able to preserve of a broad spirit of conciliation and the firm defence of British interests always made it possible for him to sympathize with the hopes of the former and anticipate the prudence of the latter.

The speeches of the Secretaries of State, in the absence of official documents, permit a reconstitution of the foreign political history of England in the last four years. Semi-official publications, printed since the commencement of the war and inspired by the Government or at least not contradicted by it, and finally the *Blue Book* published shortly after the opening of hostilities, complete the series of facts destined to enlighten us concerning the efforts made by Great Britain to preserve peace without abdication or humiliation.

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In June, 1909, the Chancellor von Bülow retired and was succeeded by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg. It is customary, when a change is made in the ministerial personnel of a State, for the new-comers to specify the main lines of their policy. In Germany, where the Emperor's will is law, the Chancellor is not obliged to render accounts to the representative Assembly. But the question of the relations between Germany and England were sufficiently serious to cause the new director of the Wilhelmstrasse to seek a conversation with the Ambassador of England and to attempt to renew the negotiations which the public declarations of his predecessor had cut short. A conversation took place and the British Ambassador was surprised to receive a proposal for the renewal of *pourparlers* on the subject of a naval arrangement. Germany, however, made their realization dependent on a certain condition: namely, that any special agreement about naval constructions should be subordinated to a general understanding about the main lines of foreign policy in the two countries. The British Government replied that it was ready to accept any arrangement not incompatible with its existing obligations towards other Powers.

Germany could not be unaware that the *Entente* with France and Russia had nothing aggressive about it. The Liberal Government had given repeated proofs of its pacific intentions, and, even had it wished to depart therefrom, it would, inevitably, have suffered the loss of a powerful element of its majority. Frequent public declarations made by members of the Cabinet had clearly specified the character of the *Ententes*. Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman had said in 1905 (16th November), speaking of France and making allusion to the negotiations in course with Russia: " Lord Lansdowne has done well to protest against the idea that the *Entente* may

imply any sentiment of hostility towards another Power. Our supply of good feeling and international goodwill is not exhausted by France. Let us hope that this wise policy will be extended. There is the Russian Empire, and, then, there is Germany."[1]

In 1909, Sir E. Grey renewed these declarations: there were no reasons to prevent the *Entente* with France and Russia being completed by an *Entente* with Germany; England certainly desired nothing better than to form new friendships, on condition that she should remain faithful to the old ones. . . . Now it was precisely from this fidelity to old friendships that Germany wished to turn her. This *general understanding* about the policy of the two countries was nothing less than an attempt to detach England from the *Triple Entente* for the purpose of attaching her to the Germanic alliance. It meant a rupture of that equilibrium which England had sought in a distribution of groups of Powers equal enough to constitute a mutual counterpoise.

The advantages which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg offered in exchange were sufficiently vague. The German naval law was to remain untouched; but it was proposed to "postpone the date of carrying it into effect." Although the number of units could not be decreased, certain important units destined to take the sea in 1914, for example, would be launched only with those scheduled for 1916 or 1917. In return for that England was asked not to intervene if Germany were attacked by one or two Powers. Germany, on her part, would subscribe to the same bond of neutrality in case an attack were directed against England.

[1] The English official documents are laid before Parliament in a *White Book* but they are put on sale for public use, in a *Blue Book*. I am employing this last denomination to avoid confusion with the German *White Book*.

What were the consequences involved in this agreement? England, bound by friendship to France and Russia, had no reason to fear an attack by these two Powers: Germany's promise of neutrality, therefore, would bring her no advantage. But on the other hand, would not the neutrality demanded in exchange tie her hands in the case of a conflict that might compromise the balance of power in Europe? Suppose war was declared by Austria against Russia, Germany would be under obligation to join her ally; Russia attacked by two Powers would have the right of demanding the assistance of France. A European conflict would break out without Germany's appearing to have had a hand in it. And then there was another consideration: supposing that Germany, as it might well be feared, were to direct her operations against France through Belgium, England would not be able to intervene for the purpose of maintaining the independence of this country . . . an independence which she had guaranteed by the treaty of 1839 and which was indispensable to her own security.

For any one able to read between the lines, the proposed agreement was nothing more than an offer of complicity in the designs of intimidation and perhaps of aggression pursued by the two Germanic Empires against France and Russia. When the differences with these two countries had once been settled, the German naval programme, postponed for a time, would resume its course and England would find herself alone face to face with Germany's naval power *plus* her immense military power, which would have acquired in Calais or Antwerp a powerful base with a view to an invasion. Against this danger, German goodwill was the sole guarantee which was left England. And for this hardly enticing prospect, she was to renounce her time-honoured policy of maintaining the balance of power:

she was to violate her friendships and dishonour her name!

In the light of the events in Morocco in 1905 and of the Balkans events of 1908, what clear-sighted statesmen would have dared take stock in German moderation and conciliation, and risk the future and the honour of their country for such a return? It is not surprising then, that the British Government, in the autumn of 1909, declined the Chancellor's offer.

Neither in the terms of the refusal, however, nor in the words or deeds of the English Cabinet in what followed, was any sentiment manifested which was not entirely conciliatory and pacific in nature. On the contrary, the desire to entertain more amicable relations with Germany was to express itself on more than one occasion. The determination to do everything possible to facilitate co-operation was more than once on the point of taking shape in certain effective measures.

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In the absence of any modification of the German naval programme, England dared not expose herself to the risk of being outdistanced. Although resolved in the interest of peace and of the resources of the country to reduce the naval budget to a minimum, the Liberal Government could not reduce the indispensable guarantees of security. The chapter of naval expenses was increased £5,000,000, in 1910. Mr. Asquith in presenting the budget pronounced the following words (July, 1910): "The German Government postulates the impossibility of reducing its naval programme. It asserts, and we are willing to believe, that public opinion in Germany would not allow it to do so." The German Chancellor replied before the Reichstag, that he had not interposed a *non possumus* to the English proposition, but that though it would be impossible to *reduce* the naval programme he

would be ready to study the means of postponing its effective realization. That was the official expression of the semi-official propositions made some time previously. London took the Chancellor at his word, consenting to abandon the ground of the "reduction" of armaments, and placing itself on the ground of a "temporary postponement." The naval programme of the two nations was to be maintained in the *status quo*, but information was to be exchanged periodically concerning the state of the constructions in course, in order to permit a slowing down by mutual consent.

As to the general spirit of the British policy, new assurances were publicly given that it bore no hostility towards any Power whatsoever. Sir E. Grey made a speech in which he measured in just proportions, the affirmation of the pacific intentions of England and the expression of the steadfast continuity and loyalty of her previous engagements.

> It would surprise people [said he] if it were known how easy it has been, in the course of the last three years, I do not say to come to an agreement, but to discuss frankly the differences which have arisen between the two governments (England and Germany). We are very far from desiring that our relations with a State should be such as to render all cordial intercourse with Germany impossible.

Then he added to make the necessary reserves: "Our policy consists in remaining staunchly faithful to every engagement to which we have subscribed, but at the same time, in doing our best to further the reign of goodwill everywhere."

What was to be the attitude of Berlin in response to these measures of conciliation and to the definite proposals which were their first manifestation? In as far as the "temporary postponement" was concerned—a proposi-

tion which had at first appeared of secondary interest to the English Government but to which it had subscribed out of a spirit of goodwill—the Chancellor withdrew his offer (May, 1911), pleading the necessity of furnishing a regular supply to German industry. This pretext was manifestly only a subterfuge. For if the objection were serious, why had it not appeared sooner? The Chancellor, then, had made the concession only in the hope of obtaining a promise of neutrality from England? The promise having escaped him, he discreetly withdrew. As for the matter of a "periodic exchange of information," it was rendered improbable, if not impossible, first by a declaration of the Emperor to the Ambassador of England to the effect that he would never permit an arrangement limiting the development of his fleet and then by one of the Chancellor's speeches (March 30) interpreting the imperial idea. "Who would accept," said Mr. Bethmann-Hollweg, "the idea of weakening his means of defence without being absolutely certain that his neighbour was not secretly exceeding the proportion allotted him by the treaty?" It is not hard to recognize, from such a tone, the suspicious temper of a State which being quite resolved to disregard its own engagements whenever there was any advantage in doing so, was unable to place any confidence in the good faith of others, especially when doing so would thwart its ambitions. The negotiations were singularly embarrassed by this attitude.

There was perseverance, however, on the English side. . . . The Kaiser came to London to attend the inauguration of the monument erected in memory of Queen Victoria. He was well received and acclaimed by the crowd. A few weeks later the Crown Prince arrived to take part in the coronation ceremonies of King George; in the procession he was followed by a delegation of white cuir-

assiers, of blue dragoons, and red hussars who were the object of a popular ovation.

Everything seemed to draw the two countries together and Germany was flattering herself already, no doubt, on winning England's friendship without sacrificing anything of her pretensions, when suddenly, the Agadir affair burst out. A small cruiser with the symbolical name of the *Panther*, in appearing unexpectedly off the coast of Morocco, reminded people that, on every point of the globe Germany was to spring into the circle of her astonished neighbours and to set her paw on the morsel which suited her with the remark: "This belongs to me because I've got claws."

The support given us on this occasion by England will be recollected. By her action, Germany contested, for the second time, England's right to sign agreements with a third Power or to make arrangements which did not take into account the extent of her appetite. The speech of Lloyd George (July, 1911), and the menace of the British fleet maintained under pressure in the North Sea during the months of August and September, saved us from war. . . . Large concessions on our part finally appeased German avidity. The atmosphere recovered its serenity. England manifested her goodwill, by expressing the hope that, since clouds were dissipated, a new era of concord was going to begin, an era perhaps favourable to the resumption of negotiations.

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At the commencement of 1912, Lord Haldane, *persona grata* with the Emperor, left for Berlin, on a business trip, that is to say, as everyone understood on a semi-official mission with a view to renewing the *pourparlers*. Two days before Lord Haldane's arrival in the capital of the Empire, the Kaiser had announced at the opening meeting of the Reichstag considerable increases in the army

and navy appropriations. The new naval law added three battle-ships and numerous submarines to the fleet, 15,000 men to its effectives and 325,000,000 Mk. to the naval budget. The conversation between Lord Haldane and the Chancellor was rendered difficult by this preamble. Lord Haldane, however, had his say and tried to make the future clear, since all negotiations regarding the present seemed useless. He found himself opposed by the previous demand, namely, that Great Britain should sign an agreement with Germany with regard to her general policy. It was simply a renewal of the proposition of 1910. Germany was trying to detach England from France and Russia; following that, it would be seen upon what basis an understanding might be reached with the stipulation, of course, that the German naval programme should go into effect.

On this occasion, Sir E. Grey pushed the spirit of conciliation to the point of considering as possible, not the reversal of British policy, but an explicit agreement with Germany, which he had thought himself unable to accept in 1910. He had the Cabinet's sanction to the following proposition: The two Powers being naturally desirous of establishing mutual peace and friendship, England declares, as far as she is concerned, that she will not engage or co-operate in an aggression against Germany. No aggressive intention against Germany is either the principal or secondary object of the groupings or *ententes* to which England has adhered or will adhere in the future. While remaining faithful to the *Triple Entente*, England, therefore, was ready to sign a formal declaration to the effect that the *Triple Entente* was pacific. Germany refused to agree; she wanted more; she desired the neutrality of England in the conflict which she had, no doubt, already resolved upon. It was this same attempt to secure English neutrality, that Germany was to renew,

in extremis, with Sir E. Grey, on July 29, 1914 . . . going so far as to make an abject proposal, the result of which would have meant nothing less than the dishonour of England.[1]

It remained for England, while rigorously applying the principle of the "double standard," to prove, under all circumstances her desire to maintain by force of good-will and conciliatory mediation, the precarious balance of power of Europe in arms. In 1912, Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, in presenting the naval budget to the House of Commons, declared himself ready to inaugurate, if Germany were willing, what he called the "naval holiday." Let any year whatsoever be chosen, it would be enough for Germany to cease building during a certain length of time, to determine the immediate suspension in the building of a corresponding portion —representing double the number of units—in the English navy. The same proposition was renewed in 1913—without result.

Meanwhile the Italo-Turkish conflict, and then the Balkan War broke out. Europe was living on a volcano. Sir E. Grey multiplied his efforts untiringly to keep the great nations in constant touch and to obtain from them united decisions, without distinction of *Alliances* or *Ententes*. In his speeches in Parliament, he explained the main terms of his policy: thus, as early as March 13,

[1] The semi-official *Gazette of Northern Germany*, published (July, 1915. V. *Le Temps* du 21 Juillet) the text of the agreement which Germany proposed to Lord Haldane in 1912. It is the confirmation of the cynical attempt to entangle England in a veritable complicity. Germany proposed: If one of the high contracting parties is drawn into war against one or several Powers and *if it cannot be established which one was the aggressor*, the other party will observe towards it, at least a benevolent neutrality. . . .

England knew what she had to expect (since the revelations about the falsification of the Ems dispatch and the manœuvres of Bismarck regarding Benedetti) concerning the competency of Germany to dissimulate her aggressions.

1911: "We have the strongest desire to see those who are our friends on good terms with all the Powers; we regard such good relations with satisfaction and without jealousy." He intervened to try and reconcile Russia (one of the Powers of the *Entente*) and Austria (one of the Powers of the *Alliance*). He kept up cordial relations with Italy who might serve as an intermediary between two groups. On July 10, 1912, he expressed himself once more as follows: "The existence of separate diplomatic groups in no way prevents frankness or an open exchange of views when questions of mutual interest arise; if this practice is established, the separate diplomatic groups will not necessarily be in opposite diplomatic camps."

Thanks to the conciliatory dispositions of France and Russia, England was thus able, during the troubled period of the years 1912 and 1913, to play felicitously the rôle of peacemaker.

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When, after the assassination of Sarajevo, the grave events of July, 1914, took place, England and France being less directly concerned in the Austro-Serbian quarrel, bent all their efforts towards the maintenance of peace.

England especially, who was not bound by any alliance, was well suited, even to the last, for making an effort to avert peril. She devoted herself to the task with a diligence, energy, and patience which would have triumphed, had they not come into collision, in the German camp, with a cynical purpose long formed. It is enough to recall briefly the supreme efforts of Sir E. Grey.

On July 23d, Austria sent her ultimatum to Servia, exacting a reply within forty-eight hours. During this short interval of forty-eight hours, England made three attempts to secure peace. 1st, she insisted at Vienna, in concert with Russia, to have the time extended. She asked Berlin to join her in her earnest entreaties. All

that Berlin consented to do was to forward the English request to the Ballplatz. 2d, she proposed to France, Germany, and Italy to unite with her with a view to mediation between Austria and Russia. France and Italy accepted; Russia declared herself ready to accept welcome intervention. Germany declared that she would wait and see whether the nature of the relations between Austria and Russia rendered intervention necessary (let us not forget that the time limit was forty-eight hours). 3d, the English representative at Belgrade received the mission, along with the French and Russian representatives to advise Servia to go as far as possible in her concessions.

Meanwhile the forty-eight hours had almost spent themselves. Two hours before the fatal moment, a copy of the Servian reply reached the Foreign Office. It was, as is well known, remarkably subdued and conciliatory. Sir E. Grey immediately asked Berlin to urge Vienna to declare herself satisfied. Once more Berlin was content to communicate the English demand to her ally.

The Austro-Servian conflict was, then, inevitable, and Russia had signified that she would not remain indifferent. Sir E. Grey proposed a Conference of the Powers not directly interested: England, France, Germany, and Italy. Germany refused without explanation. On the 28th the Austrians commenced the bombardment of Belgrade. On the 29th, Russia decreed partial mobilization. Sir E. Grey, after an exchange of views with Russia, who even then showed herself ready to go to any extreme to avoid the irreparable, telegraphed to Berlin asking Germany to designate any mode of mediation whatsoever which would be more acceptable than the proposed Conference. This appeal received a strange reply.

To the disinterested and generously humane proposal

of England, Germany replied with the cynical offer of the bargain of which I have spoken. This bargain was destined to transform a rival into an accomplice, until the time came to crush her in turn. England was to assist in the struggle as a spectator under the guarantee that Germany would not lay hands on Holland (that is to say would be satisfied with the economic empire of this country, without absorbing it) and would not annex Belgium (with the same *sous-entendu* concerning the means of communication and the ports—and all of this on condition that Belgium deliver passage to the German armies), and finally, would not seize any territory in France, her colonies alone being destined to constitute the price of victory.[1]

[1] V. No. 85 of the English *Blue Book:*

SIR E. GOSCHEN, BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN TO SIR EDWARD GREY

(*Received July 29th*)

Telegraphic. BERLIN, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor tonight. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia, a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war which might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was

The English Government could no longer have any doubt as to the intentions of Germany. Nevertheless, its inclination for peace led it to stand aloof from the conflict (at the risk of causing France the cruel uncertainty which she experienced from July 29th to August 4th), as long as her vital interests were not threatened, that is to say, until the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Our Ambassador at London urged Sir E. Grey to declare himself in favour of the Franco-Russian cause, setting forth that this single step would no doubt be sufficient to restrain Germany.[1] Sir E. Grey replied that he had distinctly declared to the German Ambassador that England by no means promised to remain neutral; but that he could do no more; that the events would determine the attitude of the English people and its Government. A step undertaken by the President of the Republic with the English Ambassador at Paris, had no

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over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty. . . .

No. 101

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies

[1] July 29th. *Blue Book*, piece 87.

more success than the preceding.[1] Finally a personal letter from M. Poincaré to the King of England received the same evasive reply.[2]

On August 1st, the day of Germany's declaration of war against France, England had not given any assurance that she would place herself on our side. Our Atlantic fleet, reduced to a few units since the adoption of the plan of concentration in the Mediterranean, steered home for the Straits of Dover at the risk of finding itself alone and face to face with the immense German fleet.

It was not until the second of August that Sir E. Grey announced that by reason of the convention relating to the two fleets, the English navy would not permit an attack against our coasts. The Royal Government, however, would make no further engagements. Finally the invasion of Belgium dealt English opinion the blow which rendered any further abstention out of the question.

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are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. . . .

. . . We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

. . . And I will say this: "If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her Allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. . ."

[1] July 30th. *Blue Book*, piece 99.

[2] July 31st. *Second Blue Book.*

England sent an ultimatum to Berlin, and, after the historic interview during which the Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg termed the treaty of 1839 a "scrap of paper," England declared war.

From the preceding facts it results that England being animated with a sincere desire for peace, kept up negotiations with Germany for ten years, giving her assurance by means of formal declarations and proving by acts that no coalition existed against the German Empire and that no "encircling process" was being put into effect against it. But Germany thirsted for new riches and for new lands: by the formidable increase of her army, by the construction of a fleet growing every year more powerful, by the diffusion among her people of the horrible doctrine of force, she was getting ready to lay brutal hold on the supremacy of Europe and the Empire of the world. In presence of this grim design of aggrandizement and of domination, without any consideration of right, justice, or humanity, of what possible avail were pacific advances, concessions, or assurances of goodwill?

Tardily, the Powers of the *Triple Entente* resolved to forearm against the assaults of force. While it is true that they have placed themselves in a certain state of inferiority, on the other hand, they have prepared by their attachment to concord, equity, and peace, a brighter future for Europe. If the United States join them, as one may hope, they will have made possible the reign of better relations and of higher justice in the world.

CHAPTER VI

England, Mother of Liberty. (1215-1815)

ENGLAND laboured for peace as long as there was a ray of hope that the conflict might be decided peacefully; she rose valiant and inflexible to defend her homes and ideals when it appeared that the enterprises of force were no longer respectful of the most sacred foundations of human justice. In her attachment to peace and in her determination to defend herself without weakness even to the end, I see the affirmation of the noble purpose of a great people proud of its traditions and institutions which it knows are its honour and safeguard and which it rightly considers as essential contributions to the universal work of civilization. The particular product of English genius, by which it has led other people on the highway of progress and thanks to which it has sown one of those seeds of moral worth destined sooner or later to spring up and fructify in every conscience, is the creation of Liberty. First, political liberty, without which the air breathed by man remains heavy, sterile, and ill-suited to the noble engendering of ideas, energies, and generous sentiments; and then moral liberty, that pure growth of the heights, the crown of centuries of collective effort: such are the benefits which England secured for herself. These she has set before the world. And she is determined to defend them with all the prowess of her arms and all the strength of her heart.

. . . . . .

English liberty was for ages an indigenous product of the British Isles, favoured in its growth by the very isolation of the nation, an unusual extra-European fruit of particularly advantageous geographical and historical conditions. For many a decade English liberty remained the exclusive privilege of an insular people, jealous of their insularity. But, in the course of centuries, the idea broadened and became humanized, waxing richer with the developments which it had provoked in foreign consciences and gathering, through reaction, a force of expansion which it did not possess at the outset.

At least, potentially, English liberty was already in existence when the great intellectual movement of the Renaissance brought to it the vigour and breadth of Hellenic thought. It was Plato's *Republic* that partly inspired the visionary Thomas More to write that *Utopia* in which he anticipated, as early as the first years of the sixteenth century, not only the civil and political guarantees of liberty but the economic, intellectual, and social guarantees as well. Protection of the poor against the rich, regulation of work, public health, religious tolerance, equal justice, education for all—such are the measures or principles which were long ago laid down by Thomas More and which our own epoch is just beginning to understand and achieve. What a noble accent there is in the words in which he demands *for all* the right of leisure, so that all may have the opportunity of developing within themselves faculties properly human.[1]

[1] "For whie in the institution of that weale publique, this ende is onelye and chiefly pretended and mynded, that what time maye possibly be spared from the necessarye occupations and affayre of the commonwealth, all that the citizens shoulde withdrawe from the bodely service to the free libertye of the mind, and garnisshinge of the same. For herein they suppose the felicitye of this liffe to consiste." From *The Seconde booke of Utopia*, translated by Ralphe Robynson (ed. Rev. J. Lumby, Cam. Univ. Press, 1897).

Wherefore in the institutions of the Republic, the object that should be especially sought after and desired is that all the time the citizens can economize from the necessary occupations and affairs of the commonwealth, should be wrested from bodily tasks and consecrated to the adornment and liberation of their minds.

Then, it was the movement of Puritanism which, although tainted in certain quarters with authoritative narrowness, nevertheless, through its revolt against the tyranny of the Stuarts, communicated a powerful impulse to individualism and independence. Milton became its mouthpiece. In the fiery pamphlets, which as historiographer of Cromwell he published in the name of the English people, one feels the warm thrill of the revolutionist and the noble enthusiasm of the humanist who has been nurtured in the liberty of antiquity. Not even in modern times have juster words and bolder words been written to claim the liberty of the press.

And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter. . . . When a man hath been labouring the hardest labour in the deep mines of knowledge, hath furnished out his finding in all their equipage, drawn forth his reasons as it were a battle ranged, scattered and defeated all objections in his way, calls out his adversary into the plain, offers him the advantage of wind and sun, if he please, only that he may try the matter by dint of argument; for his opponents then to skulk, to lay ambushments, to keep a narrow bridge of licensing where the challenger should pass, though it be valour enough in soldiership, is but weakness and cowardice in the wars of Truth.

The Puritans, who reckoned among them the sect of the "Levellers," were the first to include, in the concrete claims of the people, the civil and political equality of all before the Judgment of God. To them historians have been able to trace, in full justice, the origin of the democratic idea.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Hobbes and Locke set forth the doctrine of the "social contract" from which Rousseau was to draw great profit and which, through him, was destined to become the *credo* of the French Revolution. No doubt, French rationalism had to clarify the ideas of liberty and fire them with its *élan* and enthusiasm, before they could be carried into the world to become the soul of whatever nations were capable of rising to this height of idealism. To the French Revolution the world owes the application of the principle of liberty to the social problem and to the problem of nationalities. But the Revolution itself recognized its debt to England. Indeed Montesquieu and Rousseau were not the only ones to render homage to their British precursors; a whole party, in the *Constituante* and in the *Législative*, declared itself indebted to the English Constitution.

The French Revolution, acting by counter-shock on English consciences, has, little by little, during the course of the nineteenth century, determined the evolution of the earlier conception of liberty. By a broadening movement, conformable, no doubt, to its particular essence, but accelerated by the influence of our rationalism, English liberty has become democratic and finally socialistic. Today the thought of the French and English is in harmony both as to principles and applications. Therefore they are able to unite and raise a barrier against the insufferable claims of the German idea, which, under cover of an atrocious war not only upon armies but also upon nations,

aims at nothing less than the submission of Europe to the yoke of German militarism and German "state-ism."

. . . . . .

The English and French humanists of the Renaissance, and the French and English philosophers of the eighteenth century expressed in all its breadth the problem of liberty. They were careful not to separate free thought and free institutions. The citizen has a right to independence and to the guarantee of just and equal laws, so that man may progress in the conquest of truth. In the course of the eighteenth century, the *sæculum rationalisticum* which witnessed the admirable rise of both natural and moral sciences, liberty and truth formed an indissoluble alliance. Under the new order, truth participated in the supple and undulated movement of liberty: truth was no longer absolute and fixed, but relative and continually in a state of becoming. It was considered to be the product of the thinkers of all times and of all countries, who had brought and were still continuing to bring their contribution to the sum total. Hence arose the historical and cosmopolitan conception of the moral sciences.

Germany, who ranked at that time among the intellectual forces of Europe, had her part in the diffusion of this conception, the most fruitful of all those which favoured the expansion of modern thought. Goethe, finding himself on common ground with the French and English humanists and philosophers, borrowed from them the word "culture" to designate an effort to assimilate the best of universal thought, which was in turn to serve as the starting-point of a new effort, directed by all those who think towards a new stage of truth. The diversity of talents, of civilizations, and of races is, in this conception, a favourable element of progress. The chances of error counterbalance each other; fruitful ideas are generated more plentifully in different environments formed

severally according to the law of their history, traditions, and national temperament. "Culture" was thus a humanizing force and a promise of peace.

England and France have remained true to this culture. Germany abjured it on the day when she set her face against the great thought of Goethe, or faintly invoked it only under the cloak of hypocrisy. She renounced "culture" for *Kultur*, a narrow and brutally German idea which, to serve the plunder-plan of Prussianized Germany, exalts mechanism, passive obedience, and the horrible doctrine of force.

Kultur, the idealization of the most selfish and materialistic elements of the German character has become the *credo* of aggression and domination. If *Kultur* were to triumph, only an intolerable uniformity would survive the ruins of humanism and liberty. Individuals and peoples would be forced under the constraint of an arid scientific method (*strengwissenschaftliche Methode*) which finds its highest expression in scientific war. Under the pressure of force (*Faustrecht*), all spontaneous *élan*, all beauty, all dignity would be stifled. The Germans would bring about the unification of the world by the whipping-thong of the *Feldwebel* and by the flogging-rod of the *Schullehrer*. As for us, through the integral application of liberty, we wish to live and let live, to permit the world to achieve its union in variety and diversity through the co-operation of national energies and under the protection of particular traditions and universal reason. Our opponents would impose their *Kultur* on all; we are defending *Culture* as it was created by the Latins and Anglo-Saxons, as it was understood by Goethe, as it is practiced in our universities and in the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and as it is set forth by French and English writers.

Through culture, each ethnic group, while remaining

attached to the traditions bequeathed by its ancestors and to the principles imposed by its history, profits from the growing treasure of human wisdom. Thus develops a civilization, both individual and universal, that is marked by the distinctive signs proper to each national centre and that is enriched by the conquests of reason. And thus is rendered more precise the great hope of tomorrow—a society of nations that is consistent with the highest type of the society of individuals, built up of spontaneity and liberty, under the unifying action of a few great currents of thought operating in common.

Kultur is the exclusive and intolerant notion of a method of life, of a *Sittlichkeit*, conceived by the German mind within the limits of German science and German militarism which a people of chemists, foremen, and corporals wish to impose upon the world for the world's happiness. This people, born for passive obedience, accustomed to submission to an autocratic régime and a hierarchy of castes and classes, raised too quickly to a material prosperity founded on mechanism and bureaucracy, nourishes the arrogant idea of bending all men to its soulless discipline . . . by force. Human life is reduced to an ambition of acquisitiveness and of self-gratification, which has no aim outside itself. This ambition must needs utterly efface the original discoveries of noble civilizations, the aspirations which idealistic races have placed higher than matter, the generous dreams which the great epochs of history have pursued, maladroitly at times, but without debasement. *Kultur* makes no distinction between the means and the end, attaching itself to a sort of illuminism directed the wrong way, which exalts scientific precision, technical skill, and riches to the pinnacle of human effort after having brutally overthrown art, reason, and conscience. *Kultur* is the sinister fanaticism of power and force,—treaties trampled under foot, nations assaulted

and crucified, humanity's laws contemned or violated, the creations of genius mutilated or destroyed. Upon these ruins is to be established the reign of *Deutschtum*. The beneficent cosmopolitanism towards which the world was slowly progressing through sympathies, alliances, arbitrage, reciprocal concessions, mutual sacrifice of desires in the expansion of talents and national ideals, must needs yield to a malevolent cosmopolitanism, sprung up like pestilence in the wake of destruction and massacre.

Germany [declares Mr. Ostwald, chemist and metaphysician], on the morrow of victory, will establish the confederation of the States of Europe, under her protection and supremacy. . . . Germans have discovered the great factor of the civilization of the future, the factor of organization. . . . We are waging war only for the purpose of conducting France, England, and Russia, from the stage of a horde, in which they still exist, to the stage of an organized collectivity, which is the goal of the social effort of humanity. I am a pacifist and an internationalist: the peace and union of nations will come into existence only through the predominance of Germany, destined to become the intellectual centre of gravity of the universe.

If, in these predictions, one overlooks the naïve insolence of Teutonic infatuations, it still remains true that the principle which the intellectual leaders of Germany knowingly seek to destroy is the principle of liberty,—the conquest which the practical genius of England and the philosophical genius of France have achieved in the course of long centuries of history. Upon the principle of liberty reposes the independence of individuals within the State organism as well as the independence of nations within the society of States. Liberty, no doubt, is not enough in itself. Although liberty assures the full ex-

pansion of the faculties, the genial fruition of the supreme force of personality in the joy of independence and dignity of self-command, yet liberty also may cause fancy to degenerate into caprice; and independence into dispersion and incoherence. Liberty must be tempered by discipline, limited by order, rendered fecund by co-operation. The great laws which govern human activity are never simple, nor do they act alone. They influence each other reciprocally, so that alternately, through the acceleration and neutralization of their effects, is produced an equilibrium favourable to what one may consider for a time as rectitude and truth. All fruitful action, all justice, all happiness, all progress which is not the counterfeit of a retrogression, are the result of a compromise, of the combination of divergent and often opposed principles. Such is the price of human wisdom.

Now this is a truth which, owing to the collective aberration where Germany suffered herself to drift, a German brain is not permitted to conceive. The power of the Germans is born of force; their productivity is born of mechanism; their prosperity, such as it is—I mean that prosperity which is estimated according to quantity and not quality—is born of organization; they establish force, mechanism, and organization as absolute principles, which justify in their eyes an inhuman aggression. We do not misappreciate these principles; we give them their place, through necessity or through just admission of their value; we were ready, indeed, if Germany had cared to cease brandishing force as a menace, to learn from her lessons of patience and of economy in work. But we could not admit the imperative and excessive doctrine of machine-made materialism which resulted in the worship of force and in the negation of liberty. In our eyes *the right of force* does not outweigh the *force of right*, mechanism does not excel the supple play of intellectual and

moral activity, nor organization, the free development of individuality.

England and France, having had the glory of creating a conception of life nobly national and highly humane, cannot abandon without self-stultification the collective work of the generations of their race. Nor will they do so, since to this work is attached their deepest emotions, their honour, and their conscience.

The sincerity and breadth of their ideal permit them to understand its variations among peoples who have the same lofty aims. Not being exclusive, they are capable of sympathy. Not being deluded by self-idolatry, they can respect in others national aspirations founded on race-characteristics, traditions, and history. Whatever be the injustices or errors which they may have committed in the past, they are still sufficiently frank to recognize these errors and generous enough to repair these injustices. They are striving to create an era of right, by extending to the relations between peoples the precepts and guarantees which govern the relations between individuals. Artisans of progress themselves, they are seeking to apply to the international régime—avoiding any approach to an Utopia—what is concrete and realizable in the moral ideal. Thus on common ground they have met to defend the existence and individualism of peoples against the German attempt at forcible levelling by the sword and by *Kultur*.

For England and for France the essential principle at stake in the struggle is the principle of liberty. Liberty of the individual, threatened by militarism, scientific mechanism, political despotism and administrative tyranny; liberty of nations, threatened by the reign of war, the system of intimidation and terror, the ambitions and pretentions of *Kultur:* such are the great principles for which they are fighting, such are the universal benefits

they wish to safeguard; theirs is a contest for man's right to think, and feel, and understand life according to the generous dictates of his heart and reason,—a contest for the triumph of *moral liberty*.

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England developed, before France, the institutions which guarantee to the citizen the independence of his person and his opinions, equal justice and self-government. She is the Mother of Liberty. We shall better understand the ideal which she is upholding today by force of arms, if we trace its genesis and determine its significance in the light of history.

England is the only country in Europe in which, as early as the Middle Ages, the subjects of the Crown were citizens, protected against exaction and arbitrariness, associated with the Government, and fixing for themselves the financial contribution to be assessed and the use to which it was to be put. In this way, among them, the spirit of liberty developed very early and was maintained with a constancy and moderation which links their name indissolubly with the very idea of government of the people, by the people.

It was her privileged geographical situation and the particular circumstances of her history that permitted England to attain so early, political personality and maturity and to become the preceptor of other nations. This island protected by the natural defence of the ocean, became inexpugnable from the day when the Normans had accomplished its unification and organization. From 1066, the date of the landing of William the Conqueror on the coast of Sussex up to the time of the Camp of Boulogne, in 1804, England knew no threat of invasion. Everyone recognizes the vanity of Napoleon's attempt. This immunity, coupled with her relatively small dimensions (for, in the initial period, one should exclude

Scotland and Ireland), has made her an apt field for practicing the difficult task of constructing free government.

Strictly speaking there was no feudalism in England.[1] On the morrow of the conquest, William I was the sole master of the country; the Barons who had followed the campaign with him received as a reward for their services certain "domains" which could never be transformed into "States." If one of these great vassals appeared to seek independence, the royal armies had but little distance to cover before finding themselves under the walls of his castle. These Barons, therefore, were little inclined to play the part of small potentates. To hold in check the royal power they combined one with another and opposed the united forces of their small vassals and dependents to the armed forces of the central authority. Now all union supposes a common principle of action: the Barons, by the force of things, must have had in mind, what we should call a platform . . . which was already the embryo of a constitution. Having need of the help of their liegemen, they must have treated them with circumspection, taking note of their complaints, defending their interests along with their own, and later making place for them in the council which they imposed upon the king.

The *subjects* in England formed a class of more weight and importance than the corresponding class on the Continent. Among them from the start, before the development of town life and the rise of an urban middle-class, was a great number of freeholders. They were the descendants of the soldiers of the Conquest, who had received the gracious gift of a portion of arable land, or of the former Saxon proprietors of the soil whom the Norman kings had adroitly and liberally conciliated by

[1] V. E. Boutmy: *Développement de la Constitution Anglaise*, Plon, 1887.

leaving them in possession of their lands and independence. Hence there existed in England, a considerable time before the rise of commerce and the growth of personal fortune could give birth to the movement of the *Communes* in France, a nation of free men, founded on the most solid basis known to mediæval society—landed property. Instead of the King seeking the support of the people against the encroachments of the nobles, as was the case in France, here the nobles secured the support of the people against the Crown. From what precedes, one can deduce the extent to which the line of political evolution in England must have diverged from the line of political evolution in France. In France, the King finally overcame the resistance of the nobles, and assumed absolute power, brutally withdrawing their charters from the helpless *Communes*. In England, when the King tried to oppose one class to another and to divide in order to reign, he found a whole nation already too strongly organized for his purposes.

The instituting of regular sources of revenue—a vital necessity of all States—determined the initial resistance to royal arbitrariness. Thomas Becket refused to pay the tax which Henry II wished to appropriate on his own authority from the proceeds of the Church domains. Becket paid for his courageous resistance with his life. But some years later, in 1188, the tithe of the Crusade was fixed and apportioned through the agency of a jury of tax-payers, among whom were free men. It was significant to see a dignitary of the Church, that is to say, a representative of the great moral force of the Middle Ages thus taking in hand the defence of the subject against the régime of "do-as-I-please"; through his intervention the spirit of independence of the Barons received the moral sanction of Right. Later, another Primate of England, Stephen Langton, played the leading

rôle in the revolt of the Barons against John Lackland, 1215.

The King reduced to powerlessness, solemnly consented to recognize the guarantees hitherto accorded intermittingly and precariously, which were henceforth to be recorded in the Great Charter—the first rudiment of a constitution that Europe has known. Two essential articles were expressly stipulated therein: first, no tax shall be imposed without the consent of the Council of the Kingdom (*nisi per commune consilium*); second, no man shall be imprisoned or punished unless he has been judged by his peers, according to the laws of the Kingdom. The two essential principles of private and public law were laid down for the first time in a modern state since the fall of the Roman Empire; the right of the subject to approve the expenditures for the commonweal and the guarantee of personal independence against all acts of tyranny. This was, no doubt, only a first step. The provisions of the Great Charter were too general not to permit of their being evaded; then again, the goodwill of the kings was far from being favourable to the application of such provisions. However, the solemn ceremony of the signing of the Charter, on the island of Runnymede in the middle of the Thames, was one of those events in the life of a people which assume a symbolical value because they synthesize profound sentiments still indistinctly expressed and because they are pregnant with future possibilities.

The Great Charter intimates the whole future of England. No doubt, for centuries, the nation was to be obliged to maintain a struggle against the Crown, to obtain the respect of the engagements entered upon in 1215, and to create the organs of government fit to secure its execution. But henceforth, Right was founded; and

England was destined to offer a spectacle unique in the political annals of the world. Each time she was to conquer a new privilege, she was to appeal to the precedents, the established traditions, and, as they were termed later, the solemn guarantees of the Constitution. The revolutions themselves were to be simply restorations of liberty, and for this reason, were to assume such a character of moderation and legality that the attacks of the royal power alone could provoke the people into armed revolt.

What is important to notice here is the fact that the Great Charter was an agreement entered upon by the King with the whole nation and not merely with the Barons and Bishops whose material and moral pressure was the determining cause of this first constitutional act. So, as early as the first years of the thirteenth century, that is nearly a hundred years before Philippe le Bel, in France, had summoned the first *Etats Généraux*, the common land-owners in England were already strong enough and possessed sufficient real power to oblige the nobility to consider the expediency of defending their interests and of securing their support. Already was noticeable throughout the country the formation of a national spirit, founded on the solidarity of the classes and on the common attachment to legal liberty, pledging respect for the rights of the subject on the one hand, and, on the other hand, respect for constitutional authority. Moral forces, forces of imagination and sentiment were henceforth attached to the idea of constituted liberty and formed its most solid stay. Two centuries before French patriotism became embodied in Jeanne d'Arc, the liberator of France, there existed a type of English patriotism, made up of rudimentary yet perceptible idealism, of law, of justice, and of liberty.

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What explains this unity of aspiration among the English people is a certain union of classes, or at least of the upper and middle-classes, which is indeed very striking if one compares it with the division that prevailed in French society at the same epoch. The English nobility of this time (with the exception of a few carping barons like Simon de Montfort) does not deal with Royalty as one power with another; it is not a military caste; it is an aristocracy, very proud, occasionally violent, but resting its independence on the ground of right. It does not specialize in the profession of arms, no doubt because it has fewer occasions for exercising the profession than have the nobility of the Continent. Normally these barons and lords live on their estates in frequent contact with the country-folk, without any cessation of relations with the free land-owners or the burghers of the towns.

When the Kings had admitted that a regular assembly should unite periodically to vote subsidies and, later on, that this assembly should make laws, the nobles did not separate from the clergy and the representatives of the middle-class. The lesser nobility (knights and squires) and the lesser clergy, whose interests were similar to those of the freemen, formed the habit of deliberating with them in a special hall and thus, by accidental arrangement, the assembly became divided into two Houses, upper and lower, each a centre of interests rather than of classes. In what was to be called the Parliament, no division by Orders accentuated the distance between the different elements of the nation. The upper nobility, direct heirs of the ancient Grand Council, remained in closer touch with the King, as was natural, and became more directly acquainted with the secrets of State. On the other hand, the Commons, by no means exclusively composed of the Third Estate but including the country squires, the landed

proprietors, and the notables, alone enjoyed the prerogative—since they represented the greater part of the country—of voting the taxes.

Consequently, there were no conflicting interests or influences, no abusive privileges, no oppression of one class by another, no disdainful treatments or humiliations, and no insuperable frontiers. Later, when the country rose against the tyranny of the Stuarts, some of the upper nobility were found among the adversaries of the King and some of the Commoners among his partisans. These conditions were favourable to the gradual and regular development of free institutions: the constitutional history of England is a pacific history in which the two revolutions of the seventeenth century were only accidents, without profound repercussion on the temperament of the people and on the character of the institutions.

The assembly at Runnymede in 1215 was the first step in national representation. It laid down the essential principles of all government control by the nation, namely the right reserved to the representatives to vote taxes, to fix their amount, and to discuss their use. That is precisely the origin of all limitation of the royal power, of all guarantee against absolutism, and of all juridical establishments of liberty. Being master of the budget, the Parliament could refuse the necessary resources for such and such a policy and exercise an immediate influence on the direction of State affairs. In proportion with the progress of the juridical idea within the social body, this right of criticism, of counsel, and of control, was destined to develop into the right to legislate, and, in the course of centuries, after struggles, many of which were pacific, the King was to be finally dispossessed of the legislative power and to retain only the executive power. Such is the separation of powers which Montesquieu, a disciple and admirer of English political law, designated as the

very essence of a Limited Monarchy, the first condition of liberty. Montesquieu did not see the end of the constitutional conflict in England. The last victory of this conflict, before the advent of Democracy, was the delegation of the executive power to the Cabinet. The King became the impartial arbitrator between the parties, a sovereign respectful of the will of the people. He no longer exercised anything beyond a discreet influence, but being unable to do wrong ("the King can do no wrong") was so much the more respected and became the living symbol of the nation. Let us pass in review the stages of this gradual and incessant progress, noteworthy in that it was almost free from crises.

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It was in the middle of the thirteenth century, in 1254, that the Council of the King first assumed the name of *the Parliament*, and that the principle of elective representation was established for the Knights. The rebel, Simon de Montfort, during the short period of his rule, called together a Parliament of which he increased the membership by introducing representatives of the free land-owners and of the Commoners. The elements of the representative assembly were thus constituted. It was Edward I the King-legislator, the Justinian of the English Middle Ages, who consecrated definitely the rights so far acquired by convoking, in 1295, the *Model Parliament*. This great king, anticipating future progress, adopted the following motto: Keep the pact (*Pactum serva*), thus taking upon himself, *vis-à-vis* his people, the engagement which the French people were not able to exact from their King till five centuries later, in 1790.

In the fourteenth century the Parliament separated into two Houses, the attributes of which were not at first distinctly defined. But in 1407, Henry IV., having applied

to the House of Lords to obtain the fixing of the rate of the "aid-tax," the Commons refused to accept the decision of the House of Lords, and the King recognized the rule "that in matters of finance, he would receive the resolution of the two Houses through the *Speaker* of the House of Commons." By this same decree, the King recognized the people's right—the right of the whole people—to fix the expenses of which they supported the charge, and guaranteed, at the same time, the liberty of the Lower House to deliberate.

The fifteenth century was that sombre and tragic epoch of the history of England in which two factions of the nobility grouped themselves around rival pretenders and came near destroying each other in the long and terrible War of the Roses. In the course of this sanguinary quarrel the influence of the nobility was annihilated and when peace was finally made the great families had disappeared. During this long eclipse of the power of the aristocracy, the Parliament continued to discharge its duties. The nation lived its life notwithstanding all; indeed, it was in a still better position to maintain its safe-guards because the power of the Crown was weaker. The House of Commons assumed the upper hand and turned its consolidated situation to account in constituting itself more and more a deliberative assembly. Thus precedents were established, certain forms and limits were set up, destined to permit Parliament, as soon as the circumstances should be favourable, to evolve, thanks to the solid support of precedent, along the lines already indicated.

The internal struggle of the fifteenth century resulted in the absolutism of the Tudors. The Crown, disembarrassed of the resistance of the great families, allowed itself to be carried away by an ambition for irresponsible power without check or control . . . the sort of ambition cynically extolled by Machiavelli, which was then in favour among

most European powers. Henry VII created a new nobility entirely devoted to his interests. Henry VIII broke with the Roman Catholic Church, dispossessed the abbeys and monasteries, and succeeded in winning the new nobles to his support by distributing to them the ecclesiastical domains. The Tudors, however, had to reckon with their people. They dared not abolish the institution of Parliament; but they invaded the limitations which it imposed by procuring new sources of revenue that were exempt from the control of the national representatives. But the forms of liberty still persisted and not many years were to pass before these forms were to become once more the substantial and effective guarantees of Parliament. The Tudors (except Bloody Mary, whose reign only lasted six years) found a means of obtaining pardon for their political absolutism by favouring the Reform. England became Protestant. Parallel with the official creed, sects were formed, to which the sovereign, although he had become the head of the English Church, raised no objections. The spirit of free examination, thus favoured, re-acted on the spirit of political liberty. And so, when the Stuarts outbidding the Tudors, attempted to bring about the triumph of the royal will and pleasure in both the governmental and ecclesiastical spheres, the people rose in revolt.

The revolution, which was to cost Charles I his crown and his head, remained within the law as long as the King did not try by force to put an end to Parliament. However, even in the early days of the reign the energy of the voices raised in protest showed that there was something radically different in the temper of the nation since the already distant epoch preceding the Renaissance, the Reform, and the rise of the middle-class. The representatives were no longer disposed to bow assent to the goodwill of the King. Accordingly, when the favourite Buck-

ingham had provoked the indignation of the country by his insolence and debauchery, Sir John Eliot, speaking with a boldness unheard of in the annals of the Assembly, rose in Parliament to demand that Buckingham forfeit the duties of Prime Minister. Eliot was thrown into prison; but, as a consequence, the cause of liberty, which had thus its first martyr, was greatly strengthened.

The *Petition of Rights*, 1628, reminded the monarch of the obligations of the Crown frequently acknowledged since the signing of the Great Charter, and Charles believed it prudent to let the nation suppose, at least, that he recognized such obligations. The struggle continued with spirit, on the constitutional ground: Pym affirmed the ascendancy of the House of Commons over the House of Lords, and over royalty itself; Hampden refused to pay the tax of *ship-money*, which had not been legally voted by Parliament; the poet Milton became the mouth-piece of the austere fervour of the Puritans, who had decided not to allow the re-establishment by an act of authority of a creed against which the country had pronounced its judgment. The first acts of hostility on the part of the Royalists were checkmated by Cromwell's organization of the brigade of Iron-sides which finally overthrew the Crown.

The Monarchy of Divine Right existed no longer. Charles II, who was able to resume, thanks to the lassitude of the nation, some of the plans of his father, was obliged, however, to accept the absolute control of Parliament in financial matters. There were no more periods in English history during which the King failed to convoke the Parliament; the constitutional organ of political liberty had become the necessary machinery of Government. At the same time, personal liberty, already affirmed in the *Great Charter* was sanctioned by the *Habeas Corpus Act*, which rendered all British subjects inviolable.

The second Revolution, brought about by the folly and fanaticism of James II, was marked by but few acts of hostility. The resulting change of dynasty, imposed by the will of the people, accentuated the constitutional character of the King, who became the first servant of the nation. The ancient immunities of the Kingdom were codified in the *Bill of Rights* (1689), which gave them a clearer form without changing their essence. It was stipulated that the budget should be voted annually, and, hence, that Parliament should hold annual sessions. The disposal of the budget involved legislative power; so the King gave up taking any measure without the approbation of Parliament.

Soon after, a conflict having arisen between the Cabinet and the House of Commons, the latter consented to resume the normal course of deliberations indispensable to the State administration, only after a new group of Cabinet Ministers had been chosen and accepted by Parliament. The ministers who had been, until then, servants of the Crown, became the executive agents of the Houses and were indirectly selected by the majority. Parliamentarism was henceforth in possession of its full means of action. The eighteenth century was to be employed in fixing the procedure, in rendering the machinery workable, and in creating the state of mind, or, as Montesquieu puts it, the "habits" without which institutions are but vain forms.

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The two revolutions of the seventeenth century were the work of the middle-class; both were profitable to the directing élite of this class, composed of the important landed-proprietors who were styled the *gentry*. The rich commoners of the towns were admitted into the gentry whenever they bought an estate. The Government, then, was in the hands of an oligarchy whose power was

based on landed-propriety. It was this class and this government which definitely won for England the guarantees of liberty.

In the nineteenth century when the people became conscious of themselves, and, stimulated by the example of the French Revolution, wished to participate in political life, the ranks of the oligarchy opened little by little under pressure from below and the Democracy grew in strength, without any violent conflict, but with enough prudence to conserve the gains of the past, and with enough pliancy to leave room for the promises of the future.

The English middle-classes won liberty for themselves and exercised it, in the eighteenth century, not only with the jealous concern of defending themselves against the encroachments of the royal power, but also with a high sense of their responsibilities towards the people. The eyes of the French philosophers were turned towards England; Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau sojourned or travelled there; in France the first hint of reform came from across the Channel. England was conscious of the importance that her institutions were assuming and were eventually to assume in the history of political progress. She had her philosophers, Locke and Hume for instance, who, under the inspiration of the free and regulated society in which they lived, discussed the principles of government; others, such as Delolme and Blackstone, who analysed the English Constitution itself, and heralded the work which was to surpass them all:—the masterly production of Montesquieu.

England, in short, was proud of her liberty. One should read in the works of one of the best poets of the time, William Cowper, author of *The Task*, a passage in Book V., written in 1785, four years before the French Revolution. It may be seen from this passage that the

English writer, vaunting the superiority of free England over enslaved France, makes use of the Bastile as the sinister symbol of tyranny, and longs for the day when this fortress of despotism will be razed to the ground.

> Then shame to manhood, and opprobrious more
> To France, than all her losses and defeats
> Old or of later date, by sea or land,
> Her house of bondage worse than that of old
> Which God avenged on Pharaoh,—the Bastile.
> Ye horrid towers, the abode of broken hearts;
> Ye dungeons and ye cages of despair,
> That monarchs have supplied from age to age
> With music such as suits their sovereign ears,
> The sighs and groans of miserable men!
> There's not an English heart that would not leap
> To hear that ye were fallen at last, to know
> That even our enemies, so oft employed
> In forging chains for us, themselves were free.
> For he that values liberty, confines
> His zeal for her predominance within
> No narrow bounds; her cause engages him
> Wherever pleaded.
> . . . . . .

Liberty, such as England understood the principle at this epoch, has been defined by the statesman philosopher, Burke, a contemporary of the American and French Revolutions. Placed midway between the Tories, adulators of George III, and the Radicals, precursors of newer times, he best represented the average opinion of his day. Burke was a Whig, that is to say, a representative of that liberal aristocracy which defended liberty but wanted it disciplined, conservative and prudent, and which feared to see the rise to power of a new class, without culture, political experience, or that delicacy of feeling

and fineness of intelligence which go to make up the gentleman.

Burke fought with all his strength in favour of the Insurgents of America, because, in their resistance to the arbitrary taxes which the metropolis wished to impose, he saw the application of the ancient and venerable privilege of the English people to pay only those taxes on which it had voted affirmatively. The American Revolution was a legitimate revolt in the name of the tradition sanctioned by centuries of usage. In the French Revolution, he perceived, from the beginning, long before the *Terreur* and the deviation towards military despotism, certain dangerous elements well calculated to seduce men to destroy the world with fire and sword, but not sufficiently in keeping with the natural laws of the development of societies to permit of any constructive work or of any lasting result. His philosophical intuition, both acute and profound, laid bare the weakness of absolute idealism; his criticism, if one eliminates its virulent explosions of wrath and hatred, pronounced a most equitable judgment upon the defects of "the doctrine of Reason" and upon the dangers of the revolutionary method, or as designated nowadays, the "catastrophic" method.

Nevertheless, his point of view, altogether insular and pervaded with the prejudices of the Whig oligarchy, not only ignored historical causes and the particular situation of France, but remained blindly closed both to the fruitful promises which the Revolution contained, as well as to the bold truths which French logic, despite the apparent contradiction of facts, imposed upon the future, and also the pregnant principles of humanity, of justice, and of emancipation, which French generosity disseminated over the world.

After many terrible years of internal convulsion and external adventure, France was about to feel the need of

learning the applications of English liberty which Burke raised to a political philosophy; she was about to attend Burke's school of realism, and understand that the life of a nation does not evolve ideally according to a rigid line of abstract reasoning but concretely according to a sinuous line, often bent back on itself, often thrown out of direction by the sentiments, habits, and prejudices which are imposed by experiences, traditions, historical fatalities, social instinct, and the national spirit.

On the other hand—after twenty-five years of blind reaction, due to the fear of the Revolution and the menace of Napoleon—England was about ready to receive what the French doctrine contained of truth, of generosity, and, once better understood, of example. The history of the nineteenth century in England, which was to be that of the development of Democracy, may be considered in part as resulting from the initial shock of the French Revolution.

The French ideal and the English ideal were to encounter each other with the result of enriching, broadening, and strengthening the principle of Liberty.

CHAPTER VII

English Individualism and German "State-ism." First Part (1815–1867)

WHEN Burke declared himself the irreconcilable enemy of the French Revolution and led England in a crusade against France, it was, in the last analysis, because he saw in the men of 1793 the founders of a new order of things. He forgot what they had borrowed from English liberty and considered only the innovations in their doctrine and methods which, if victorious, were destined, in his thought, to destroy the age-old work of liberty in England itself. The government of the wealthy minority, well-educated, respectful of precedents, self-governing and capable of understanding the complexity of political problems, was to be supplanted by the government of the mass of the people, ignorant, irresponsible, impulsive, actuated by elementary ideas, indifferent to the subtle action and reaction of the forces, currents, and interests constituting collective life. Burke was right to be alarmed. France herself, in looking back over more than a century, still contemplates with emotion the audacity of the men of '89 who led her into an era of revolution and painful reconstruction. But Burke, believer in the past as he was, did not have sufficient confidence in the future. A stupendous movement had commenced. Political prudence ought to have counselled

moderating rather than completely checking the movement. The spirit of liberty was on its way down into the lower strata of society, from the second to the third and then to the fourth Estate. It was to become the soul of a new régime in England, a prolongation of the old, but henceforth complicated with serious problems. The régime of democracy was about to be established, and shortly afterwards, the régime of social democracy. In Burke's time, liberty was the mainspring of the political organism. Forty years later it was the same force, no longer considered as an element of class defence but as the protective principle of the whole nation; it was then to receive the name of individualism. Still half a century later, individualism was to undergo still another transformation: it was no longer possible to separate it from a strong social organization; it was no longer thought of except under a socialistic form laying weight upon the solidarity of society. Hence the problem of liberty had been considerably transformed and complicated: the idea of liberty had been brought into question and sometimes held in check; finally it had been victorious after having been modified by a conciliation of the rights of the individual with the rights of the collectivity.

The history of the nineteenth century presents two successive phases: the development of democracy and the converging of democracy with social legislation. The force which first originated in England and was afterwards powerfully influenced by the French Revolution—Liberty—is to follow its own evolution on the one hand and, on the other, to undergo the pressure of another force which was latent both in the older England and in Revolutionary France, namely, the force of social cohesion. In France and in England, however, social cohesion is to be established only to guarantee liberty more effectively; democracy is to become more and more socialistically

inclined without ceasing to be preoccupied especially with the autonomy of the individual; the State, which is only the servant of all, is to play a fuller part in legislating and arbitrating, without trespassing on the essential rights of citizens; the growing sense of solidarity is to lead to the respect of individualism.

To study the genesis of democracy and the socialistic developments of democracy in England in the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth, is to follow the modifications and extensions of the individualistic idea. I shall make the characteristics of this evolution more striking by contrasting it with the progress or rather with the invasion of governmental intervention in Germany, which little by little, in certain domains—and precisely in those which most concern the enriching of the human personality—has annihilated individualism. It is no longer a question, in that country, of social reforms compatible with liberty, but of State socialism or more precisely of State-ism which, instead of favouring the spiritual development of the individual, of raising him to a higher level of humanity, reduces him to the rôle of a wheel in a machine. The results of this have long escaped the world at large dazzled by the material prosperity of Germany and fascinated by her military prestige: they reveal themselves today in the aberration of pride of the whole nation, in its contempt for the opinion of civilization, in its madness for conquest which borders on the madness of suicide, and in the shameful outburst of barbarous appetites, vices, and instincts, dissimulated under a thin varnish of artificial politeness. Democratic and social individualism is the civilizing force which has lifted France and England to the front rank among the noble nations: the annihilation of the individual, considered as a living spirit, is the rust which has operated so destructively in the apparently formidable framework

of German society; the enormous steel carcass, clamped with the rigid chains of administrative formalism, encloses nothing but emptiness.

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England, unlike France, did not pass at one step into integral democracy, at the risk of keeping up, for three parts of a century, a painful and wearing struggle to attain a state of equilibrium. The shock of the French Revolution determined in England an initial movement, which, arrested by the conservative reaction of the Great War period, resumed its course after 1815 and gathered momentum gradually, without violent collision, assuming, by reason of conditions peculiar to England—survival of traditions and economic evolution—a character distinctly original.

At the time when the middle-class, in France, seized the power abruptly, in 1789, the corresponding class in England was content to be governed by an oligarchy of great landed proprietors—the people were not taken into account. The literature of the end of the eighteenth century willingly treated, sometimes, indeed, in lyrical mood, the subject of liberty; but its concern was with English liberty and not with theoretical and abstract liberty born from the logical exigencies of reason as expressed in the articles of the French *Déclaration des Droits*. There is continuity between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the notion of liberty spreads to a new class of citizens and, in the course of the economic transformations of society, displaces its angle of incidence, but does not become modified in its essence. In comparison with the French notion of liberty, English liberty constitutes a variety, not less noble, nor less useful to the progress of the human conscience, but different. Each was destined to unite with the other—and they have fortunately united—for the good of the world.

French liberty and English liberty are essentially, and to an equal extent, the expression of a psychical need. It is to our honour and to the honour of our English friends to have kept in view, in the midst of a century of scientific and industrial mechanism, this principle of psychical need and to have remained, despite the general tendency, a collectivity of souls. We are ready to accept mechanism wherever it is necessary (indeed we know how to draw surprising effects from its use, thanks to our qualities of invention and daring): but we have not allowed ourselves to be absorbed by it. We respect the law of things, but we do not abdicate the sovereignty of spiritual rights. To the brutal rigidity of fact, we oppose the elasticity of Reason, the *élan* of feeling, and the creative force of will. To cite only one example, in what concerns France and the events connected with the present war:—the victory of German arms in 1870 is a fact which the pride and unrelenting harshness of the conqueror rendered iniquitous by the mutilation of France; against this iniquitous fact, our sense of justice has revolted with a persistence which remains an object of astonishment to the Germans. "It is a characteristic trait of the French people," wrote Herr von Bülow, "to place psychical before material needs." Justice and liberty are sentiments which are on an equal footing: injustice is a crime against the moral person, consequently a diminution of liberty. The English have the same attachment to noble sentiments. They do not manifest them, as we do, in exterior demonstration, but, under their apparent impassibility, is hidden a profound emotional tendency which is expressed in the form of tenacity, pride, and determination. With them, as with us, it is individual independence—legal and moral independence—which gives its value to national independence. Their patriotism, like ours, is nourished with lofty aspiration. It has nothing in common with

the fierce appetite for domination which the Germans adorn with the same name. The mother country, for the Germans, has become an association for material advancement, and, should an opportunity offer, for robbery, by the agency of militarism and administrative despotism and at the cost of a dead-levelling of individualities. For the English, as for the French, patriotism is the union, under the ægis of liberty, of moral and spiritual energies with a view to the fullest expansion of individualities. The moral history of England during all epochs, but more especially during the days of democratic development, is really the history of English individualism.

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The French philosophers of the end of the eighteenth century, who brought about the expansion on our soil of the individualist forces of the Revolution, owed a great deal to English thought. Their rationalism contributed thereto the element of theoretical rigour and universality. Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote the *Contrat Social* according to the mathematical method dear to Descartes, observing social facts from a distance, and, to the extent to which these facts, being simplified and lightened of the complexities of reality, could be generalized into abstractions and expressed in formulas. The men of the Revolution, guided by the same fondness for logical propositions, of the axiom type, supported for ten years the superhuman effort of trying to realize the ideal in human affairs. They broke down under the strain; but the hopes conceived and the principles propagated throughout the world lived on in the thought of future generations—in France and outside of France—as important verities, unattainable no doubt in their integrality, but worthy of being maintained as distant beacons of human action. England was not insensible to the appeal. But she allowed herself to be influenced

by French thought only in as far as it could be embodied in her tradition, and moderated by her political prudence, temperament, and the lessons of her history.

France had passed without transition—under the influence of rationalistic idealism—from absolute monarchy to integral democracy. England, already in possession of her constitutional liberties, advanced by degrees, without hurry, without preconceived designs of a speculative order, along the same highway which she took a century to travel over . . . taking time to fortify herself in each position won and to prepare the advance of the morrow. This circumspection permitted her to consider without surprise the birth and growth of the democratic problem as well as the development of the social problem and to make a parallel study of both, sometimes furnishing for both joint solutions, and sometimes opposing one to the other and thus keeping them both provisionally in suspense.

Toward 1830, the conservative reaction, determined by fear of revolutionary excess, was entirely spent. A new class, the manufacturers of the city agglomerations aspired to a share in the government of the country. Indeed the transformation of England into an industrial country, had rendered the existing bases of national representation inadequate. While the towns had suddenly grown at the expense of the country, the right to elect members of Parliament had remained in possession of the rural boroughs, sometimes reduced to a few farmers. The Government was in the power of the landed interests—of the landlords who no longer formed the majority of the country. Furthermore, the influence of the aristocracy was too easily exercised on the constituencies often composed of a few of the landlord's tenants. The House of Commons was thus transformed into an assembly subject to the House of Lords; the national will was becoming the

will of a handful of important families. A reform was urgent; but, except for a small group of theorists who assumed the appellation of "Radicals," it was not in the name of the "Rights of Man" that the reform was demanded. The concrete English mind was little accessible to the doctrine of the "Sovereignty of the people" and of the "political equality" of the citizens. On the contrary it adapted itself to the inequalities in the Constitution, to its anomalies and apparent illogicalness, thanks to which certain competent and self-sacrificing elements, likely to be disregarded or envied by universal suffrage, were at the country's disposal. It was not, then, the wish to establish, by right of vote, an artificial equivalence, which maintained the reform movement. Two causes, one relating to the age-old tradition of liberty, and the other, to the concrete conditions of productive activity, united the majority of the nation in the common purpose of renovating the elective system.

Among the great land-owners monopolizing the power, the Whigs, being more firmly attached to liberty, were more particularly concerned about the Crown's encroachment upon Parliamentary prerogatives and about the displacement, to the Crown's advantage, of the even distribution of powers . . . that delicate and subtle system of counterpoise and check upon which the Constitution reposed. The royal power had been responsible for the American War of Independence which had cut the Anglo-Saxon world into two portions. Owing to a system of favours, sinecures, and pensions, and also to the corruption prevalent in the Rotten Boroughs, the King was becoming unduly and dangerously important in the Government. And so it was urgent to bring about the elimination of these "rotten boroughs" by a rearrangement of the voting districts and to renew the electoral and representative bodies by the admission of a new class to

the voting qualification. Furthermore, those whom the existing organization excluded from power—the manufacturers and merchants, whose new importance in the State was due to their recently acquired riches—felt that certain questions were involved, by reason of the development of the régime of the wholesale industry, which they alone would be able to solve conformably to their interests. Thus the liberalism of the ruling oligarchy and the aspirations of the new middle-class combined to carry the Reform Law of 1832. It was not a democratic reform: the middle-class alone secured the right to vote along with a legitimate influence in the direction of the country's affairs. But an initial breach was opened in the old-fashioned system of the distribution of political power: through this breach, in the course of time and thanks to the progress of the individualist movement, the whole people was destined to pass.

Up to that time the people had been willing to accept their fate which amounted, politically, to non-existence, and often, in other directions, to misery and degradation. The minority which took part in the revolutionary movement, known under the name of Chartism, was not very considerable. There was no union in England as in France, of the middle-classes and popular masses, at critical moments, for armed revolt in the streets or resistance on the frontier. The middle-class followed its own evolution. The populace, less prompt than ours to translate its feelings into action, made very few attempts to make its weight felt in the State. The rare insurrections, or rather noisy manifestations, were severely repressed. The individualist movement which, in the initial rush, had carried the middle-class into power, was to penetrate very slowly as deep as the lower strata of society. Meanwhile, the victors of 1832 organized themselves for the purpose of increasing their influence, their means of action, and their

chances of success. In conquering their "place in the sun" they expended an energy which was not exempt from harshness and which did not sufficiently resist the suggestions of selfishness. Not, indeed, that they were devoid of pity: their charity, which they called philanthropy, manifested itself in praiseworthy efforts to alleviate the ills of poverty. But they were too absorbed in the magnificent and arduous task of subjecting the forces of nature to the will of man, of creating the machinery of production, of multiplying the means of communication, and of founding financial establishments . . . to be disturbed about the material and moral situation of the workingman. They had their own particular doctrine. They, the men who had paid little heed to the idealistic rationalism which had come from France, allowed themselves to be seduced by a utilitarian rationalism which appeared in England in due season to serve their interests. The philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, a doctrine of radical individualism and uncompromising utilitarianism, became the catechism of their party.

Bentham and the utilitarian radicals had in mind only one of the principles of the French Revolution, namely, liberty; moreover they applied it with an inflexible rigour to the constitution of the industrial society. The desire for liberty did not mean for them, as it did for Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the French individualists, an emotional aspiration guided by a rational ideal . . . a passion sustained by a conviction. Their doctrine was not a doctrine of revolt conceived in tumult and borne onward by a powerful wave of imperious desire. It was a doctrine of organization, of a cold and positive order, begotten of a new spirit which was beginning to overtake the century . . . the scientific spirit. The notion of *law*, which the chemists, the physicists, and naturalists were establishing more and more solidly in

the domain of concrete phenomena, was penetrating into the domain of moral and social phenomena. Did not ethics, the science of human conduct, and political economy, the science of productive organization, have their particular mechanism set in movement by a few simple initial forces? Let these forces be discovered, let their law be formulated, and then it would be possible to eliminate the obstacles maladroitly raised by human ignorance and to rectify the deviations introduced by empiricism.

A new form of society was shaping itself: the industrial society. Was it to be left to develop itself haphazard at the risk of paralysing the rich promises already announced? Bentham thought that he had discovered the law of the new economic and social order in the individualistic principle of "interest." . . . Individuals are actuated by their interest: the interests of each in coming into collision, neutralize each other; whence results a harmony which is the basis of order and the source of all prosperity. Let the social organization, then, allow individual interests full liberty to manifest and exercise themselves; the resulting energies will be stimulated to the highest degree and the productive capacity raised to the maximum. The very struggle itself will be an element of vigour and success: it cannot degenerate into anarchy, for order is a law of nature, and one may count upon human intelligence, under the spur of suffering, to discover the modes of social harmony consistent with universal harmony. Hence, just as in nature, forces so balance each other that they produce the magnificent bloom of life, so, in the economic order if the forces of capital and labour, of desire and need are allowed to operate without untimely intervention, the equilibrium will establish itself for the greater good of progress. Let there be no Government interference in questions of production and exchange . . . liberty for all

is the best means of securing happiness for all. If temporary sufferings result from its application they are only secondary ills, not at all to be compared with the immense benefits of liberty. Whence the formula: *laisser faire, laisser passer.*

In the name of the new science, political economy, the new school rejected all legislative measures, all mediation between masters and workingmen, all protection of commerce by means of premiums or custom duties, and all tutelage of the individual under cover of protection or assistance. The Government was to be reduced to the minimum rôle or defender of property and life, in foreign as well as domestic matters. Such was the programme of the utilitarian economists and radical individualists from 1840 to 1860.

Individualism as thus defined enjoys nowadays, in the minds of most, an unenviable reputation because it is held responsible, not without reason, for the miserable condition of the majority of the working class towards the middle of the nineteenth century. In effect, while its principle was just, its application was perverted and furthermore its uncomprising attitude was inadmissible. In the first place its application was perverted: for, in order that free competition might result in an equitable equilibrium, the contending forces should have been perceptibly equal and should have operated under conditions equally favourable. Now, to take the most striking case, the conflict between employers and employees, the latter found themselves abandoned, crushed by their poverty, pressed hard by hunger, and placed at a disadvantage by their ignorance and isolation *vis-à-vis* an organization of masters, supported by capital, social prestige, middle-class solidarity, superiority of intelligence, and technical ability. The right of association, at least, should have been granted to the workingmen: and

yet, in that direction the law set up all sorts of restrictions. . . . In the second place, radical individualism failed in its purpose because of its uncompromising attitude. . . . Now, in human concerns, there are probably no simple principles which are wholly true. In all questions, truth is found at about equal distance between the extremes, and justice resides in an even poise of principles, of modes of action, and of legislative measures which counterbalance each other. Radical individualism, then, represented only a part of the truth of which the counterpart had still to be found. It emphasized initiative, energy, enterprise, and all the qualities which the Englishman includes in the word self-help; but it neglected the duties of assistance and succour which the privileged of fortune, intelligence, and education owe to the disinherited; it disregarded one of the essential rôles of the State, namely, the protection of the feeble and vanquished in the battle of fate and the battle of life. Henceforth, in the face of uncompromising and unilateral individualism, the "social" conception of collective life was destined to take its course—this was the movement which certain sociologists call the collectivist movement, by reason of the importance accorded to the collectivity, but which, in order to avoid confusion with the same epithet used by the revolutionary school, it is perhaps preferable to call the "solidarist" movement.

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In England, the solidarist movement was not associated from the start, as in France, with the democratic movement. While the proletary was feeling its way, uncertain, between political agitation and social agitation, the conservative aristocracy, against which the Reform of 1832 had been carried, rallied of its own accord to a policy of Government intervention in favour of the workingmen. The aristocracy adopted this policy partly through

jealousy of the manufacturing class of which it had become the political rival, partly through fidelity to the tradition of solicitude towards their dependents observed by the great land-owners and partly through religious sentiment, or the humane sentiment of duty towards the unfortunate. Thus the paternal benevolence of the feudal lord, the charitable devotion of the Christian, and the sense of actual necessities, united, under the shock of contemporary events, to form a new sentiment of social duty and a new policy of social reform. The immediate cause of this was the desire to oppose to the democratic policy of the Liberals a policy of political protection and intervention which could rally the masses. The underlying cause was the dumb anger of the people, goaded by hunger and obscurely wrought upon by the political and social forces set in motion by the French Revolution. The political force—derived from the "Rights of Man"—had determined the Chartist movement—a democratic demand for a "People's Charter" advocated by a handful of revolutionists. The social force—derived from the great hope of a better state of life conceived for a moment by the French people, was, in fact, the more active of the two; it acted upon the whole mass of the people who were, however, incapable of expressing it in a programme.

A few men of the Tory party understood the situation; a more intelligent policy might be pursued than that of repressing by force the revolutionary efforts of the dissatisfied. It was clear that throughout all Europe, a movement of impatience was stirring the masses. The revolution of 1848 in France, which from democratic had become socialist in character, might well lead to fear that the contagion would reach England. . . . It was at this juncture, that men like Lord Shaftesbury, an influential nobleman and fervent Christian, and Carlyle, a moralist well versed in the Bible and an historian who was

unwilling to forget the social lesson of the French Revolution, preached a crusade of intervention and set England on the path to social legislation. The first measures of the solidarist policy, then, were the work of the Conservatives: the protection of the workingman originated with the upper classes. The movement, however, although it did not proceed from the people, possessed an individualistic character which distinguished it from German socialism of the "State-ist" type. It prepared the great work of today: the emancipation of the people by the people.

Thus, to the illiberal rationalism of the economists and radicals, who neglected the fact of poverty and deliberately set aside all consideration of sentiment, the Socialist-Tories (as they were called) opposed two forces of the past which they wished to revive and adapt to present necessities: human sympathy and the sentiment of national union. Their action was powerful and fruitful because they had understood that the most pressing need of the moment was to counterbalance the mechanical rigidity and doctrinal egoism of the Manchester School by an antagonistic force, capable of re-establishing the equilibrium. The hard law of competition, the cast-iron law of supply and demand, the implacable precept: "Each for himself: help yourself! . . . " were tempered with the new sentiment of the responsibility of society towards its members and by the new notion of the organic unity of the collectivity . . . in such sort that a part may suffer or die from the suffering or death of the other parts. . . . Of this doctrine, so full of promise for the future, Carlyle was the interpreter.

In the name of *social duty*, he demanded that the "captain of industry" should make it his concern to obtain for the manual labourer at least a minimum of the material comfort without which human dignity is not possible. Upon this foundation of health, of modest competency, of

restricted suffering, of muscle-free exercise and a little leisure, the State and the initiative of the cultivated class should construct the moral development of the workingman by means of instruction, education, and outdoor exercise in the sunlight. In the name of national solidarity, then, let the "collectivity" organize with a view to employing all the vital forces of the nation and protecting the workingman against the accidents and ills of industry, with a view to preventing the cruel shock of man's goodwill against the relentless barrier of poverty, unemployment, and the payment of a life of labour in the miserable coin of old age, want, and decrepitude. The whole social programme, whose realization was to last through the nineteenth and part of the twentieth centuries, lies exposed in its main tendencies in the work of Thomas Carlyle. It was not, however, through the means particularly favoured by Carlyle that the reform was to be finally accomplished. The socialistic toryism of the author of the *Latter Day Pamphlets* differs profoundly from the socialistic radicalism of today. The understanding of this difference will be a step towards preparing us to understand what distinguishes English individualistic socialism from German state-made socialism.

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Carlyle has no confidence in democracy. He writes at an epoch when democracy, struggling for existence, is feeling its way by efforts which an observer ill-disposed in its favour might consider as chaotic. Democracy, even matured by experience, remains in other respects tainted with defects, which its enlightened partisans do not dissimulate and which, besides numerous corrections, will no doubt need the slow process of time and perhaps the wisdom born of great suffering before approximate rectification. All Carlyle's criticisms respecting the ignorance of the masses, the blight of corruption, the

moral low-water mark of electors and elected, the outbidding and fawning, the plague of parliamentary loquacity . . . still hold good today. But he has no eye except for the dark side of things and never stops a moment to ask himself whether the apparent disorder, the desperate and violent struggles, and then the waste of words and ideas are not after all signs of life. Liberty has its fashions which entail secondary evils but forfend the irreparable disaster of the subjection of souls to a despotic authority or to a tyrannical idea. At bottom, Carlyle is in favour of a strong authority, sufficiently justified in his eyes, if it remains, what was called in the eighteenth century, "enlightened." He wrote a lengthy work in praise of Frederick II, the founder of Prussian militarism and Prussian imperialism. Fondness for order, administrative skill, devotion to public welfare, talent for creating an atmosphere of mute and humble obedience . . . such qualities prevented Carlyle from discerning this Monarch's rapacity, duplicity, and cynicism.

Moreover, the veritable hero in his eyes, the born leader, the man predestined to command, in view of the salvation of mankind, is Cromwell, that is to say not only the "enlightened despot," but the "moral despot," the King-Priest who, through the exterior discipline of law, prepares the human conscience for the interior discipline of good. Carlyle is of Calvinist origin; the moral fanaticism of his faith colours his political doctrine. This overshooting trust in authority—in which, moreover, there is an element of the spirit of contradiction, an element of unpleasant sourness, and even an element of whimsical humour—represents the crumbling part of his system. Nevertheless, when one compares it with the system which Treitschke has inculcated in Germany and which prevails today in that country, one must recognize that Carlyle contests the benefits of political liberty only for the purpose

of making surer of the triumph of moral liberty. The liberty of vote, of haranguing in public meetings and of manifesting in the street, appears to him of doubtful benefit, at least for the simple man whom he believes still incapable of thinking for himself, of judging of the significance of his own decisions, or of criticizing Government measures. Notwithstanding this, he sets forth the leading principles of moral individualism, that is to say the means of liberating the soul, with a nobleness and breadth which place him in the front rank of the great moralists. The preaching of his whole life consists in humbling pride, in condemning cupidity, and in stigmatizing the lie. What a cruel awakening would be his, were it his lot to live with us once more, to see the German people, in whom he had faith, because of Kant and Goethe and its virtue of silent obedience, rush headlong, furiously, shamelessly, into the vices which he most abhorred—pride, cupidity, falsehood! He would straightway recognize that what was best in his own doctrine, was not the advocacy of authority and hero-worship—because the hero, in spite of his genius, may err, and because authority which shackles intelligence, obstructs the free flow of ideas—but the glorification of moral individualism which maintained the spirit of criticism active within him and led him to set forth the principles whereby modern man is to remain faithful to the humane ideal established by ancient wisdom and Christian virtue.

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The German nation would have disappointed Carlyle: it has painfully disappointed all those who, in spite of Bismarck and his zealots, hoped for a renaissance of the traditions of the great epoch, for a return to the sources of thought which flowed so abundant and rich, for Germany and the world, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Kant had recapitulated all the ethics of transcendentalism

in a social precept worthy of becoming the watchword of future reformers: "The individual ought not to be treated as a means but an end"; that is to say: it is not permissible for man to make use of his fellowman as of an instrument; every individual, whatever be his condition, is a moral person potentially or in act, who, in the name of the innate dignity of mind has right to our respect or to our solicitude. Goethe, in the more matured and beautiful of his works, in *Faust*, in the second *Wilhelm Meister*, and in his *Conversations* with Eckermann, had already expressed the substance of modern wisdom, such as it ought to be formulated on the morrow of the tumultuous and disordered epoch of Romanticism.

Goethe had understood that Romanticism was a psychological deformation essentially German. Romanticism, when considered as an attitude towards life, is a disproportioned aspiration of the finite being to espouse the infinite, a dream which bewilders reason and perturbs the will. Faust soars upward to conquer the boundless region of fancy, stretching his desire to the poetry and prose of existence, to the joys of the spirit and the pleasures of the senses, to the verities of science and art and to the secrets of the other world. He lends an ear to the cynical and scoffing voice that counsels him to trample underfoot the moral laws, the cherished tradition of things revered, the instinctive nobleness and acquired prudence which religion, philosophy, and rectitude have opposed, from antiquity down to the tumultuous *élans* and immoderate appetites of the Ego. Finally, Faust, disabused and scourged, recovers, little by little, in the school of ancient grandeur and Christian charity his sense of equilibrium and finds serenity in the spirit of abnegation, in the sacrifice of desire to the law of moderation, and in the absorption of the Ego's energies in labours of Çatholic interest. The tragedy of Faust is the secret tragedy

of the soul of Goethe, conquering itself through will and reason, wresting itself from the fascination of Romanticism by communion with the best of human thought, quickened by its genius. He bequeathed to the world the secret of his convalescence in the ensemble of intellectual and moral precepts, which according to his own expression constitute *Culture*.

Between the wisdom of Goethe and the so-called "enlightened" despotism of the masters of Prussia, Carlyle believed that there was compatibility and possibility of intimate alliance. The pharisaism of Bismarck deceived him as the apparent devotion of Frederick the Great to the public weal had previously deceived him. In reality there was profound variance between the spirit of Kant and Goethe and the spirit of the Prussian monarchy: the latter was destined to kill the former. . . . Is there not a sign of the spiritual death of Germany in the manifesto of the ninety-three intellectuals published on the morrow of the Belgian massacres and of the bombardment of Reims, denying the butcheries, thefts, and destruction, declaring German Kultur—not Culture—one with German militarism, and basely and falsely constructing for itself a rampart with the names of Kant and Goethe. . . . Kant and Goethe who would have disowned them with contempt? No, Kant and Goethe no longer belong to Germany, guilty of collective crime, of national frenzy, and intellectual servility, because she has denied what they most prized . . . moral individualism and liberty.

When Goethe expressed his earnest desire for the unification of Germany, he was thinking of a political union capable of giving more cohesion to German thought and more prestige to the German ideal, but incapable of destroying the intellectual and moral source of life represented by particularism of tradition and custom. Thanks

to the variety and diversity of active centres within the Fatherland, the Germanic thought, while developing characters properly national, would remain in touch with the thought of humanity. But already, even in his time, national exclusivism was growing. The humiliation of Jena had provoked the movement of patriotic revolt which was to conduct Prussia to the revenge of 1814 and 1815 and beyond the victory—to the laying by of a supply of hatred and pride as well as to the fostering of a savage fondness for war. These passions were reflected in the doctrines of the time. In return, these doctrines encompassed the passions within the rigid lines of theory and stamped them with their intransigent character. Fichte, the disciple of Kant, who had been, at the outset, enamoured of the dream of liberty and fraternity of the French Revolution, became, after 1806, an ardent, impetuous orator of national awakening. His idealism shrunk close around the German idea, and, from its original universal character developed into a docile instrument of the national ambitions. A strange servitude of thought, which was to have the gravest of consequences on the German philosophy! For this people of metaphysicians, it was to legitimize a policy of "state-ism," militarism, and unscrupulous imperialism by the imposing consecration of a system.

In his initial attitude, Fichte amended Jean-Jacques Rousseau advantageously. The mainspring of individual life should no longer be a spirit of revolt and a wild desire for independence, which would reduce social ties to their simplest expression, but a moral aspiration towards the full expansion of the spiritual being, realized by the co-operation of all, in a strongly organized society. The ideal of liberty was shifted from the plane of personal action to the plane of collective action, by means of order, education, and discipline. In the same degree that

Rousseau had faith in the natural abilities of the individual and leaned consequently towards democracy, Fichte was on guard against errors overfrequent with the individual, ignorant, and blind, and leaned towards the authoritativeness of power and knowledge. Up to that point, his doctrine was justifiable; moreover it arrived opportunely to correct the excesses of revolutionary individualism. It re-established the importance of the social idea and gave the strength of cohesion and hierarchy to miscellaneous efforts; it was liberal in nature for it attributed authority, not to the strongest, but to the best. Nevertheless, the wave of fanaticism liberated by the awakening of German patriotism troubled the sane clearness of this idealism and perverted its application. The desire for social and moral progress was confined solely to the German people, who believing themselves henceforth set apart from the world, exalted above common humanity through their lights and virtues, entered into a latent conflict of ideas and sentiments with their neighbours, moulded of inferior substance and worthy of contempt. The German people became the people elect, the people "from ever" the *Urvolk*, inspired by God and charged with a lofty mission of civilization among the impure and bastard races, the *Mischvölker*.

Fichte's successor was Hegel, who, outbidding his predecessor, imparted to the German doctrine the rigidity and uncompromising character which it has since conserved. With Hegel is to be noticed the expansion of two tendencies of the German mind which explain both its force under certain favourable conditions—for example, when a 420 millimeter shell falls directly on the cupola of a fort—and its weakness—for example, when the sledge-hammer blows of this enormous projectile encounter the supple agility of a living object. These two tendencies, which correspond to a predilection for the colossal and for

theoretical delusion in military art, represent, in the speculative domain, fondness for the absolute and mystic illusion. Instead of following the sinuous lines of facts, of adapting themselves to the anomalies of reality and of trying to find an equilibrium between extremes, as the French do with facility, thanks to their clear sense of proportion, and as the English do, thanks to their spirit of compromise, the Germans pursue an idea to the last limit of reasoning and to the complete exhaustion of dialectic expedients. Having reached this summum of abstraction where the nation becomes a pure concept, floating, immaterial, in the highest heaven of transcendency, they endow it with a superterrestrial existence. Thus an idea, a mental form, a category in which is summarized, for the convenience of speech, an aggregation of concrete facts, assumes in their eyes a mystic reality before which the intellect remains confounded, but which irresistibly attracts the feelings and the will. It is by virtue of these two tendencies, properly Germanic, that Hegel exalts the notion of State to the pinnacle of thought, deifies it and crushes the individual will with its weight. The individual has no longer any value as such; he fully realizes his human destiny only in merging with the social entity which attracts him, absorbs him, and magnifies him. In presence of the universality of the State, how paltry the particularity of the individual conscience seems! What would one not sacrifice so to feel his personality growing, ascending, broadening with the sum of the collective energies accumulated in the stream of time, by history and in the world of space, by national unity? The German, then, is willing to suffer eclipse before the authority of the Emperor, of the bureaucrat, of the overseer, or of the corporal, and to play no other part in the immense organism, than that of a partial man—of a *Teilmensch*. He submits to regulations which reach him

even in his private life; he suffers the yoke of a humiliating and brutal military discipline; he obtains his judgments and ideas from the top; he renounces what other people call political rights; he exercises, without faltering, at the request of the State, the functions of secret-agent and spy; he feeds upon *Kultur* and, in the name of *Kultur*, at the order of his leaders, he plunders, ravishes, and murders. He has no revolt of conscience, because his own conscience is supplanted by the code of civic or military duties which the State judges expedient to prescribe for him in all circumstances of peace or war. What remains in such conduct of the noble Kantian doctrine of autonomy and of the eminent dignity of the person?

Hegel, when developing, as he thought, the mystic and dialectic virtualities of the philosophy of his master, Kant, suffered in reality the pressure of the new conditions in which the history of Germany evolved. Germany, conscious of her force and irritated at seeing this force squandered, useless because of its dispersion, was on the point of throwing herself into the arms of Prussia, who was destined to accomplish her unity by iron and blood. Prussian militarism was a steel spring bent for action: Hegel's doctrine hollowed the groove along which it was able to act and to arouse the inertia of the country. The idea of the absolute power of the State became in the hands of Bismarck the instrument of authority and discipline by which he forged German unity. The mystic worship of the State was applied to that particular attribute of the State which Bismarck represented to it as the most effective and the most productive of results, namely, force. It was thus that a people of thinkers and dreamers fell, by reason of its abdication of individualism, into the idolatry of national prosperity due to the administrative and industrial machinery and into the

passion of haughty and brutal supremacy brought about by a military machine.

Beyond the frontiers of this people, the world has progressed. The social ideal expressed by Fichte has developed in England and France in harmony with and not at the expense of the individualistic ideal, so as to encourage, by means which the new conditions of life imposed more and more, the integral development of the human person. The gulf has widened more and more between French and English thought on the one hand and German thought on the other. The complexity of internal problems and external relations, absorbing our people's attention and efforts, has prevented some from measuring its depth; the profundity of this cleft is becoming evident today.

It is now our purpose to indicate in what manner the compromise between individualism and socialism was established in England from 1860 down to the present, and in what manner, under the shock of events, the contrast between English and German thought widened. . . . This contrast makes the war of today not only a conflict of interests but also a conflict of ideas in which the progress and civilization of humanity are at stake.

Second Part (1867–1914)

The history of politics and of political ideas in England, from 1860 to the present day, consists mainly in tracing in what way, under favour of the notion of national solidarity, a new form of individualism was established—a more fecund, because more organic, form which tended to realize the social equilibrium without exhausting the individual sources of thought and action.

The first social reforms such as protection of women and children in factories and mines, reduction of the hours of work, laws on the hygiene of workshops and on trade-

unions, were found to coincide with a period of economic prosperity and high salaries. Under the beneficent action of the new legislation and the appeasing action of a better scale of living, the disaffection of the working classes disappeared; for a period of twenty years, the solution of the political and social problem proceeded in peace and goodwill.

The Liberal party, faithful to the traditions which had founded its greatness, remained attached to the doctrine of self-help and leaned more and more towards the natural consequences of this doctrine—democracy. But, being carried away by the new current of solidarist feeling, the Liberal party disengaged itself insensibly from uncompromising individualism after the manner of Bentham, who wished to leave individuals alone, face to face, in the arena of competition. One may follow the transformation which was effected in the midst of the party by studying the conversion of one of its most eminent members, the philosopher John Stuart Mill. Mill had been reared by his father in the pure tradition of scientific economy. What he saw in social activity was only a set of ineluctable laws and blind forces of which men were the necessary agents. In his mind morals amounted to an arithmetic in which interests, dissociated from persons, were combined like numbers. The inter-relationship of man to man appeared in his eyes under the form of equations which scientific economy taught one to solve in the algebraic fashion. Individuals, in order to play their rôle in this system of mathematics, should be free, in the political and economical sense of the word, that is to say, be able to embody, without hindrances, the social force which chance has had them represent. The effect of this doctrine upon the character of the young John Stuart was, as he tells us in his *Autobiography*, to plunge him at twenty years of age into the most sombre pessi-

mism. The emotional influences which he assimilated in the contemporary environment saved him. Everywhere around him the social and moral conscience was awakening. He read the poets Wordsworth and Coleridge who exalted the power of duty and the beauty of sympathy. Carlyle taught him the splendour of voluntary effort, the joy of struggling against the mechanism of blind forces, and the supreme satisfaction of sacrifice. He understood that besides economic and political liberty, which has its function, there were moral liberty and moral *élan* which have their functions too. He came to believe that man is not the product of circumstances but that he may, by an effort of will, break the encircling ring of steel and become in part the author of his destiny. And so he was seized with the new joy of feeling, desiring, and hoping. The prison of fatalism, the whitened sepulchre of his youth, crumbled utterly away. What is sombre in the condition of man, tossed about in the currents and eddies of cause and effect, condemned to an endless struggle for some unknown end, "vanished out of his sight; he saw himself a free man, capable, through the union of reason and love, of removing social fatalities and of preparing a better fortune. . . . It was birth into a new life."

Individualism assumed a new value in his eyes. Liberty remained the precious acquisition which modern civilization had conquered over despotism; but it was not only a negative good, it was a means in view to an end. The individual, finally enlightened on the solidarity which unites him to his fellowmen and guided by the sentiment of sympathy, is to seek the development of his personality not only for himself, but also for others. He is no longer to throw himself blindly into a *mêlée*, the conditions of which are supposed to be determined by the fatalism of the laws of nature. He will learn in sounding his

conscience, in taking counsel of his heart, in looking around him with a clearer look, that the modes of human life do not correspond servilely to the modes of the law of things. Man will be able to act upon himself, upon his fellows, and upon the framework of existence. The rôle of the social philosopher, of the statesman, of any man who thinks, will be, then, to discover the means of bettering the environment, whence depends in part the amelioration of the individual. Thus through the notion of liberty, John Stuart Mill reaches a solidarist conception of society.

The case of conscience of this philosopher, who began his spiritual life as a disciple of Bentham and who left a posthumous work inspired by socialist principles, is the case of numerous Liberals. His conversion is the sign of a movement of thought which, in the following years, assumed an extension almost universal. At the same time the Conservatives, who had initiated the movement of the century towards solidarism, drew nearer to democracy. This rallying, it is true, was less the effect of a sincere conviction than of a skilful political manœuvre. Disraeli, who assumed the power as leader of the Tories, in 1867, feeling that the democratic reform was imminent, wished to confer on his party the honour of making a *beau geste* in favour of the people; he had voted the passage of a Bill of suffrage extension, which raised all householders to the dignity of electors. The effect of the Bill was to open the franchise to the great majority of the workingmen of the towns. It will be easily understood how this masterstroke of the Conservatives won them, for a time, the sympathy of the lower classes.

This alliance was, however, of short duration. Ulterior developments so shaped themselves that, as a result of political events which it is useless to recall, democracy and socialism encountered each other and presently

united in a single current destined to dominate all others in the internal history of England. The people were not backward in increasing still more their share of power. The electoral law of 1884 completed the law of 1867 by a new extension of the suffrage. Henceforth the lower class was master of its destinies. In short it was the people who established progressively, at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the programme of *social democracy* which is being put into effect today.

But the term "Sozialdemokratie" is also employed in Germany. The word "Liberalism," too, is of current use there to designate one of the parties of the Assembly elected, apparently, by universal suffrage. Can it be possible, then, that there is any parallelism or resemblance between the institutions and political spirit of England and Germany? Despite the difference in moral value between the two peoples, which is so striking today, can it be possible that the principles of collective life were the same at the outset? Such a possibility is unlikely, and indeed such is not the case. Before indicating the proportion of individualism and genuine liberty to be found in what is meant by democracy and socialism in England, let us stop to consider what is hidden under appearances in German liberalism and German socialism.

Liberty is a delicate plant which does not grow in a soil artificially prepared to receive it. It flourishes only in a nation possessing traditions like England, or which, by the force and elasticity of its psychical faculties, like France, is capable of creating itself a new spiritual being. Now Germany has no real traditions; nor has she, since delivering herself to Prussia, any psychical individuality. She is a nation only through the artificial action of an exterior force. Bismarck, who made Germany in order to serve the interests of Prussia, was well aware that the union

could not be maintained without a permanent stimulus; and so he deliberately tore Alsace-Lorraine from France to engender hatred between France and Germany, and through hatred to endow German unity with a fictitious solidity. The existence of the German nation, so recent and so precarious, is the result of force and is kept alive by force. Militarism was its instrument and remains its prop and pillar: how could liberty live under such trappings? The German jurisconsults are well aware of the situation: "To enjoy a political activity capable of leading to success," says one of them, "the German people, by reason of the essence of its character, has need of being directed by a firm authority to which it willingly submits itself."[1]

There were German Liberals in 1848. They were bold enough to form a revolutionary committee at Heidelberg, and over the Sovereigns' heads convoke the Parliament of Frankfort. This Convention, derisively called a "conventicle of professors and ideologists," offered the title of Emperor to the King of Prussia, Frederick-William IV—who haughtily refused "a crown of wood and mud" at the hands of the people. In his own kingdom, however, the same Frederick believed it prudent to grant a Constitution (which is still in existence), but under which the Landtag remains under control of a small group of country squires and financiers allied to the Crown. In swearing allegiance to the Constitution, the King added: "In Prussia, the King must rule, and I rule because it is the order of God." His great-nephew, William, when ascend-

[1] Eichhorn, *Wahlrecht und Volksvertretung.*—*Cf.* Von Bernhardi: "There is no nation so little qualified as Germany to direct its own destinies. . . . The German people have always been incapable of great actions for the common good, except under the stress of exterior conditions or under the leadership of powerful personalities. . . . We should, then, take care to guarantee such personalities the possibility of acting with confidence and with a free hand. . . ."(*Germany and the Next War.* 1911).

ing the imperial throne, was to repeat: "I am God's Lieutenant on earth." The people, through the double effect of their passivity and of their mystic tendencies, bowed down before the autocratic will of the Emperor in an attitude of respect and quasi-adoration. . . . Above all else, the Emperor is the military head: no party, not even the Socialist party, has ever opposed the policy of incessant increase of the armaments.

Since Germany has been Prussianized, liberalism has perished in fact, although it has half subsisted in name. The epithet that describes it has undergone a characteristic modification: today the party is labelled *national-liberal*, that is to say that it has substituted the sentiment of patriotism (with the aggressive character which it is known to have in Germany) for the sentiment of attachment to liberty. It conserves the former title of liberal only through the effect of class feeling, to mark that it unites the middle-class in opposition to the landed proprietors, and the interests of commerce and industry in opposition to the agrarian interests. The Reichstag, where this party sits with the Agrarians, the Catholic Centre, and the Socialists, is not really the representative of the nation. In theory the mode of election is universal suffrage: in fact, the inequality of the electoral districts secures the advantage to the upper classes, drugged with militarism and jingoism by the Gymnasiums and Universities. Besides, how is it possible for the national will to assert itself in a Parliament which has not the initiative of the laws and which, in case of conflict, is obliged to submit to the executive. The Chancellor and the Ministers, not chosen from among the Parliament and not really spokesmen of the people, but functionaries of the Emperor, are not subject to the votes of the deliberative Assembly. Their deftness, in general, permits them to obtain the approval of their bills by a House without

genuine personality; but even when conflicts do arise, they remain in power none the less and force the bills upon a new House, after the dissolution of the refractory Assembly.

The German people, formerly so remarkable for its particularism has become tainted with absolute uniformity. All opinions, all tendencies, have been absorbed by the rising tide of nationalism. Political rivalries, class antagonism suffer eclipse under the irresistible pressure of German pride and German ambition. Just as the individuality of the States is re-absorbed into the Empire, so the individuality of the classes disappears when questions of Empire are at stake. Even the individuality of the conscience bows before the ruthless imperative of the *raison d'Etat*, as we have seen in the case of the ninety-three intellectuals, who dared not protest even by silence against the crimes of the soldiery, committed in obedience to orders. With a sinister unanimity, the whole people, as though possessed of a consuming hunger, rushed forward to adore the gods of material prosperity and force. Incapable of keeping alive inwardly the living flame of idealism, which supposes individual activity, a spirit of free examination, and even a spirit of contradiction, having unlearnt spiritual aspiration which can only assert itself through independence, liberty, and diversity, the people abandoned itself to the machinery of systematized and hypertrophical industry, where the same qualities are called for as triumph in the machinery of militarism. Crushed between two cog-wheel systems, individualism, with all that constitutes the nobler traits of the personality, was annihilated. Science was no longer cultivated except in as far as its direct applications place man in possession of material riches. History itself was constrained to serve the ends of Germanism. Biology was put on the rack to exalt the "dolichocephalous

fair-haired race," the predestined victors in the struggle for pre-eminence. Philosophy had no other office than that of preparing the supremacy of Kultur. All the energies of the nation, under the pressure of opinion, the ferule of the school-master and the semi-despotism of the Government, were bent towards the unique good of securing for the country the advantage of force and making individuals the instruments of force. Even brutality and trickery were inculcated as a means of vanquishing the rivals of Germany in a world in which they noticed, with cynical joy, the growth of the sentiments of fraternity and humanity. Indeed this gentleness of manners would bring other peoples more rapidly into their power. How could there be in their thought or heart, a place for liberty which expresses itself imperfectly in parliamentary institutions, but which notwithstanding, despite pettiness and slackness, nagging and botching, lives therein and grows apace, and in the hour of peril cements the people into an indestructible union, because it is a union of free consciences.

Without the institutions of liberty, without even the desire for liberty, how was it possible for socialism in Germany to acquire the same democratic and individualistic character which it presents in England and in France? With German workmen the socialist agitation was only a means of obtaining surer and better conditions of material existence, that is to say of obtaining a share of the economic prosperity, resulting from the formidable and methodic industrial and commercial organization. It is far from being evident that this material comfort, for which the Socialists fought by strike and ballot—as far as the Constitution permitted these to have any influence—embodied for them a higher aim than itself or was considered by them as a step towards a higher and richer jewel of individuality . . . a transition, as it were,

towards a worthier moral life. They formed powerful trade-unions through a natural leaning towards organized association. But with them this was barely a manifestation of the spirit of discipline, an instinctive inclination towards aggregation, to escape, in a manner, the horror of emptiness which the isolated individual feels whenever he is incapable of finding a refuge in his individuality. These trade-unions obeyed their leaders and lent each other mutual aid in the struggle for higher wages. But they reflected no original idea, no general view, no generous aspiration. Nor did they ever seek to check Germany in her course along the highway of imperialism: the vote of the armament budget was only an opportunity to win some economic or fiscal advantage. . . . Their consciences were levelled under the iron rule which bows the German forehead.

The Government did not fail to take advantage of this tendency. The century was hastening all countries towards social legislation. Instead of allowing the people to conquer its new privileges, Bismarck anticipated its claims. As early as 1878 he inaugurated the great social policy which provided workingmen with legal protection, the right to leisure, easier conditions of work, insurance against old-age, sickness, and unemployment . . . all advantages which were to be won later and more slowly in other countries. "We want to create as much content as possible," the Chancellor was in the habit of saying. In this way the working class was placed under the State's tutelage. The new situation, no doubt, was not established without contest: the workingmen wanted more than was offered or else revolted against the restrictive laws by means of which the Government took its precautions. But, on the whole, the opposition of the workers, as evidenced by the voice of their representatives in the Reichstag, was not irreducible. "My Socialists," re-

marked William II, "are not so bad." The Reformist party of Bernstein, which disapproved revolutionary means, has continued to make progress. The German Socialist, originally a "State-ist," has accepted the *mainmise* which the State sought to operate against him and succeeded in accomplishing.

Nor did the independence of the middle-class, of those who decked themselves with the title of Liberals, appear to any better advantage. Citizens of all classes and all parties accept the scarcely attenuated autocracy of the Government and the constant meddling of the administration in the daily acts of life. Along with the clogging of political liberty in Germany, the acts of individual conduct to which English and French attach so much importance, are continually shackled. How does it stand with liberty of speech? The imprudent person expressing himself anent the Emperor, not in disrespectful but simply in familiar terms, runs the risk of seeing some member of the social group rise and declare that he will be denounced for the crime of high-treason. Is it a question of the liberty of the press? In that case, if some journalist, for instance, has published a soldier's complaints against the brutality of an officer, he is summoned to appear in court and called upon to disclose the name of the complainer: does he refuse? He is straightway thrown into prison. The German people unflinchingly accept compulsion where free peoples recognize offences against the private person and against the conscience. It is domesticated and ordered hierarchically. Does not Professor Ostwald appraise us of the subtle distinctions imposed by rank even in the matter of piety: he gravely tells us that "God the Father" is reserved for the exclusive use of the Emperor.

We were apt to laugh at that sort of thing until the hour when the consequences of it all rose up before us in tragic reality. That sort of thing is the sign that

individualism, the conquest of the moral nobleness of the English and of the intellectual intrepidity of the French (which the Germans had understood in 1789 and again in 1848) . . . no longer exists beyond the Rhine. It is annihilated under the crushing weight of State supremacy. Historians and political writers have translated into practical rules Hegel's mystic respect for the idea of the State. Treitschke teaches that "The State is the highest point to which the human society may attain; above the State, there exists nothing in the history of the world." Nothing, indeed, not even eternal reason of which the great writers of all epochs have expressed the precepts; nothing, not even the conscience! The *raison d'Etat* triumphs over every other consideration. What is in the interest of the State, what the State commands, at a given moment, under given circumstances, that is well and good . . . it is right. The State engenders Right by means of force. The individual no longer has recourse to that "inner light" which nourishes itself with the best of human thought and which tends to unite men into a society of minds. Let a general appear who can translate the doctrine of the State and the doctrine of force into military terms, and we have the aphorism of Bernhardi: "For a nation which is growing, force is the supreme Right, and the point of knowing what is just is decided by the arbitrage of war." Our revenge is this, that the contempt of individualism has vitiated even military methods, in which German "State-ism" believed itself triumphant. Their atrocious manner of conducting the war has proved to be the supreme error of their scientific barbarism: it has not vanquished the individual valour of the soldiers of Right; the terror which they believed they could inspire exists no more, submerged under an irresistible wave of revolt and indignation.

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And now let us turn to England. . . . How comforting is the voice of her philosophers and moralists after the sinister homilies of a Treitschke, of a Bernhardi, of a Maximilian Harden! How cheering a sight is the rise of her people, with all the dignity of a man proud of his personal value, of his independence, of his particular thought, yet ready to respect real superiority and competency, ready to accept the discipline which gives its cohesion to the nation, voluntarily subject to those time-honoured rules and gradations which Burke named "the solemn plausibilities" of the social body! How well her contemporary writers, even those most penetrated with the scientific spirit, even the partisans of what is fecund in the solidarist doctrine, jealously defend the fortress of the individual conscience, set in the heart of socialism as a lighthouse and defence!

The work of Stuart Mill on *Liberty* expresses, no doubt, too great a distrust of governmental intervention in private conduct, intervention which a juster conception of the general interest causes to be accepted almost universally today. Nevertheless, one must go back to a few imperishable pages of this work, if one wishes to find the just expression of the essentials of individualism. Whatever extension of State functions one may admit, there is a sphere which should remain forever inviolable in any community in which the principle of liberty is not systematically overthrown. . . .

In the first place [says Mill], this sphere comprises the domain of consciousness: Liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and sentiment, and liberty of opinion on all subjects, practical or theoretical, scientific, moral or theological. . . . In the second place, liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing our plan of life to suit our own character; of acting as we please so long as we do no harm to our fellow-creatures, even

though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. . . . In the third place, liberty of association, which results from all the others, and which should be limited by one restriction only:—that the association be formed by mutual consent.

The reason why Mill insists upon the full enjoyment of the diverse forms of liberty, is because liberty is not one in nature, but complex and variable. At such and such a moment of the evolution of thought, it is made up of the sum of the original notions born of the individual reaction of minds on the multiple forms of experience.

Humanity is not infallible; our thoughts are for the most part but half-truths; the unity of opinion, unless it is the result of the free comparison of opposed opinions, is not desirable. Diversity, very far from being an evil, is a good . . . at least as long as humanity is not more capable than at present of considering the different aspects of things.

It is, then, the scientific idea of the relativity of judgment which inspires Mill with his passion for liberty; he is resolved never to fall asleep on the soft pillow of doubt, but to struggle unceasingly, with the help of all, in free and fruitful competition, in order to wrest from the universe some new tokens of its secret.

The other idea of which he constructs the basis of his belief, is the idea of gradual and continual development. Liberty, as he understands it, is attached to the principle of evolution, which has become in our century the great mainspring of progress. A nation is not great by reason of the momentary force which it draws from a factitious uniformity: the temporary advantage thus obtained by constraint is only a shadow, for it is based upon immobility. Now immobility means moral death. . . . True national greatness can only repose upon the moral and intellectual

growth of individuals. What a monster a collectivity would be, if it were reduced to the state of a mechanism. Inclinations and desires disciplined by the reason are really what constitute the *person*. . . . "He who feels himself moved by inclinations and desires distinctly his own—the expressions of his temperament, developed and modified by culture—possesses truly a character. He whose inclinations and desires are not his own, has no more character than a steam-engine." The social organization ought, then, to have in view the development, by a happy combination of governmental intervention and liberty, of the greatest number of individualities. "The value of a State, finally, is nothing else but the value of the individuals of which it is composed."

Stuart Mill owed much to Carlyle who taught him the narrowness and insufficiency of uncompromising rationalism, and pointed him towards sympathy, sentiment, social solidarity, and the respect of the intuitions of the heart and conscience. But the friendship which united these two men for a time, could not last, because each represented one of the extremes of contemporary thought. Carlyle, fearing the excesses of democracy, insisted too strongly on the principle of authority; Mill, fearing the excesses of governmental intervention, exaggerated the uncompromising element of the principle of liberty. English liberalism is seeking its way today in an application prudently swung from one principle to the other, that is to say, in a compromise. It is not obliged, however, to deny either one of its two spiritual ancestors, for both have strengthened, though differently, English individualism. Mill demanded the independence of thought, since, being scientifically minded and impressed with the sense of the relative and the sense of change, he looked for progress from the shock of ideas and from the co-operation of all in the work of truth. Carlyle pointed

out the force of feelings and beliefs, that is to say, of firm motives, which, at a given moment, captivate the will, determine the related action, and become a tie between consciences. "Firm motives" and not "fixed motives," one should observe: for he, too, admitted evolution and progress. He saw in the lives of great men, or *heroes* as he calls them, the creatures of new and prolific ideas, which, from century to century, cause humanity to advance a few steps. The common mortal is scarcely capable of aught but imitation, which in turn is based on respect. These were profound observations which were destined to rally the adherence of Mill. They express well enough the mentality of the English nation, which is disciplined and respectful without ceasing to be individualist. Where the two thinkers differed was on the question of degree and means. Mill wished to see the development of strong individualities capable of forming the framework of the social body, not merely of a handful of heroes, but of a considerable élite of superior men, sprung from the masses, as the plant springs from the soil, sustained and nourished with the sap of liberty. Mill had faith in democracy, itself qualified to proceed with the work of selection, whence it draws its value, and alone rich enough in human virtualities to supply and accelerate progress. It was his conception which prevailed, modified, however, and vivified by the doctrine of the *social organization.*

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According to the conception which is the latest form assumed by English individualism, society is not composed of isolated individuals, whose dispersion is corrected only by sympathy and the consented acceptance of discipline; it is a living body, the parts of which—just as the organs of a being of flesh and blood—are in such intimate relationship that the action of one influences the action of all the

others and that the suffering of any one involves the decline of the whole body. There is then an analogy between the modes of social life and the modes of animal life, but with this difference, that the social organism is the work of the intelligence and of the will, amendable and modifiable at each moment of its duration, and more than that, under the strict necessity of being amended and modified in order to endure. The *social organism* is a creation of man which can subsist only through a continuous act of creation. In France and in England, countries of democracy and liberty, the direction which the collective will communicates to the complex working of the organism is the development of the individual. The collective conscience is made up of the sum, or rather of the interpenetration and of the interaction of the individual consciences. The whole is not an excrescence; a parasite vegetation which absorbs the sap of the individual cells, causes them to droop and surrender their self-existence, as it happens in the German conception of the State. The whole exists only as instrumental to the growth of the parts . . . a comprehensive intelligence which surveys the needs of the ensemble, but thinks only through the thought of each . . . a general will, the determinations of which proceed from the periphery towards the centre, instead of shooting out from the centre and finally smothering the peripheric elements. The parliamentary régime is the only form of government which suits social individualism, for it is only through the parliamentary régime that individual judgments harmonize into a collective judgment, always ready to undergo modifications according to the fluctuations of events and the psychological reactions which accompany them. The associations play the part of intermediaries between the individual and the collectivity. Thus the wills, being both free and conjugated, accept the more active and frequent intervention of the

State, because there is no longer any conflict between the Government and the free citizen, and because, on the other hand, the liberty of all receives its full development through the moderate and opportune intervention of the Government.

The full fruit of social progress [writes Professor Hobhouse], can be gathered only by a society, in which the generality of men and women are not passive recipients but active producers and contributors. To make the rights and responsibilities of the citizens real and living, and to extend them as widely as the actual conditions of society will permit, such is the end of the organic conception of the social body; such is the justification of the principle of democracy. It is also the justification of the principle of nationalities. For inasmuch as the true social harmony rests on feeling and makes use of all the natural ties of kinship, of neighbourliness, of congruity of character and belief, and of language and customs, the best, healthiest, and most vigorous political unit is the one towards which men are drawn most strongly by their feelings. All breach of such unity, whether by forcible disruption or by compulsory inclusion in a larger society of alien sentiments, habits, and laws, tends to mutilate or strangle the spontaneous development of social life. National liberty and social liberty grow on the same root; their historical connection reposes on no accident but upon ultimate identity of idea.

These words written in 1910 are the expression of the best of English thought; the sentiment which inspires them is the sentiment which is sustaining the energy of the English people and its soldiers. It is also the sentiment which suggests to the leaders of English thought the wise and just resolution (entirely shared by the French) that the war, which ought to put an end to Prussian militarism without pity, ought not to aim at the dismemberment of the German nation. Under this condition (provided the Germans are amenable to humaner

feelings) the Allies, who found their cause on right, will be able to establish the future of Europe on the principles of equity.

The doctrine of social individualism is a compromise between two forces which were long believed to be antagonistic, and which a better understanding of the conditions of collective life, a more legitimate direction of the intelligence and the will, has reconciled. Let us not be surprised however that, with the sociologists of today, personal preferences incline sometimes towards individualism and sometimes towards socialism. What is remarkable is that even the Socialists in England propose, as a goal for collective organization, not the enthroning of a Despot-State, a Leviathan-State, bent on devouring individualities, but the establishment of a more intelligent society, which, by "comprehensive co-operation," definitely liberates the individual. Mr. H. G. Wells, better known in France as the author of fantastic novels than as the sociological novelist and political thinker that he really is, represents this form—so fruitful, even if it wanders somewhat towards Utopia—of constructing and liberating socialism. Mr. Wells, who commenced life as a professor of science, is, of all English socialists, the most sympathetic towards German scientific thought. He is struck with the disorder which reigns in the world. Competency is scarce, vanity rules as queen, and the insufficiency of some and the over-sufficiency of others are conducting us into a chaos of bungling activity. The most capable rarely wish to employ their talents for the common good; as for the waste caused by the incapable and perverted—it is incalculable. From his point of view—(Wells is a pessimist through a natural tendency, exaggerated by a desire for literary effect)—our society, despite half-hearted desires for organization, still presents the spectacle of " . . . the Individualism of a crowd of

separated, undisciplined little people all obstinately and ignorantly doing things jarringly, each one in his own way. . . . Each snarling from his own little bit of property, like a dog tied to a cart's tail. . . ." The remedy which he proposes is the reconstruction of the whole system according to the axioms of science. The new science of "Eugenics" which endeavours to better the conditions of birth, is to give us a healthy and robust humanity. A rational education is to construct, on a foundation of physical health, the mental faculties which are to make all citizens useful to themselves and others. No sentimentality: the socially useless is to be eliminated, or definitely prevented from reproducing. As to productive activity, it is to be regulated in all branches by expert functionaries to be rigorously chosen for their science and competency. The State is to intervene wherever its authority is necessary to co-ordinate private action, even in questions of marriage and property. In short, the whole matter of government and administration is to be revised by utilizing as a starting-point the new principle of "efficiency."

What precedes would seem to classify Wells necessarily among the "State-ists." Yet all this systematization of the social organization betrays, after analysis, a fundamental principle of supple life, of spontaneous vigour, and of autonomous individualism. Of course some principle is necessary, we must have organization; but this principle and this organization ought to spring from the social body itself and vary according to the phases of its evolution. No authority of a haughty and despotic nature ought to prevail; not even a scientific idea ought to compress the free play of moral forces. Mr. Wells writes a *Utopia*, but he warns us that he poses only general principles destined to stimulate thought and that the particular solutions which he is led to suggest ought not

to be considered as final. He furnishes the example of a mind at work; he hopes to lead forward towards social speculation all creative intelligence the collaboration of which is necessary for the discovery of truth, that is to say, for the setting of practical applications which may be expected to prevail for a time. The higher aim of this collective effort is to liberate individuality wherever it exists potentially. What Carlyle was in the habit of calling a "hero" and Mill a "strong character," Wells calls a "unique man"; his whole sociology tends towards producing the "unique." A progression in this sense is noticeable in the course of his literary production: one of his more recent sociological novels, *The New Machiavelli*, deviates from a certain rigidity of doctrine which was not absent from his first works. The leading character indicates in the following terms his ever-growing attachment to the predominance of the "unique":

> I began in my teens by wanting to plan and build cities and harbours for mankind; I ended in the middle thirties by desiring only to serve and increase a general process of thought. . . . The real work before mankind now, I realized once and for all, is the enlargement of human expression, the release and intensification of human thought, the vivider utilization of experience, and the invigoration of research. . . .

This final outcome of English Socialism is characteristic: it is the triumph of individualism by means of organization.

The programme of the Radical Socialists, who have been in power for ten years, is an application of liberal principles to social individualism. It is recapitulated in two important articles: first, economic liberation of the proletariat through high progressive taxation on the unearned incomes of the rich, purchase of the large landed estates by the collectivity, insurance against accident, invalidity,

and weakness through old age or sickness; second, political liberation by means of rights granted to municipalities, universal suffrage, soon to be followed by woman's suffrage, and the suppression of the veto of the House of Lords.

I shall attempt to show in a following chapter in what way English customs, the methods of education, and the spirit which sways the people bring to light everywhere, as in the case of institutions and doctrines, the triumph of individualism.

There is, then, essential incompatibility between English thought and German thought. Nevertheless, these same Radicals who hold so tenaciously to the individualist spirit in the initial process of social transformation cultivated German friendship as long as it was possible, and to such lengths, indeed, that the confidence they obstinately placed in the people across the Rhine came near to leaving England in the lurch, at the moment of aggression. There were two reasons for this attitude. The first was that love of peace, opposition to all military organization, and desire to reserve all the resources of the country for social needs led them to hope that their exemplary proceeding would merit reciprocal action and that the German menace would soon calm down. The second was that the hypocritical protestations of the Emperor and of the successive Chancellors so expert in juggling with words of peace and the good-fellow attitude of the *Sozialdemokratie* simply imposed upon them.

Today the scales have fallen from their eyes. The latent antagonism between English individualism and German State-ism has broken out, and so much the more violently, after the rending of the veil, because English goodwill had previously redoubled its efforts to dissimulate the state of affairs. It was at this juncture that individualism revealed itself in its most admirable form:

two million voluntary enrolments were signed—without the intervention of the law and solely through a sentiment of duty and a spirit of sacrifice—by the sons of England ready to do battle for the English ideal. The Germans were overwhelmed by the significance of the deed.

CHAPTER VIII

Imperialism and Empire

FIRST PART: IMPERIALISM OF EXPANSION

BESIDES the foundation of liberty and the development of individualism, colonial expansion is England's particular achievement. Just as, since the Middle Ages, the Constitution forms the pivot of her internal policy, so from the Renaissance down, the Empire forms the central point of her external policy. Nowadays, "imperialism" is understood to mean the movement which induces vigorous nations to extend their activity beyond their national frontiers. Spain gave an example of it in the New World, but she was unable to maintain the necessary effort. France, despite certain painful vicissitudes, succeeded in the attempt. For England, colonial expansion has been a triumph: her flag floats over territories which cover a quarter of the habitable globe.

Now English imperialism has an exclusively colonial character; it extends beyond Europe to minor peoples little capable of governing themselves and to territories either unoccupied or maladroitly exploited by the occupants. It is important to distinguish this form of expansion from that which Pan-Germanism puts into effect or would like to put into effect. German imperialism fixes its choice in Europe upon historical and ancient possessions,

occupied as rightful properties by worthy and capable owners, sanctified by the heroism of a lineage of great ancestors and by centuries of civilization. German imperialism, guilty of aggression and assault, in negation of all right, has rendered itself odious by cruelty in war and tyranny in peace. English imperialism, whatever wrongs it may have inflicted at certain moments, has never ceased to be actuated by a desire for more justice, more liberty, and more humanity. The English, not only because of their acquired rights, but also because of their respect for abstract Right, are justified in defending their Empire against the attempt at universal domination by which the Germans, according to their own testimony, wished to complete their attempt at hegemony in Europe.

What English Imperialism is, in its more recent phases, in what respects it authorizes the English people to fight today with a clear conscience for civilization and progress: we intend to seek to determine in this chapter.

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It was in the second half of the sixteenth century, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, that the desire to force the barrier set by the ocean all around the British Isles appeared for the first time among men of thought and men of action in England. The English were neither the first explorers nor the first colonizers, but when they had once entered upon the great movement which had already led the Spaniards to the New World, they displayed, with as much boldness as their rivals, the qualities of self-command, of consistency, and discipline which were to give them the advantage over all others.

They were a race of sailors, inured to the perils of the Ocean. Their pulses beat with the blood of the Vikings . . . those hardy rovers who, urged by their valour and lured by the spell of the unknown, were wont to steer their frail crafts straight into the open sea. This spirit

of the Vikings showed itself, in the sixteenth century, in men of the Willoughby, Drake, Frobisher, and Walter Raleigh type. The love of a hard fight against the elements and the intoxication of risk went hand in hand with the hope of big booty—spices and gold-dust ravished from the lands of sunshine, or seized aboard Spanish galleons. The more unprincipled among them managed to conciliate a passion for gain with their patriotic duties. Such were certain pious buccaneers who plundered King Philip's subjects, the vanquished of the Armada, with the idea that they were fulfilling a "heavenly mission." The more enlightened were already brooding over a vast dream of national aggrandizement. They were cultured men brought up in the school of the Renaissance; they had not forgotten the history of Greece and Rome. Why should not England become in the New World the emulator of those who had colonized and civilized the Old?

History was to give body to these dreams. Carried forward by her vitality, by her passion for the things of the sea, by the need of escaping the limits of her island, by her talent for trade, England, little by little in the course of fortuitous events and struggles with rival nations, extended her possessions. Sometimes the independent spirit of a religious sect, and at others the enterprising spirit of a trading company, won her a colony. Her most precious conquests were made at the expense of France. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries she availed herself of every armed conflict with her French neighbours to extend her boundaries or settle in some part of the world whither they had preceded her: thus Canada and India fell into her hands. At Gibraltar, at Malta, at Aden, in Mauritius, in the Malay Archipelago she established defence and relay stations along the great oceanic highways. The continuity of her plans, her tenacity in holding firm wherever she settled, the ad-

vantage of her insular position placing her beyond continental complications and encouraging her to concentrate her efforts on the extension of her colonies, and finally her supremacy of the sea, assured her success precisely where others failed. These two centuries thus represent the great period of her colonial construction and consolidation.

In 1775, the revolt of the Colonies of America marked the beginning of a transformation in her administrative methods: prompt to take advantage of the lessons of experience, she came to understand that she was ill-directed in treating her own people settled in distant lands as subjects and not as citizens. Hence began an era of colonial emancipation destined, in freeing the English beyond the sea, to attach them to the mother country by ties of gratitude and affection. Still later, the movement of nationalities, which caused an outburst of powerful group-sentiment all over Europe, found in the Anglo-Saxon people dispersed across the continents a new and immense field in which to exercise itself. In the second half of the nineteenth century, two currents of spiritual forces were set in motion: one from the colonies towards the metropolis and the other from the metropolis towards the colonies. And so this great body became animated with a soul. England grew conscious of the importance of the work accomplished, of the task yet to be achieved, of the possibilities of material and immaterial power contained in the Empire, ready to be developed. Once the Empire was organized, bound into a sheaf and rendered more and more accessible to higher destinies, Englishmen began to speak of an "imperial policy" and of an "imperial destiny." The horizon lifted and broadened; new points of direction were discovered in the distance. The growth of the Empire was no longer to be left to the drift of happy circumstances; a guiding principle was to

preside over its doings and a deep-rooted sentiment was to lend it spiritual force. Thus the imperialistic spirit took definite shape and assumed a distinctly English value—in other words it became the desire to found, through expansion and union, the *Empire* of *Greater Britain.*

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New conditions of fact and new currents of ideas combined in the last half of the nineteenth century, to give direction to the imperialistic movement. Not since Waterloo had England been menaced in Europe. She was aware of her strength: her supremacy of the sea and her prestige permitted her to make her influence felt even in questions which did not immediately concern her. She challenged no one; she remained attached to her policy of the balance of power; but she was wont to intervene fearlessly, both to protect her interests and to defend liberty imperilled or the principle of nationality violated. The activity of Palmerston and then that of Disraeli are the outward signs of this national health and vigour.

After 1870, the necessity of a world-policy forced itself on her attention. France was increasing her colonial domain. Russia was growing in Asia. Germany, who had long limited her ambitions to the Continent, was seeking, in her turn, to settle in the parts of the world which had remained unoccupied. England could not hold her position as mistress of the seas unless she secured new points of support along the routes of the globe and new lines of communication between the scattered elements of her Empire. Moreover, the development of her population and the considerable extension of her commerce and industry gave rise to new problems. From a country of twelve million inhabitants in the days of the Napoleonic wars, she had become a country of forty million souls. Each year emigration poured into other lands the overflow of her subjects: was it not fitting to

give a direction to this wave of vital energies, which ought to remain English, and to hold the sons of England in close relation and sympathy with the mother country? Finally, industry had need of raw material, commerce had need of markets: new colonies ought to be the reply to this progression of economic development.

New currents of ideas and sentiments threw these facts into clear relief, co-ordinating them and drawing therefrom the moral and practical consequences. The meaning of race solidarity was growing within the Empire, precisely at the time when the sentiment of social solidarity was developing within the nation. The same thinker, Thomas Carlyle, expressed them both under the sway of the same historical causes and of the same emotional and idealistic influences. Now if it is true that a nation can attain its full growth and develop both in power and in harmony only by means of the mutual aid, respect, and goodwill of the component individuals and classes, is it not also evident that a prolific, energetic, and enterprising race like the Anglo-Saxons will attain its full power of expansion and creation, its full capacity of civilizing action, its maximum greatness, only by means of the union and co-operation of the group-elements which it has sown across the world? Initiative, daring, the spirit of adventure, legitimate desire for gain, vigorous self-confidence, self-reliance, in short all of the individualist qualities which guarantee the Anglo-Saxon his power of success will not be diminished but rather intensified by the voluntary submission of the egoism of each group to the common interest. Each filial society in its corner of the universe will share in the English power, and, over and above the advantages measurable in coin, will maintain within itself the living flame of the spirit, which passes measure:—the English conception of things, an English code of moral duties, a communion of sentiment, volitions,

and hopes with the leaders of thought, the creators of art, and the founders of the ideal of the English race. And so a current of moral force, or as Carlyle liked to say, a breath of "heroism," will carry the enthusiasm for the glories of the past and the fond hopes of the future from the mother country to the colonies and back from the colonies to the mother country. And this spiritual cement will create an indissoluble union . . . the union of hearts and minds.

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It cannot be dissimulated that this exaltation of the racial idea contained a leaven of vast ambitions which are not unlike that tumultuous ebullition of the national spirit of which Germany is furnishing the spectacle today. Nevertheless, despite certain alarming germs and certain violent impulses towards expansion, English imperialism has discovered, in the noble traditions of the nation, in the deep-seated poise of the national temperament, and more recently in the sentiment of human solidarity, a counter-weight which has arrested her on the slope of injustice and led her back, after temporary backslidings, into the straight road of equity. Compared with English imperialism, German imperialism is the perversion of a great national force, such as one could expect from a people which, for a century, has sought success only through the agency of exclusive egoism and unchained violence. English imperialism has grown temperate, thanks to an ethical instinct which keeps alive, in contemporary England, the feeling of self-respect and the sentiment of the solidarity of nations in the work of progress. England has never been possessed with the madness of brutality and pride into which Germany has fallen in defiance of her former greatness and of all that is sacred in the common patrimony of mankind. Since moral causes have come to be reckoned in the conduct of nations,

England has shown herself respectful of the obligations due to humanity and mindful of the unwritten law. We encounter this dignity and this lofty conscientiousness even in certain doctrines—outlived today—which reveal an excessive exuberance of race vitality.

Carlyle, the first interpreter of imperialism, expressed his admiration for force with too much insistence. His temperament evidenced a disproportionate share of that particularly Saxon quality, energy; similarly his work gave proof of a disproportionate share of what one might call "saxonism." He preached the gospel of energy; he did not stop short of an apology for force. Force, he said (and in that he was right), force is one of the means which nature imposes on man to make her will prevail. Human concerns are complex and uncertain; at a given moment truth is but partial truth and perhaps only apparent; prejudices, passions, even perversions are mixed and entangled with just and disinterested reasons, in such a manner that it is difficult to know what order of motives we obey. Fortunately there exists in the world, through the will of the Creator, a fatality for good; conflict is the tangible form which its evolution assumes; the man—or the group of men—who has sufficient moral force to persevere in the struggle even unto victory, is worthy of victory. . . . In other terms, at such and such a point in duration, force is equivalent to right. That is getting dangerously near the conclusion formulated by Hegel and put into practice by Bismarck, Bernhardi, and their school. But let us look a little closer into the matter: there is really only a semblance of similarity between the two doctrines. Carlyle makes allowance—perhaps too great allowance—for force: but after all he subordinates force to right. In his thought, which was strongly influenced by German thought, there is a little too much mystic realism suggesting Hegel; yet, after all, he dis-

claims neither English wisdom nor human reason. Instead of abandoning himself as Hegel did, to the fanaticism of national sentiment and the adoration of established power, Carlyle upholds the rights of the conscience against this power, if it be unjust, and against national sentiment itself if it fall into error. He is not only a prophet whose impassioned homilies summon the Anglo-Saxon race to lofty destinies; he is also a vehement scoffing critic, so bitter at times that he lacks all tact and judgment, and upbraids and berates his countrymen and mankind, wholesale. He recognizes an immanent justice, superior to the will of the powerful, higher than all interests, even those which make use of the name of patriotism; such is the principle of eternal right, "never realized in fact, but burning with a pure flame in the souls of heroes" and revealing itself to the masses in transient gleams whenever criminal enterprises or iniquitous laws violate the popular sense of justice. Carlyle, then, admires those who use force, whenever force is the outward expression of purified thought, of firmer will, of more steadfast purpose resulting from intentions truly upright and disinterested. Whenever he takes up the discussion of that logically associated couple, right and might, he gives precedence to right. For example, he holds that right and force are at any given moment terribly different from each other; but if you give them centuries wherein to be put to the test, you will find them identical.

A sentence like the following is the condemnation without appeal of the war unchained by Germany in 1914:

> If a judgment is unjust, it will not and cannot get harbour for itself, or continue to have footing in this Universe, which was made by other than One Unjust . . . it will continue standing for its day, for its year, for its century, doing evil all

the while; but it has one enemy who is Almighty; . . . and the deeper its rooting, more obstinate its continuing, the deeper also and huger will its ruin and overturn be.

Thus Right, the instrument of which is righteous force, rises inexorably against unjust force.

The criterion is the consent of the totality of men. A conquest "which renders service both to the vanquished and victors" receives the sanction of equity. If Carlyle had been able to ascertain the truth concerning the barbarism whence German force takes its source and the abhorrence it arouses wherever it passes, he would not have looked upon it with the favour he did in 1870. . . . In reality German hypocrisy had beguiled his good faith.

English imperialism, which owes a good deal to Carlyle, did not long retain the biblical form which he had given it in his apostrophes to the "nation elect," predestined "from all eternity" to see the universal triumph of its genius; but it has kept in mind the moral obligations which Carlyle imposed on it as a protecting and civilizing force. English conquest avoids useless violence: English administration is beneficial to infant-peoples whom it saves from barbarism. Wherever English law is established, tribal warfare, assaults on property, personal acts of cruelty cease. Just as we in our colonies, so the English in theirs create order through ties of affection and gratitude: that is why their native troops, like our own *tirailleurs* of Algeria, of Senegal, and Tonkin, are devoted to them, and why they have been able to draw from India 100,000 soldiers ready to fight the good fight with them. The Germans, on the other hand, find the means of sowing revolt in their African colonies, as well as hatred in the annexed provinces of Europe. They do not possess that gift of sympathy which permits an English or French colonial to enter into the mentality of

the African or the Oriental; wherever they go they transport German arrogance, German routine, and that mental inflexibility which in administrative matters causes them to pursue a method to its extreme consequences without concern for humanity, and in the field of speculation, to its extreme conclusions without concern for common sense. By dint of prudent dealing and justice, the English have solved the problem of getting their negro subjects to accept taxation as a benefit. A Frenchwoman who studied their administrative methods in Nigeria recently cited the following detail:

> The hour for paying the taxes is also the hour in which justice is rendered, and each family group which brings its portion of millet, its young goat, or sack of salt understands that this represents an exchange, a contribution paid to the white man, because the white man protects. This is so true that a civil officer among the Munchis was able to use the following threat without smiling: "If you go on fighting with the neighbouring tribe, I shall not come among you any more to get the taxes and settle your quarrels. . . . "

Kipling, who has celebrated in verse the daring and the enterprising spirit of "the imperial race," has also solemnly prescribed its code of duties under the noble formula of the *White Man's Burden:*

> Take up the White Man's burden—
> Send forth the best ye breed—
> Go bind your sons to exile
> To serve your captives' need;
> To wait in heavy harness,
> On fluttered flock and wild—
> Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
> Half-devil and half-child.

Take up the White Man's burden—
  In patience to abide,
To veil the threat of terror
  And check the show of pride;
By open speech and simple,
  An hundred times made plain,
To seek another's profit,
  And work another's gain.

Take up the White Man's burden—
  No tawdry rule of Kings,
But toil of serf and sweeper—
  The tale of common things.
The posts ye shall not enter,
  The roads ye shall not tread,
Go make them with your living
  And mark them with your dead.

The vigorous pressure of colonizing energy, due to the growth of English population, to the development of English industry and the movement of ideas and sentiments of which Carlyle and, later, Kipling were the principal interpreters, resulted, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in a period of conquering activity which added to British possessions territories equivalent to a third of Europe. Under the direction of the Conservative Party and of the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, in particular, this was the period of imperial expansion. External causes no less than internal ones explain the movement. The entrance of all the great nations, France, Russia, Germany, and latterly Italy, into the competition for colonial conquest could not leave England indifferent. She was obliged to expand in order to defend her frontiers and maintain her spheres of influence where there was danger that she might be supplanted.

In this more recent history of the extension of the British Empire, there is a certain chapter which should hold our attention, notwithstanding the controversies which it has provoked. Precisely because it is a somewhat perilous subject for discussion I shall not attempt to elude it: it is the Transvaal problem. Many Frenchmen have been insufficiently informed concerning it, and it remains in their memory as one of the black pages of the colonial annals of England. The Transvaal War broke out during that period of tension between France and Great Britain in which the two countries, in conflict for the partition of Africa, were disputing certain territories foot by foot. The checkmate of Fashoda, the painful uselessness of the heroism spent in extending our Soudan as far as the great lakes, the grim determination of the English Government to keep us from approaching the sources of the river to which Egypt owes its fertility . . . all of that left us naturally enough with a certain feeling of rancour ill-calculated to dispose us in England's favour. Through generosity, our sympathy inclined towards the intrepid little people which was defending its independence against a powerful nation. This sympathy was not ill-directed; our generosity was not ill-spent on the unworthy; the bravery of the Boers, their indomitable determination to yield only after having exhausted all possible means of resistance, their boldness in the offensive, their ingenuity on the defensive, deserved the admiration which we felt for them. England, herself, when the war was over, rendered them due homage in the noble fashion she is wont to adopt with courageous and chivalrous adversaries. The Boers were worthy of conserving their racial characteristics, their customs and self-government, their traditions and their particular aspirations; and these they now possess. These are assured to them forever under the same liberal guarantees

which prevail in the relations of England with all the parts of her Empire.

The question which we are to examine is the question whether England, in reducing the obstinacy of the Boers, committed one of those odious and cynical violations of right, of which Germany furnished the example in tearing Alsace-Lorraine from us, and Austria in wishing to force Servia under the yoke of Germanism. The question is whether—however painful the violence done the Boers may have been—England did not obey certain justifiable motives, and perhaps a certain unavoidable necessity. Do we not find ourselves in presence of one of those insoluble conflicts that history furnishes, in which the forces of the past, worthy of respect in all that goes to make up the beauty of venerable things, encounter the forces of the present, deservedly legitimate in all that gives value to progress? The conflict may be deferred but not avoided. Its conclusion is decreed from the first: the phases of the drama are harrowing as much for the suffering endured as for the fraction of human nobleness destroyed. At least in this case we know that the living anomaly recently called the Transvaal Republic did not succomb to an aggression of shameful appetites, and that all that was noble therein was destined to flourish again—has indeed reflourished already—under a new form in a rejuvenated society.

The Transvaal question was so complex that it divided England itself. As a matter of fact, the apparent provocation of certain acts of the English is explained by the lack of continuity in their policy, by the disorder into which they were thrown by the differences of opinion between the parties, between the successive cabinets, and between the governments of the Metropolis and Cape Colony. The sharp and instant grievances of the Transvaal Outlanders, that is to say of the English engineers,

business men, and merchants established in the gold-bearing region of the Rand, coupled with the menacing armaments of President Krüger, were necessary to induce all the English to adopt the policy of armed intervention. The fact that until the last moment there existed a party of generous and enlightened men to defend the already doomed but noble cause of conciliation and peace reflects honour on the country. If there was aggression, this aggression was not produced as in the case of Germany and Austria in 1914, under the unanimous impulse of national error, in a violent eruption of covetous and unbridled passions.

The study of the circumstances which preceded the final act will show us that there is no parallel between this painful episode of British imperialism, which, after the victory, threw England's liberalism and sense of justice into clear relief and the unpardonable episode of Germanic imperialism, destined, if it succeeded, to efface Belgium and Servia from the map of Europe and to subjugate the world.

The Dutch pioneers who emigrated from Cape Colony in 1833, through inclination towards a nomadic life, into the open air of the Veldt, enjoyed full liberty to organize a small society of hunters and cattle-raisers under the Republican form. Up to 1877, England maintained only a neighbourly attitude towards them, an attitude which might have continued had they themselves not introduced a change in their situation. Their existence has been represented, not without purposeful partiality, in idyllic colours. In reality the Boers were very far removed from the shepherds of Theocritus or Virgil. The sons of adventurous emigrants, and themselves brought up to brave the dangers and to taste the emotions of a roving life, they were particularly fond of hunting and war. One of their occupations consisted in undertaking periodic

raids into the territories of the savage tribes which surrounded them. In 1877, the warlike Zulus answered attack with attack and went so far as to threaten President Krüger in his capital. The Boers called on the English for help: the Zulus were driven out of the country and the supremacy of the white race was re-established in South Africa.

This occurred at a time when new prospects were opening in Africa for the great nations of Europe. The new continent had been largely explored and its riches inventoried: colonies established along the coast had prospered; raw materials and products of the soil offered important resources to commerce and industry; it appeared that the productive activity of the colonizing peoples would find a source of supply in Africa as well as a good market. England and France had commenced their policy of expansion there; Germany had made up her mind, somewhat late, to enter into competition with them; Italy was thinking of taking rank with the other powers. Under the influence of Beaconsfield, English imperialism had become a government doctrine and one of the forces of public opinion. Under these conditions, it can be understood that an enterprising government, desirous of smoothing the way for future progress in a region where it had important establishments, should have thought of incorporating into its possessions the little republic which had just given evidence of its inability to defend itself against the neighbouring black populations. It was not a question of violent absorption or of forced assimilation by methods which Germany is employing in Alsace-Lorraine and in Poland; but of federation, under British suzerainty and under the protection of British liberty. . . . The spirit of savage independence in the Boers rebelled. For a period of three years, they prepared for war; then, taking advantage of the moment when the Tory

ministry was replaced by a Liberal cabinet, they attacked and defeated the small English garrison at Majuba-Hill. Blood had been spilled; one of those fatalities engaging the national honour had occurred; nevertheless the Liberal Premier, Gladstone, who was hostile in principle to colonial enterprises, made no attempt to "revenge" the English defeat. He was content to affirm the nominal suzerainty of England and let the question sleep.

Unfortunately, so grave a question, on which partly depended the future of English colonization on the East Coast of Africa, could not be treated by mere neglect. It was soon seen that this was true. Two events happened to give a particular importance to the Transvaal: first, the discovery of very important mineral riches; secondly, the occupation of Egypt by England. These two events brought about the public appearance of the daring Cecil Rhodes. The Rand gold mines, in the vicinity of Johannesburg, were found to be among the richest in the world. This happened at a time when the scarcity of gold was so appreciable on the London market that the entire monetary economy of Great Britain was affected. A formidable "rush" of prospectors, speculators, engineers and of all of those traders which a camp of gold-seekers allures, brought to the Transvaal an enormous population of British subjects, whom the Boers regarded with disdain and later with suspicion. For them, it was belittling oneself to dig the earth, to become the slave of a machine, and to count columns of figures, instead of practising the noble occupation of hunting big game, or, when there was a good opportunity, of hunting the Matabele or the Zulu. They submitted most reluctantly to the presence of the Outlanders—intruders separated from them by blood and by a long stage of civilization. The struggle between the past and the present was henceforth engaged. It

was carried on at first peacefully by Cecil Rhodes in a broad spirit of conciliation.

Rhodes was not, as he has been represented sometimes in France, an unscrupulous adventurer, who, having become "diamond King" and Premier of Cape Colony, employed in the service of the Colony and of the Metropolis the doubtful system of morals which under favourable circumstances leads on to riches and power. His character exhibited certain intimately allied yet contradictory qualities which are sometimes observed in the English mind: on the one hand, enterprise, daring, and vast ambition for his country; on the other, an element of idealism allied to the best of human thought in all times.

The son of a clergyman, he had had a good classical education before going to the Cape to tempt fortune as a diamond hunter. His genius for organization led him to rise in a few years to the position of overseer and later to that of owner of the famous mines of Kimberly. A millionaire at thirty years of age, he returned and took his place once more on the benches of Oxford without neglecting his business interests, for the purpose of refreshing himself at the fountain-head of the spirit of liberty and leadership, whence the English ruling class and the colonial personnel derive their force. It was not, then, as à *parvenu* in business and politics, but as a statesman nourished with the historical traditions and substance of British thought, that he assumed the direction of affairs at the Cape. From the outset, he distinguished himself in his position by the breadth of his views.

England had established herself in Egypt and had been led by the necessity of her new position to extend her power as far as the great lakes. Why should she not advance from the Cape towards the North, to encounter in Central Africa the southern extremity of Egyptian

Soudan? The English possessions would thus form an immense domain, a single stretch, extending over the east of Africa, from Alexandria to the Cape; a railway line was to run through it; one of the finest fields of activity which has ever been opened to human enterprise was to be realized. This colossal dream pre-supposed a union concluded between the English Colony of the Cape and the Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and of the Transvaal. Rhodes worked to bring about the federation of South Africa. He found President Brand of the Orange Free State favourably disposed to his plan, which was to leave the participating states political independence and to furnish the guarantee of English imperial power for their security. But these excellent intentions were reduced to nought by the obstinacy of Krüger. Krüger intrigued in the Cape Parliament through the agency of trusty adherents, stirred up racial hatred in the Orange State, and rendered any friendly understanding impossible. Before long the colonial ambition of Germany in West Africa furnished him a solid support.

After Bismarck had taken possession of the Damaraland, President Krüger, it was noticed, made a voyage to Berlin. . . . During the dinner which was offered him at Potsdam, he pronounced the following words addressed to the Emperor: "It is by the favour of God that we are able to regard your Majesty and the German Empire with looks of affection and confidence." William II., without replying (for he had to be cautious with England, who was still friendly and unsuspecting with regard to Germany's world policy), rose, shook the hands of his guest with emotion, and gave him the accolade. This happened in 1884. German friendship could go no farther than that, for England, having had wind of a trans-African railway project which was to unite the

German colony on the west with the Transvaal at the east, had had her troops occupy Buchanaland in Central Africa, and had put a stop to the German-Boer enterprise. The tacit encouragement of the Emperor, however, was well calculated to strengthen Krüger's obstinacy.

From this time on, Krüger kept up a mute struggle, by means of intrigue abroad and by measures prejudicial to the Outlanders within the country. The mines of the Rand were furnishing most of the riches of the country: yet 100,000 English who were exploiting them were put beyond the pale of the law. Crushed under taxes, obliged to construct their own roads, deprived of schools for their children, and of all city improvements in their town of Johannesburg, forced to buy dynamite at exorbitant prices and subject to prohibitive tariffs on the Delagoa-Bay railroad, they were even refused the right to vote, by which they hoped to make their grievances heard. The situation was intolerable. One can understand—without being able to excuse the act—the *coup de force* attempted by Jameson, who at the head of a few resolute horsemen tried to lay hands on Krüger and the Government. The raid did not succeed. But the bitterness which it left in both camps rendered war inevitable. Krüger made the most of the time from 1895 to 1897 to provide the Army with artillery bought in France and Germany. When hostilities broke out spontaneously, so to speak, the Boers, who were incomparable marksmen and expert in all the wiles of hunting, also proved themselves excellent tacticians. It is a matter of history that England prevailed only at the price of very heavy sacrifices.

An active minority in England protested against the Jameson raid and against the war itself. All the objections which could legitimately appeal to sentiment and conscience in this painful Transvaal affair found their interpreters. But the complexity of the problem and

the action of forces more powerful than the immediate interests concerned rendered a peaceful solution impossible. At bottom, it was really a question of a conflict between a modern industrial community and a form of society going as far back as the age of the hunter or shepherd. From another point of view, it was also a question of principle, which England—not only the imperialist England of Joseph Chamberlain, but also the moderate and sober-minded England of today—cannot abandon—the principle of the cohesion of the Empire. In a parallel case, would the French permit the Principality of Monaco to thrust itself like a wedge between the Comté de Nice and the Provence? Similarly, the 200,000 Boers of the Transvaal threatened to cut the English East-African possessions in two. The problem to be solved was then—all due allowance being made—the problem which the United States of North America solved against the Southern States by the war of 1861.

Although the restless and uncompromising spirit which for a time marked English imperialism may have sometimes inspired colonials of the Jameson school to adopt regrettable measures with regard to the Transvaal, it may be asked whether the restless and uncompromising spirit of the Boers would ever have permitted them to be won peacefully to a federative policy in South Africa. Whatever may have been England's wrongs, she did not act cynically through a spirit of plunder. As soon as imperial unity was achieved, she generously granted the Boers self-government and the general direction of their destinies. Today, one of the generals of Boer independence, General Botha, is President of the Federation and governs both English and Boers according to the traditions of British liberty. A party of Boer scouts is fighting with the English troops against the Austro-German coalition, a Boer contingent has dislodged the Germans from German

West Africa; another will probably achieve the conquest of German East Africa. What better proof could be furnished that barriers of injustice no longer exist between the adversaries of former days, and that the war of 1900 has not left any bitter memory in the minds of the Transvaalian?

There is something further. The painful necessity which obliged England to resort to force against a people of European race, whose obstinacy she had to overcome but whose determination and courage she admired, led her to submit to a conscientious self-examination. The Conservative party, which was extremely imperialistic, fell from power: Mr. Chamberlain lost all credit. The Liberals of today have given up the principle of expansion and have adopted "union-imperialism." In the following pages I shall explain upon what traditions and upon what principles rests the cohesion of the Anglo-Saxon race, in one great family, the members of which, free and animated with the individualist spirit, live their particular lives, pursue their particular ends, defend their own interests, and yet find themselves united in the hour of peril to save England and the English ideal from belittlement or destruction. But I should like to conclude this part of my subject by specifying how much progress the English have made since the days of Carlyle.

The English remain a people of energetic and daring initiative but they no longer exercise this initiative to increase their share of property in the world, a share already so vast that their task of owners seems too heavy for their shoulders. They have no other desire than to civilize, humanize, and teach. Force still remains a necessity to put a restraint upon perversity or to reduce error. But they wish to restore force to its simplest expression: they no longer admire force in itself. At home their mission is to complete the work of justice towards

the disinherited, and abroad, the work of humanity towards the feeble and backward. For these ends they desire peace: their position is purely defensive. Their idealism has grown broader and richer; it is limited less strictly than before to the Anglo-Saxon race and to Anglo-Saxon sensitiveness, imagination, and ambition. It seeks its inspiration more in the universality of human thought—that is to say in that "humanism," which is the moral sense of the citizen world, which unites the great men of antiquity and the founders of modern wisdom in the same spiritual communion. I should like to cite as a proof of this the article published by the distinguished Oxford professor, Sir Walter Raleigh, on the morrow of the declaration of war. He makes use of the title "Might is Right" not with the idea of paying a tribute of approbation to the German doctrine, but of demonstrating its horror, and, furthermore, its stupidity. Carlyle is rather severely handled, because, despite the value of his moral precepts, his admiration for force carries him down a dangerous slope. Since 1870, Germany's aberration as a nation has revealed the germ of madness which lies dormant in the worship of force when it is pushed to the extreme of fanaticism. At the end of the course the final result is bestiality: the *Urvolk* of Fichte becomes the "blond beast" of Nietzsche. Sir Walter does not deny the cousinship of the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans, but he prefers recalling the importance of the Latin and Celtic elements in the race. "The English are a very mixed people, with enormous infusions of Celtic as well as of Latin blood. The museum of Roman sculpture at Naples is full of English faces." Then again there was too much mystic fatalism in the faith of Carlyle, that is, an excess of that Germanic vice, romanticism. Contemporary England has learned the beauty and the force of rationalism, that is of the thought which examines

itself, of conscience which keeps in touch with the truths taught by the Greek philosophers, the Latin law-makers, the fathers of Christianity, the great modern thinkers universally recognized as masters.

"Might is Right": what else does the term mean in the German acceptation, if not: Might is Might? But in another sense, that which a consensus of opinion proclaims openly, the term signifies that there exists a force superior to the brutal arbitrage of arms, a force of sympathy, of justice, of beauty, and of righteousness, which finally carries the day even against "the shining armour" and the "mailed fist" . . . and that force is called Right. . . . The contrary doctrine, the doctrine held by the Germans, has rendered them obtuse. For have they not finally become hypnotized in contemplating the blade of their sword? and has not this led them to the point where they no longer know anything of other peoples and no longer understand humanity? Again, how was it possible unless the craze of force had blinded them, how was it possible for them not to perceive that a spirit of revolt was astir in the world? Is there not a sign of their dementia in their not understanding that humanity was weary, or, to use the very fitting expression of Gabriel Seailles, that "indignation had killed fear"? They set the other peoples at naught: the other peoples' answer was scorn for their colossal scarecrow—force!

In presence of the dishonour and abasement of Germany, England, like ourselves, has become more steadfast in the service of justice, promising herself that she would use forceful means only to bring about the triumph of right. . . . The days of conquering imperialism are over; what is left is that admirable and noble achievement, the Empire, a corporate being animated with a single soul and united by ties of affection, respect, and liberty.

SECOND PART: UNION-IMPERIALISM

The colonial history of England, like all history, is a succession of splendid pages and sombre pages, of glorious doings and acts of selfishness, of magnanimous traits and vulgar passions. Human action under whatever form it occurs, individual or national, is thus composed of the best and worst, and offers the moralist nought but a varied pageant of humanity's doings. Yet, the English nation, although seeking its interests, at times blindly and avidly possesses that particular nobleness which has enabled it, in the light of experience, to recognize and repair its faults. While certain men have fallen into error and have allowed themselves to be carried away by cupidity, other parties and other men have openly recognized the voice of truth or of justice. In short, the nation has increasingly progressed towards a higher conception of political liberty, towards a nobler notion of the duties of the strong towards the weak, of those in power towards the governed, and of one man towards another. It is owing to this independence of criticism in Parliament and in the nation, to this firmness of principle among the better classes, to this ever-increasing clearness and sincerity of conscience more and more inspiring government action, that England's colonial history has so often reached the summits which mark the way for other nations. The British Empire consolidated into an indestructible whole by powerful ties of moral attraction furnishes the most praiseworthy example of political creation, notwithstanding the diversity of interests and races, which the world has known since the dissolution of the Roman Empire. In following the stages of its development and in noting the phases of ideas which have presided over this development, we shall be in a position to appreciate the generosity and prudence

—instinctive or acquired—of the English as a colonizing people. These qualities will appear in a more vivid light in contrast with German methods.

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In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, English colonial policy, although comparatively humane, did not introduce any novelty into the relations commonly admitted in those times between the colonizing countries and distant conquered territories. The colonies were considered to be possessions from which it was lawful to draw all the revenue possible without regard to the rights of the occupants. It was the time when slavery was considered to be the legitimate law which the strong might impose on the weak, and the ruling races on the inferior races. When a tide of emigration, determined by religious persecution, had carried over important groups of English colonists towards the temperate climates of North America, and after New England, New Holland, Pennsylvania, had become veritable English provinces beyond the seas, a colonial administration was set up which was honest in character, respectful of justice, but not very liberal. The idea of treating these new British lands, politically and administratively, as the British people were treated at home was never really entertained. The home government assumed an air of sovereign authority in the matter. The population, although of English blood, was considered as a population of *subjects*, liable to taxation and to statute-labour, as were the French, for instance, under the régime of the absolute monarchy—and not at all as Britons, naturally protected against arbitrary dealing through the extension to outlying countries of the constitutional guarantees assured to English citizens.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century there occurred two movements of the highest importance for the future of English colonization: first in the colonies of

America, the movement of revolt destined to result in the independence of these colonies, and ultimately in the liberation of the other colonies settled by the white race; secondly at home in the mother-country, with reference to India, a protest against any unscrupulous exploitation of the inferior races. This protest was destined to result in the triumph of honesty and humanity in the methods of government and administration whenever, in presence of the unfitness of the peoples to govern themselves, it was necessary to delegate part of the central power to English functionaries and to maintain order by acts of authority. The spokesman of both these movements was the great statesman whose preponderating rôle and decisive intervention in the constitutional history of England we have already discussed . . . Edmund Burke.

India, towards 1780, was in the hands of the East India Company to which the English Government had entrusted the duty of keeping order, as well as the task of agricultural exploitation and commercial organization. Thus left to themselves and under cover of the general indifference with regard to the fate of the natives, the functionaries and business agents of the Company recognized no other law than that of success. Daring, skill, enterprise, and talent for organization were translated into terms of shareholders' profits, all acts of cruelty or betrayal, all methods of fraud or cynicism were overlooked. It was thought natural that Clive should have duped the Rajah Omichund by producing a false signature; that Impey should have had Nuncomar hanged for the same fault of which Clive had been guilty, although forgery is not a grave offence according to the Hindoo code of morals, while it is a crime according to the European code; that Warren Hastings should have lent English troops to aid in the extermination of a tribe with whom he had made a pact

of peace; that Benfield should have been associated with an Oriental potentate to put into effect a policy of extortion at the expense of his subjects. These "nabobs" were honoured when they returned to England with their coffers full of gold, and spent their fortunes royally in mansions, in pomp, in hunting, and in generous donations left in the hands of the party leaders. But Burke was keeping watch. He used his eloquence in the service of the rights of the conquered peoples. His protest against the practices of fraud and rapine which threatened to debase the conscience of the nation, encountered keen opposition at the outset but silently made its way into the heart of the nation. He accused Warren Hastings before the House of Lords, sitting as a High Court. The trial lasted six years. The cause was not sufficiently matured to permit of honesty and eloquence triumphing over corruption and the fascination of success. Nevertheless, despite a temporary check, the intervention of Burke prepared the downfall of the East India Company and the establishment of a state administration which was to become, in time, the famous *Civil Service*, recruited among the best University graduates and very generally admired for its high competency, its disinterestedness, and its dignity.

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In the question of the colonies of America, Burke did not win the immediate success which the logic and the generosity of his point of view merited; the disastrous consequences of the contrary policy, however, retrospectively lent an irresistible force to his arguments. The principles which he laid down became the very basis of the future relations of England with her colonies. His two speeches *On American Taxation* and *On Conciliation with America* have come down to us, thanks to their broad and generous ideas, as classics of English political science.

About 1775, a strong current of independence was noticeable in the political literature and in the popular centres of England precisely at the time when the *Contrat Social* in France was popularizing the first democratic demands. Certain small but enterprising groups of citizens, deprived of the right of vote, were exerting themselves, not indeed dangerously, and yet with sufficient effect to disturb the Government and the ruling oligarchy. There was rioting, without gravity but indicative of a certain spirit of uneasiness. This outcrop of individualistic and democratic feeling—a forewarning of the great movement which, fifteen years later, was to occasion the great Revolution in France—had its rebound in America where it incited the colonists who had no deliberative voice in the affairs of their own country to refuse the new taxes which the Metropolis wished to impose and to which they had not consented. There was co-relation between the spirit of revolt which manifested itself in America and the demands for the extension of the right to vote which, in such popular movements as that headed by the agitator Wilkes, were forcing attention in England. Those in power were aware of the state of affairs, yet they braced themselves in an uncompromising attitude of resistance. This resistance triumphed over the riots of London but was to be of no avail against the insurrection of Boston.

Burke had no sympathy for democracy: it was not in the name of the "rights of man" that he defended the American colonists. But instinctively through fidelity to the traditions of English liberty he wished to secure for all English citizens—in whatever land they had settled —the guarantees of the parliamentary régime. The practical means of avoiding the catastrophe, the distant rumbling of which was becoming a menace, was, he said, to grant to all Englishmen, whether in distant lands or in

the mother country, the benefit of the immunities of the Constitution. Hence, in his case there was no rationalist idealism, no set of abstract principles, the universality of which extends to all men, but there was a profound feeling for the nobleness and human value of the forms of civilization created in the course of centuries by English genius. All those who had been nourished with the milk of English liberty were to grow strong and prosper under the ægis of the law founded by a liberated England for the protection of all her citizens: the fact that they had carried their young strength and activity across the seas ought to entail no loss whatever.

Of little importance to him were the questions of self-esteem and self-interest—after all doubtful—which the Government advanced in the name of the sovereign right of the nation or in behalf of the necessities of the budget. For Burke there was no sovereignty outside of the legal dispositions established by the nation's collective wisdom and conserved by tradition. All questions of interest were contemptible in comparison with the dignity and happiness of a people living within the limits of its historical rights. In this noble doctrine, the observer discovers the English citizen's deep-rooted feeling of pride in and his warm attachment to the national institutions, that is to say to the English ideal destined to become, in the nineteenth century, the active principle of the nation and to constitute the social bond of the different parts of the Empire. To Edmund Burke is due the honour of having expressed this doctrine for the first time.

Burke's warning was not heeded. Events proved, however, how much he was in the right. Indeed it was precisely to those moral forces representing the moral heritage of the English conscience, that the insurgents of America owed their military success against the Hano-

verian mercenaries pitted against them. The loss of America was so much the more cruel for the mother country because in the choice of its institutions the new Republic proved its fidelity to its origin and sought political stability in the application of the very principles defended by Burke. The lesson was severe. When, after the Napoleonic wars, political progress resumed its course in England, the recollection of the American insurrection led the Metropolis to adopt a policy of moderation and liberalism in the establishment of the Constitution of Canada.

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The conquest of Canada left no bitterness in the hearts of the French colonists, because it spared the civil population and was followed by a broad and tolerant administrative régime. There could be no question, in 1785, of self-government; indeed the problem had not yet been posed even for New England. The French colonists, who had recently been accustomed to the feudal domination of the old French régime, did not desire it. The Governor and civil servants of the Crown secured the sympathies of their new subjects by respecting their feelings, their customs, and habits and all those things which, for a cultivated people with lofty aspirations, make life really worth living. French remained the official language of the country, and Catholicism the state religion; the schools remained in the hands of the Jesuits who had possessed them before the conquest. Furthermore, the English emigrants settled mostly in the unoccupied region of Lake Ontario and along the upper course of the Saint Lawrence, leaving the rural districts of Lower Canada in possession of the French. Fifteen years after the conquest, the inhabitants were closely enough attached to their new country to refuse to join the insurgents of New England: it was owing to their loyalty

that England was able to conserve her magnificent colony of North America.

Meanwhile, in Canada as in Europe, the progress of political ideas was following its course. If, it is true, the echo of the French Revolution was not particularly apparent, the same cannot be said of the English democratic reform of 1832. The movement of political individualism which emancipated the middle class at home, created a desire for self-government in the colony. Certain local difficulties rendered it more and more pressing. Canada was divided into two provinces: Upper Canada inhabited by the English and Lower Canada settled almost exclusively by the French in the rural districts and by a mixed population in the towns. Differences arose between the two provinces and between the English and French elements in the towns of Quebec and Montreal. The Metropolis, desirous of making concessions, granted each province an elective Assembly, but placed the executive power in the hands of a corps of functionaries nominated by the Crown. These powers, of different origin and often opposed in spirit, were found to be in conflict concerning certain questions of vital importance. Riots, headed by the French Canadian, Papineau, broke out in Lower Canada. Instead of using these troubles as a pretext for re-establishing direct administration in the colony, the English Government, more and more inclined towards a policy of colonial liberalism, dispatched a High Commissioner to Canada—a broadminded man of tried moral value, Lord Durham, who had played an eminent rôle in the great Whig cabinet of 1832. The task was an arduous one. It was necessary to establish order by energetic means and upon this basis of dictatorial authority to construct an edifice of liberty, to reduce laxity and revolt, and yet to win the sympathy of the colony. Lord Durham left England

in 1838. The conflict was so bitter, that he had to abandon it six months later, being held in check in Canada and hampered in the House of Commons by imprudent ministers. The High Commissioner's career was ruined as a consequence; but representative government was established in Canada. In 1840, the Constitution which governs the Dominion today was proclaimed. It became the model of the political régime applied afterwards to the sparsely settled colonies of Australia and New Zealand and, later, to the Federation of South Africa.

These countries are governed by a House elected by universal suffrage and by a cabinet ministry responsible before the House. England is represented by a Governor who occupies a position somewhat similar to that of the King in the British Constitution, that is to say, who can intervene as an independent arbitrator between the parties, but can make no decision against the will of the people expressed by its representatives. Like the sovereign who delegates his powers to him, he symbolizes the national idea. By the dignity which surrounds him, by the prestige of his character and reputation, by what he represents of English greatness, of English tradition and historical memories, he adds solemnity to the ties which attach the colonies to the mother country.

The colonies themselves decide everything which concerns the internal legislation, the revenues and expenditures of the budget, the commercial system and the social reforms. Going still farther, New Zealand and Australia recently have tried the experiment—noteworthy in the history of the world—of intrusting their government, for a time, to a socialist cabinet of workingmen's representatives. Similarly, Canada, considering it to be to her interest to protect herself by a customs tariff, voted heavy duties on foreign importations without excepting English products. No sovereign can abdicate more radi-

cally than England has done the former colonial conception which treated the over-seas countries as possessions to be exploited. It is impossible to be more deeply concerned for justice and more scrupulously respectful of liberty. Owing to that fact the British Empire takes its place in the front rank among the great instruments of civilization.

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The Irish problem should hold our attention just as much as the colonial problem, and for the same reasons, since it, too, poses the question of liberty within unity and since it has been similarly solved by the triumph of right. The liberation of Ireland was more laborious—and more tragic—than that of any of the colonies. In the long run, however, we see the same moral forces, which developed in England in the course of the nineteenth century, triumph over historical fatalities, old-time hatreds, and complexity of interests. The acts of justice which Parliament has accomplished within the last thirty years, in behalf of the sister island so long oppressed, is proof that the English mind is definitely won to the point of view first expressed in France, in 1792, by a member of the Convention: "Gentlemen, we are discussing a novel problem in Europe, this problem treats of the happiness of nations." The emancipation of the colonies, and the liberation of Ireland, are the stages which have led England to consider, as we do, that the annihilation of Servia and the enslavement of Belgium would have marked a halt in the idea of justice and a retrogression towards barbarism.

Through centuries, the question of Ireland has borne the weight of the terrible complications created, at the origin, by the antipathy of two races, in an epoch when to talk a different language, to profess a different religion, to practise different customs, were crimes in the eyes of

strong and conquering nations. Until the end of the seventeenth century, the policy of the Kings of England (which Cromwell continued with greater ferocity) consisted in breaking the resistance of the Irish by war, massacre, and expropriation. We can get an idea of the martyrdom of this unfortunate country by comparing it in time of war, with the Teutonic invasion of Belgium and Northern France today, and in time of peace with German administration in Alsace, in Poland, and in the Danish Duchies. There is this difference: the things we are talking about took place at a time when conquerors were without pity for the conquered; that is the excuse of the English in the days of the Tudors and of Cromwell. But for the atrocities of which the Belgians, the Servians, the Poles, and our own unhappy compatriots are the victims in the twentieth century, through the agency of a nation which announces its pretensions to culture, there is no excuse. Such acts place the German people beyond the pale of civilization.

Ireland survived, despite bad treatment and massacre; and never ceased to lay claim to the distinctive traits of her nationality. English nobles became landlords in Ireland; English colonists settled there, built towns and formed an industrial and commercial middle class. But they only prospered in the north-east province of Ulster which they made into what is now called "the Protestant garrison." In the eighteenth century English proceedings became milder; but a war of tariff duties and prohibitive laws began, and this interfered with the economic, intellectual, and social development of Ireland. The effect of this latent persecution was to inspire the Irish with a fierce attachment for the national idea, which they confounded with the religious idea, and to drive them into a state of veritable fanaticism. The aspirations towards independence which could not find expression in

the legal and pacific struggle for political emancipation took the violent form of rioting and sometimes of a systematic campaign of murder. More than once, famine exasperated the anger of the people; often enough an English nobleman, sometimes the most innocent, fell at the edge of a wood, shot down by one of those sanguinary enthusiasts who adopted the name of "Fenians." The emotion caused in 1882 by the murder of Lord Cavendish in Phœnix Park, Dublin, is still remembered. Terrible measures of repression replied to these attacks; hatred became more acute, and the situation instead of brightening grew more sombre.

Nevertheless the spirit of justice of English liberalism finally triumphed over the perilous complexity of passions and facts in which race-hatreds, religious prejudices, and economic and social problems were inextricably entangled. The same movement which caused a rapid progression of social reform around 1875, also paved the way for the emancipation of Ireland. This liberating legislation was an application of that moral idealism which tends more and more to exercise its empire in human concerns; that idealism which England and France are defending today against a blinded and brutalized Germany. The man whose generous intervention we have noticed in the problems raised by the question of nationalities—Gladstone—was also the man who engaged his party in the perilous defence of Ireland. Thanks to Gladstone, *Home Rule* has been one of the essential articles of the Liberal programme since the eighties. Death surprised him before he had had time—a necessary element for the success of so great a reform—to mature his plans. But the heirs of his policy, the Liberals of the Asquith ministry were on the point of bringing it to a successful issue, despite much dangerous resistance, when the war broke out suddenly and interrupted their efforts.

The Irish economic reform is henceforth an accomplished fact. For several years certain agrarian laws have been in application. The effect of these is to bring about the transfer of land from the great English landlords to the farmers by the application of maximum sale prices established by decree and with the aid of capital advanced on mortgage by the State. The time has gone by when the peasant was wont to see himself crushed under an enormous farm rent, stripped of the fruit of his own improvements on the leased land, brutally ejected from his thatched cottage through the effect of the pitiless laws of eviction. The Irishman has become the owner of his field; he himself administers, by virtue of new municipal laws, the parish and the district; he has acquired the right to vote, and in the near future, if all goes well, will elect his own representative to the Irish Parliament. The late insurrection of the Sinn Feiners, fomented by German intrigue and fostered by German gold, is but the scum that gathers on the fringe of an appeased sea. Age-old restlessness could hardly have been entirely cleared by English liberalism and justice from a soil so favourable to fanaticism as the hearts of the Irish professional malcontents, during the troubled time of the World-War. But let us not forget that 300,000 Irishmen have enrolled as volunteers in the British Army and are fighting Britain's fight against the oppressors of nations.

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Ireland will be free to administer Irish affairs by Irishmen, while she will remain intimately connected with England by federative ties. This union will become the model of the Imperial Federation which is to cement, on the morrow of the war, the mother country to the colonies in an indissoluble Empire. It will be essentially a moral union, defined by a few general stipulations regulating questions of national defence and to a certain extent

associating the colonies with the discussions of foreign policy. But it will respect the independence of all the parts of the Empire according to the principles established in the last three-quarters of a century.

Some years ago, a project of more intimate union was broached by a party which adopted, for this reason, the name of *Unionist.* Its leader was Mr. Chamberlain. The policy of this party was determined, as English decisions are often and legitimately determined, both by sentiment and interest. The Unionists strongly appreciated the beauty and nobleness of the British Empire which would enjoy, they thought, an incomparable prestige if it were cemented into an homogenous whole; and not less vividly they depicted what its economic force would be, if it were possible to co-ordinate an imperial system of production and exchange.

In presence of German competition, a certain number of English manufacturers and merchants were beginning to lose confidence in Free Trade which had been for so long the supreme article of faith of English trade. The colonies had not adopted Free Trade, because young countries need to protect their infant industries, and because the custom duties are one of the indispensable sources of revenue for a budget still insufficiently nourished by direct taxation. England perceived that she was hindered in her business transactions by the custom barriers of her own colonies. On the other hand, the colonies saw themselves embarrassed in their trade relations with the Metropolis owing to the system of absolute liberty of commerce, which forced them to compete with countries capable of more abundant or better organized production. Was it not possible for England and the colonies to assure themselves reciprocal advantages by means of reciprocal concessions? Let the oversea states agree to tariff reductions in favour of English

imports; let the mother country apply a schedule of custom duties to foreign imports competing with colonial imports: both parties to the contract would profit by the transaction. The agreement thus reached would make a vast *Zollverein* of the Empire, upon a basis of preferential tariffs which would only slightly modify existing habits, and of which the consequences would be incalculable. The immense community of 300,000,000 people understanding the English tongue, recognizing English law, and commending themselves to the English ideal, would find a new element of cohesion in the mutual adaptation of material interests. All the English throughout the world would form a compact block against their rivals in the pacific struggle for prosperity, and would be able in case of need, should any peril menace the Empire, to consider the means of facing together the dangers of war.

The project, however, involved serious difficulties. The majority of English people were not inclined to abandon the advantages of Free Trade: a vigorous protest rose from the ranks of the worker against "dear bread"; numerous manufacturers declared that they could not abandon the advantage of buying their raw material at an easy rate. Moreover the colonies live under geographic, climatic, and economic conditions too different from those of the metropolis, and in fact, have acquired a mentality too distinctly individual—American, African, or Australasian—to be able to accept the common idea of legislation, of administration, and of the financial and even military policy which the Union would imply. The problem of the defence of the Empire was one of its principal stumbling-blocks. Before Germany, in her world-policy, had so completely unmasked her designs on English possessions, the colonies did not feel themselves in peril. They were not greatly concerned about carrying their share of the enormous burden of armaments. If

some of them felt themselves under the menace of a danger, it was not the particular danger which was hovering over the mother country: for instance, Australia believed she had more to fear from Japan than from Germany. For all these reasons the restricted material and legal union of which Mr. Chamberlain dreamed, was deemed impossible. The check of the federative policy of the Unionists was one of the causes of their unpopularity and of the return of the Liberal party to power in 1906

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The Liberals, although true to Free Trade and true also to the doctrine of the independence of the Dominions, although, in other words attached to the commercial and colonial individualism which constitutes the traditional policy of England, are not, however, hostile to imperialism. They wish to combine in equitable proportions independence and union in imperial questions, just as they have discovered a just formula of alliance between individual liberty and social organization in questions of home policy. Harshness towards the colonies would have been dangerous; the example of America in the eighteenth century was valuable as a reminder that England can expect that filial attachment which in case of danger or attack means to her a powerful increase of force, only from the goodwill and affection of the colonies. (As a matter of fact neither goodwill nor affection were refused her, in the hour of trial. This had just been proved in the critical circumstances of the Transvaal War, when the colonies had been assiduous rivals in the voluntary sending of combatants and war material to England, heavily engaged in the struggle.) The Liberals themselves (the "radical" fraction of the party at least) showed a tendency to ignore the German peril. In their love for peace, they supposed in good faith that their cousins beyond the Rhine really entertained the pacific sentiments which

they professed in their speeches. Nevertheless this peril became startlingly evident at certain moments, for instance, following a check of the attempts made to reach an understanding, or following a sudden increase in the German naval programme. Here was a warning that England might find it profitable to realize a stronger cohesion of the Empire.

The Liberals, then, were seeking to bring about the union—or more precisely the free union, the English union—of the colonies and the Metropolis. They maintained the political instrument, created by their predecessors, of the "Intercolonial Conference," a periodic assembly in which the delegates of the Dominions met in London with the Crown ministers in order to discuss semi-officially questions of common interest. In the course of these meetings they were careful, both in their propositions and in their conversations, to treat the colonial ministers on a footing of equality, not to urge them to accept such or such a solution against their preference, to take into account the particular problems arising in the colonies, the colonies' desires, and even their local patriotism and point of honour. When New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa generously offered to contribute to the increase of the British Navy by the construction of battle-ships, they accepted this important contribution with gratitude. When, on the other hand, Canada made known her wish to substitute her own militia for the English garrisons, and to construct ships which were to remain in Canadian waters in time of peace, they acquiesced. This attitude directly induced Canada to give proof of increased goodwill by preparing for the co-operation, in case of need, of her militiamen with the British Army, through the nomination of a Canadian General Staff resident in London and constantly in touch with the English General Staff.

Thanks to this prudent dealing and liberal spirit, the Union Imperialism, which had made no progress as long as the question had been placed on an administrative and legislative basis, gained strength when placed on the ground of common memories, of identical political and moral aspirations, and of unanimity of feeling and affection.

"The indestructible basis of the Empire is sentiment—the intangible but very vital compound of patriotism and pride in the stock, pride in England and in English history, and passionate attachment to the British Crown—all this idealized, raised to the highest degree of fervour and genuineness, made romantic, if you like, by distance and the glamour of a long-drawn perspective. There is poetry in it; there is almost a sort of religion in it."[1]

The Empire is not composed solely of free Dominions inhabited by the British; it also comprises the "Crown Colonies" in which the imperial administration is exercised authoritatively over subdued peoples. Among these possessions, India is the most important with its 231,000,000 inhabitants, its immense stretches of territory, its memories of an ancient and brilliant civilization, its distinct customs, its potentates, and its castes. Until a few years ago, England's task had consisted in establishing order in this vast country without brutality and yet without weakness, without clashing too violently with anciently established habits and yet without sacrificing the necessities of humanity and of civilization. She had succeeded in this object thanks to a chosen corps of functionaries, the famous India Civil Service, who employed their technical competency and their high-mindedness as gentlemen in the service of the provinces. During the last ten years, however, the situation has become considerably complicated. The successful efforts made

[1] Sydney Brooks, *Fortnightly Review*, 1913.

by England to uplift the Hindoos and initiate the upper classes at least into European civilization, have produced their fruits. The Hindoo schools and Universities have formed a middle class not only cultivated but ambitious, which has become enamoured of the vision of a return to the great epoch of the Kingdom of Magadha. Industrial establishments have increased manifold, bringing in their train more comfort, a more rapid penetration of modern ideas, and a diffusion of the spirit of agitation in the underlying social strata. Finally the victory of Japan over Russia has caused the appearance throughout Asia of a restless thrill of hope.

From 1906 on there appeared in India a nationalist movement which drew attention to certain claims suggested precisely by the very principles of English liberty which the Hindoos had learned in contact with their masters. The leaders of the movement claimed "three rights which belong to every English citizen": the administration of the public services entrusted to the inhabitants of India; the voting of taxes by representatives of the people; and the exclusive use of the Indian budget for the needs of the country. The energetic firmness of the people's spokesmen, and, soon after, the revolutionary acts into which certain fanatics translated the political idealism of the leaders, forced public opinion and the English Government to pay attention to the movement. The controversies were animated, since it was a question of nothing less than deciding whether the paternal despotism, which had characterized the English domination in India for more than two centuries, should give place to liberal institutions in a country where the division of races, castes, and religions, the primitive state of customs among the greater number, and lastly, the delicate relations between conquerors and conquered, rendered all questions extremely complex and arduous.

England's instinct and tradition of liberalism led her to choose the new and perilous route of concessions to the Hindoo people. The Secretaryship of State for India, in the cabinet, was given to the venerable veteran of the Liberal party Mr. (since Lord) John Morley, and a series of reforms was inaugurated. The Imperial Legislative Council at Calcutta was reorganized, being henceforth composed of representatives of all the provinces and of all classes of the population and virtually transformed into a sort of small Parliament. The complaints of the natives were able to find expression. A new Governor, the ex-cabinet minister, Charles Hardinge, set himself fearlessly to study the reforms immediately possible and those which could be prepared for the future. The serious problem of rivalry between the Mahometans and the Hindoos was solved, at least provisionally. Finally a definite measure was adopted at the time when King George came in person in 1911 to have himself crowned in the ancient capital of Delhi: during the ceremony of the Durban, a herald-at-arms proclaimed to the people a veritable charter of emancipation which granted the notables an important part in the Government and gave satisfaction on numerous points to the self-esteem of the nation. That evening an immense crowd came to bow down before the throne where the King had given audience. The loyalty of the nation was given new life; India was definitely reconquered. In 1914, she remained deaf to the instigations to revolt prompted by Germany. 100,000 Sepoys are now fighting valorously for England on the plains of France, on the border of the Suez Canal, and in Mesopotamia.[1]

[1] Minor facts allow us to judge of the differences between the English and the German methods. A Rajah who was serving in the English contingent in China, at the time of the expedition against the Boxers was so indignant at the contempt manifested by the German officers towards

The German Empire possesses certain colonies. One may judge of the success with which it governs its African subjects by the fact that the natives of the French territories of the Congo, ceded to Germany by the terms of the treaty of 1911, deserted their homes in mass to escape the domination of the Germans whose unpleasant reputation was only too well known to them through their kinsmen of the Cameroon. As for the European populations annexed by Germany . . . their long martyrdom is a matter of common knowledge. In Poland, in order to overcome the country's obstinacy in conserving its language, school children were subjected to the whipping-system: *Kultur* by flogging, such was the civilizing method invented by the nation which proclaims itself predestined through the will of its "Old God" to govern the world. Then, again, it used the policy of expropriation. The rich plains of Poland were to pass into the hands of German colonists who, little by little, would drive out the first occupants, finally reduced by poverty to dependence or emigration. But thanks to the patriotic devotion, to the invincible tenacity, and also to the subtlety of the Poles, the law of expropriation remained without effect. Despite the considerable sums placed by the State at the disposal of the German farmers, the children of the soil held fast to their birthright. Since 1864 the

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him that in 1914 he asked, as a favour, to serve with all his men against the Germans in order to avenge their treatment. An Italian journalist who was visiting the English lines in France, reports a conversation which he had with a Hindoo chief. "Are you content to have come here, in a country which is not yours, to serve the interests of a nation which dominates your people?" The Hindoo replied with high spirit: "India is not dominated; she is a part, and not the least part of a great Empire. . . . If the Empire were threatened in India, English soldiers would be there to defend us. It is now threatened in Europe; we have come to fight for it." He added with pride: "We are English." (*Il Secolo*, 19 Oct., 1914. Cited by the *Times*.)

Danes of Schleswig have maintained an obstinate struggle to conserve their affiliations with the old Scandinavian mother country. Since 1870, the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine have exposed themselves to cruel treatment in order to maintain in their midst the vitality of the French language and civilization until the day of liberation. All sorts of means have been employed to seduce them: violence, hypocritical mildness, intimidations through threats, astonishment through the use of the "Kolossal," division through hatred, and corruption through favour. After the concession of a false autonomy the German authorities have returned to repression by means of the state of siege as was instanced by the odious military tyranny meted out to the town of Zabern for the cry of a child in the street.

Wherever the Germans establish themselves they make people forget the happy effects of their genius for organization, of their methodic administration, of their patience and of their foresight in the matter of economic development, because of their brutality and their contempt for psychological values. Their contribution to progress (the merit of which would not be disputed, if it were not accompanied with insolence, pride and, unfortunately, barbarism) pertains only to the mechanical order. It has its value; it will receive due credit when it no longer threatens to lead the cultured society of European nations back to the age of the cave-men. In order the better to establish its will-to-power, this nation has thrown away all dignity and nobleness and all human kindliness. And that is why, if it is legitimate to allow it to exercise what Carlyle called "beaverish activity," it is contrary to the universal law of the supremacy of the spirit to allow it to exercise a rôle of direction and command. These people were determined to command, through mechanism and force; but mechanism and force, employed in the service

of humanity and of right have turned against them. Nor did they omit the claim to dominance in the distant countries won over to civilization by the humanizing genius of England and France. Their pre-war literature cynically proclaimed, in the name of *Kultur*, the right of the Germans to drive the impotent English and French out of their colonies. The same Bernhardi who inculcated cruelty and treaty-violation, announced that the British Empire, hopelessly decadent, would at the first shock disintegrate under the action of an irresistible "centrifugal force." . . .

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On this point, as on so many others, German arrogance was built on a foundation of stupidity. Just as soon as war was declared, the Irish (with the exception of a handful of mad men) showed their loyalty; the colonies, who had been unwilling to bind themselves, ahead of time, by a formal treaty, made an admirable effort to help the Metropolis with all the forces and all the means in their power; the British possessions, in which Germany tried to foment trouble, drew close around their protectress through attachment to British rule and through hatred of the German yoke. The list of troops, of provisions, of sums of money sent to the Government in London or placed at its service by the different parts of the Empire, forms a folio of forty pages. I cannot cite all the articles of this document—a veritable Golden Book of the Empire, which will become later the great souvenir, more useful than all legislative acts, upon which the solidity of the union will repose. It is enough to recollect that India sent 100,000 auxiliaries; that Australian and New Zealand soldiers defended the Suez Canal, conducted themselves like heroes on the Gallipoli peninsula and are now fighting in France; that the Australian fleet captured the German colonies of the Pacific and destroyed the cruiser *Emden*,

that every month Australia forwards several millions sterling for Belgium, invaded and pressed by hunger; that 200,000 Canadians including 40,000 French-Canadians have arrived or are about to arrive in the trenches; that the Boers and the English of South Africa have beaten a force of rebels financed by Germany, have conquered German West Africa and will help to complete the conquest of German East Africa. The wheat and the horses of Canada, the frozen meat of Australia, the rice and wheat of India, arrive in great quantities and are often offered gratuitously by the colonial governments. Finally the private generosity of the many millions of British settlers the world over has permitted the forwarding to the centre of operations of ambulances, of dressing material and pharmaceutical products, and of considerable gifts of money. Belgium, so cruelly tried, has been a particular object of their solicitude, and France has not been forgotten.

What precedes is merely an outline of the sacrifices voluntarily and enthusiastically made by the colonies on behalf of the mother country which is esteemed and respected as the guardian of the traditions of liberty, justice, and human nobleness constituting the English ideal. The Empire will emerge stronger from this trial which has thrown the chivalry of England and the treachery of Germany into violent contrast, and set up a startling opposition between the former's law-abiding spirit, respect for humanity, generous defence of the weak, and the latter's sanguinary savagery, contempt for the laws of war and civilization, cynical and inhuman aggression against unprotected peoples.

The Dominions have found a way of employing their moral force—a force of youth, of daring and prompt adaptation to circumstances—in the service of the Metropolis. If a new organization of the Empire is to prevail,

an organization destined to articulate the scattered members of this vast body and give it a force of cohesion and union which will leave the way open to splendid achievements, such a result will be due in great measure to the initiative of the colonies. The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Hughes, who came to England in the early part of the year 1916, has succeeded, thanks to his clear-sightedness, his ardent imperialistic patriotism, and his sincere eloquence, in creating a wave of opinion the effects of which will survive the war. The colonies, like the Metropolis, are liberal and democratic. Their spirit and their ideal are violently opposed to the oppressive and barbarous methods of German despotism. If the United States, finally enlightened, sees fit to co-operate after the war in the great effort made by England and her Empire to bring about the triumph of individualism and liberty, then the Anglo-Saxon world and France, firmly united, will form an indestructible rampart against a renewal of German brutality and will become the arbitrators of the future in the name of peace, of human sympathy, of respect for human independence, of the observation of treaties, of the sacredness of honour—in a word, of all that constitutes the nobleness of life.

CHAPTER IX

The Modern English Spirit as Exemplified in English Customs

THE moral causes of Anglo-German antagonism and of Franco-British friendship centre around two essential qualities of the English mind: love of freedom and respect for the human person.

We have already drawn attention to the presence of these qualities in England's political constitution, in her social organization, and in her colonial régime. We are now to try and render them apparent from another point of view, with their original value and deep significance, by tracing them to their source in English manners and customs. The subject is vast; we can only refer to its principal aspects. So brief a study, however, will not be without utility. It will show us in what way the spirit of independence and the quality of lofty aspiration originate in the social *milieu* and develop therein through the added effect of education, tradition, and opinion, and of all the thousand and one influences which constitute the creative power of a civilization.

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The child in the family and in the school is brought up to become not only a good Englishman, but also, in the loftiest sense of the word, a man. The quality which comprises the essence of a man and which the English place on the highest level is the quality of responsibility.

To develop responsibility, that is to discipline the will to do good and not at all to satisfy a master or to serve the interests of the community—even were this community of a higher order, like the State—but to obey the conscience, such is the ideal which in all classes of society and in all walks of life, English education aims to achieve. The term *Good* in such education means dignity, honesty, and straight-forwardness, which the general consent of men—in countries where the conscience has not been perverted by some collective madness—considers as the essence of the moral person. The English boy learns over and over again, by precept and example and by the movement of the social organism itself of which he forms an integral part, to curb equivocal suggestions and base desires, to respect his spiritual being, and to remain worthy of the ideal through which English honour finds itself in touch with what is best in humanity.

Like every young and vigorous being, the English boy loves to fight; but the battle must be even-sided and must be fought according to the rules of a loyal contest or of what he calls "fair play." A tradition of the schools prescribes that a dispute or some contested point of honour or right should not be settled on the spot with the feet and hands in a furious onset which anger may cause to degenerate into a brutal performance. The two adversaries, however strong their resentment may be, control themselves from a feeling of dignity and of self-possession and from desire to dominate their passions. Were they to fall short in this respect, school opinion which is expressed in the school spirit—an unwritten law more powerful than codes—would call them to order and, in case of need, would impose the necessary sanctions. Whenever a dispute assumes such proportions that the decision can only be reached by a show of force, there is an appeal to single combat before witnesses according to

traditional rules. Kicking is prohibited; a blow struck below the belt, an attack made when the opponent stumbles or has lost breath would call for the indignant intervention of the onlookers. Regular rounds and regular intervals, timed to the second, characterize the battle. Its consequences may very well be unpleasant for one or the other of the contestants and sometimes for both. But even when blood has been drawn, when the flesh is bruised and the face swollen and disfigured, neither fighter at any rate can be accused of having struck a cowardly blow. Fair play does not exclude manly roughness, an element which no virile civilization can afford to neglect; but it does prohibit violence representing merely a savage boiling over of the instincts and finding cowardly outlet against feeble or helpless opponents without the risk which ennobles the struggle and gives it a moral character.

Thus, the Rugby, Eton, or Harrow boy does not shun a fight when it is forced upon him—and he must conduct himself therein courageously and nobly—but he does not seek it in a spirit of vain-glory or premeditated brutality, as the German student seeks his rapier wounds or slashes. The *Mensur*, that is the duel of the Teutonic Universities, is at the same time an initiation into the aristocratic mysteries of the *Burschenschaft*, a swashbuckler's bravado and a legendary exploit of rough violence; but it does not necessarily call for any real self-possession and it is entirely free from any feeling of chivalry. The slash is worn like a coat of arms, but it is an outward sign which often corresponds to no sort of spiritual nobleness.

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Moreover it is not the single combat or fist-fight which really attracts the Englishman—except perhaps as a spectacle in the ring. Our over-channel neighbours seek the

strong emotions of the hunter or the warrior's rugged virtues—now reduced to noble souvenirs—in the practice of athletic sports. They depend upon these sports for the training of the muscles and will-power necessary to thoroughly develop the individual. In France we are beginning to understand how essential for the physical and moral development is the practice of great organized games; but we are still very little inclined to give them the importance which they have assumed in England for a century or more. Great Britain is the only country in which athletics have their full educational value, because they really represent a national training school. People of all ages and all classes devote themselves to some kind of sport. Children enjoy reserved quarters on the Common or parish play-ground to practice the elements of football or the first steps of cricket. Elderly men organize their own matches in which they are no longer able to compete with younger men. The adults of the country form club teams everywhere, to fit themselves, in their moments of leisure, according to preference or aptness or according to the season, for the noble practice of the national games. The outskirts of the towns are intersected with a net-work of meadows of close-cropped grass, where groups of young men in white flannel or variegated jerseys disport themselves. Twice a week the shops and factories cease work in the afternoon, and release "all hands." Employees and workmen are soon transformed into nimble, daring, and persevering players. At set dates, matches permit rival teams to measure their strength, in presence of thousands of on-lookers. . . . The boatrace between Oxford and Cambridge is an event which attracts an immense crowd to Henley from all parts of the United Kingdom. The practice of sports thus organized and generalized and finally become an institution and a national passion undoubtedly exercises

a formative influence on the character of the race. And in fact the qualities that can be attributed to this influence are many. I shall mention physical endurance, the spirit of discipline, the devotion of the individual to the group, the sacrifice of personal vanity to the common interest, initiative, patience, and authority. I shall particularly insist on fairness in combat and generosity towards the opponent.

In the more sharply contested parts of a big match, it would be impossible to obtain the victory by some underhanded manœuvre, or to reduce an adversary to powerlessness by some foul stroke. Public opinion would be extremely severe with those who should thus abase a noble struggle of combined courage, skill, and tactics to the level of a vulgar scramble for success. Collective sentiment, the auxiliary and support of individual sentiment, creates an atmosphere of honesty and chivalry in connection with athletic sports in England. Of whatever strenuousness the opponents may give proof in seeking victory, which means notoriety and almost glory, yet they are really sustained in the contest by a spirit of noble emulation. Like the Frenchman, the Englishman places honour above material advantages, with this difference, perhaps, that the latter who possesses a sense of the value of social discipline seeks to do better with a view to the triumph of the group, while the former usually outdoes himself from a feeling of pure individual excellence. But in both cases it is self-respect and love of valour which give a value to athletics. There again, Herr von Bülow would be surprised at the importance given to "psychical needs" in these two countries.

I know of no better example of magnanimity between rivals than the example of the Oxford rowing men, of which I was a witness while I was a student at Harvard University. The Oxford "Eight" compete periodically

with the Harvard "Eight," sometimes on the Thames and sometimes on the River Charles at Boston. The American crew was beaten several times, despite the men's splendid muscular development, their excellent training and unity, because it had adopted a less effective stroke. This cause of inferiority having been recognized, the Oxford men thought of the following manly thing to do; they sent Harvard their own coach, a graduate of Oxford University and a perfect gentleman, who was to spend six months teaching the Harvard crew the use of the Oxford stroke. I saw Mr. Lehmann arrive from England; the Harvard students gave him a magnificent reception; in the cheering which greeted him, in the enthusiasm of thousands of students shouting their admiration in loud hurrahs was expressed, I think, one of the noblest emotions of the human soul—the recognition of generosity.

The example which comes from above descends from Oxford and Cambridge into all the social classes. Athletics thus understood become a school of dignity and of moral elevation which penetrates the entire nation and permeates even the lower classes. The soldiers of the regular army, the "Tommies" who were the first to fight for us in France, although often recruited among the social outcasts, have learned fair play and self-respect in the practice of sports. They are capable of responding to the lofty appeal of their officers, who are born gentlemen and representatives of the best type of English moral idealism. Indeed these professional soldiers, whom the Germans sought to brand with the name of "mercenaries" and whom they treat shamefully as prisoners, gave these Barbarians a lesson of decent behaviour and common humanity which the world will not fail to appreciate. Still more plainly does the great volunteer army fighting now in Picardy prove itself worthy of the chivalrous

traditions which are the honour of the English nation. The army is ready to do its duty, determined to use force with those who have rendered themselves doubly criminal by their initial aggression and by their atrocious fashion of conducting the war; but it is just as much incapable, as our own army, of abandoning itself to the instincts of the brute, of making use of treachery, or of giving itself up to an orgy of murder committed against innocent beings without defence.

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The English did not want war, because even when waged with humanity and prosecuted against armies alone and not against women, old men, and children, war is atrocious. Far from making a "national industry" of war, as our enemies did, they were unwilling to prepare for it even on the ground of sheer necessity. Until the last moment they hoped, by dint of liberalism and reasonable concession, to avoid its scourge. Once the war was declared, despite the passionate hate with which the Germans pursued them, they refused to allow themselves to be dominated by anger or the spirit of revenge. They were even slow to be moved, largely, no doubt, because England was not invaded, but also because the violence which war entails was repugnant to their notions of true sport. They came near being too late in defending themselves and in defending European equity with us, because of a certain gentlemanly haughtiness. But Germany took care to teach them that war of booty and murder, as she understood it, admits neither considerations of pity nor acts of imprudent magnanimity. And while it is true that they entered the campaign with a certain aristocratic nonchalance, they soon learned to change their attitude; the ferocity and baseness due to systematized native barbarism, practiced in the opposite camp not only in the ranks of the professional trooper but also in the highest

degrees of the hierarchy, soon convinced them of the necessity of throttling the monster. It is no longer a question of esteem for an adversary whom one would like to respect, but a question of justice and reparation in keeping with the magnitude of the crime. The *Times* expressed this clearly in an article written after the act of piracy committed by a German submarine, which cost the lives of one hundred and twenty passengers of the *Falaba:* "We are slow in getting started. But when our indignation has been aroused, nothing can arrest or temper the inevitableness of our prosecution of the criminal." The English, like the French, however, will not lower themselves to the shame of retaliation by the use of Teutonic methods. But like ourselves, they will persevere even to the end, being tenacious in overcoming obstacles and implacable in the demand of guarantees destined to assure the future.

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Firmness in repression, once the responsibilities are established, is only a form of loyalty; loyalty to oneself and loyalty toward the task undertaken. Indeed rectitude is really loyalty, and rectitude is an English quality. It is not merely in the competitions of the athletic field that the Englishman has confidence in others and inspires their confidence; this is true concerning the acts of daily life and more particularly concerning the shifting sands of commercial competition. In the opinion of the generality of business men, no other is more honest than English commerce. The goods which leave the over-channel factories may have defects but they are of excellent quality and promise no more than they can fulfil. Previous to the importation of objects "Made in Germany" goods of inferior quality were unknown in England. The word of an Englishman in business has the value of an oath. The English merchant does not vaunt the

articles which he has for sale, for, in his eyes, any insistence would be equivalent to insincerity. If you go into a shop the clerk replies laconically to your demands, he shows you the articles for sale, he mentions their price and, if you hesitate about buying, he leaves you to your meditation, without troubling himself further about you. The more important business transactions are concluded on *parole:* there is no need of writing. A business man who should pretend to have forgotten his engagement or the conditions agreed upon would be discredited for life. I have still in my mind the answer—remarkable for its directness and simplicity—which a boat-builder of Hampton Court made to a certain query of mine. He was an unpretentious mechanic who worked alone with his son in a small yard on the banks of the Thames; his Canadian canoes had struck me because of their excellent lines and finish, their elegance and solidity combined. The canoe had to be sent to France; he asked me to pay the price in advance. I hesitated a moment. "On the word of an English citizen," said he simply, "you'll have your canoe in three weeks with all your rigging!" I trusted him . . . any one acquainted with English probity would not have refused him their confidence.

In France we were wont to speak, in the days of our misunderstandings with England, of a "perfidious Albion." It is only common justice today to reconsider our judgment. In the matter of colonial expansion—precisely where we were the rivals of the English—the conditions change from year to year; circumstances which permit certain concessions at a certain time, do not allow doing so at another. Gladstone, for instance, did not wish to occupy Egypt. The offer which he made to France and then to Italy to co-operate in the police operation which was the origin of the Egyptian campaign is a proof of this. But the occupation had to be continued for strategic

and financial reasons; England undertook certain public works, employed her capital there and began work necessary for the good of the country and consequently for its pacification, as well as indispensable for its financial prosperity and consequently for its solvability. The revolt of the Soudan necessitated an expedition which the "piece-meal" system rendered very laborious. Now once the honour of the flag is engaged, a great nation cannot recede. A conquest once begun at the price of much blood and treasure can scarcely be abandoned. England had no intention of remaining in Egypt, but the logic of events obliged her to do so. Let us reflect on certain consequences of our own colonial expeditions; we might be accused of perfidy in cases where we have only obeyed certain exigencies of the inevitable. Political realism has its laws: there are natural frontiers which must be reached, certain animosities which must be overcome, certain anarchical practices which must be repressed, economic possibilities which must be developed. A nation the work of which is to civilize, which would shun its task through fear of being accused of perfidy, would fail in its mission. We understand the whole question better today, and we no longer repeat the empty phrases concerning a "perfidious Albion."

. . . We know now, alas! what the perfidy of a nation really means. What people has been preparing war for forty years, allaying the fears of its neighbours meanwhile with feigned words of peace? What people, at the supreme moment, precipitated hostilities by means of an unjust quarrel, while trying to throw the blame on others, and when once it had determined to attack, tore up the "scrap of paper" protecting a defenceless country and martyrized that country in bitterness and hate, denying its crimes in the very hour of their committal? What people, in order to vanquish without risk, sheltered its mitrailleuses

behind the Cross of Geneva and its cannon behind a living wall of women and children swaying with anguish, and in order to spread terror in the land left a trail of murder and fire in its wake, machine-gunned the hostages by hundreds, led away the survivors into bondage, dispatched the wounded, wrecked hospitals, and bombarded cathedrals? What people having hypocritically put its signature to The Hague agreements, disowned the engagements solemnized before the world? If you want perfidy—base and cruel perfidy—there it is. For such perfidy as this the English people conceived a sentiment of indignation mingled with horror. Their humanity revolted—as the conscience of the civilized world will revolt when the last fears inspired by Germany have vanished—and they rose in arms. This people which in all spheres, in family and school education, in the practice of manly sports, in business and daily living cultivates the idealism of plighted faith, of respect for humanity in men, of generous rivalry and chivalrous competition cannot repress a feeling of scorn, today, for the nation which shamefully deceived its trust, in the hour when it was most trusted.

The English "State," naturally realist and resolutely practical, has defended its interests at times with an asperity which has caused its opponents to resist most sharply. This is why France has a number of painful memories to recall. But whatever shocks our sensitiveness may have received on certain occasions, we cannot reproach the British Government with treason. This Government does not counterfeit dispatches nor tear up treaties nor invent certain *casus belli*, nor flood the world with false news, nor accuse victimized countries of having provoked the executioner. The English "State" has often been ambitious and overbold in the pursuit of its ambitions; but it has never built up falsehood into a sys-

tem nor created a government doctrine out of duplicity and cynicism, nor declared that Might is Right. It has a conscience; this conscience is the synthesis of the English citizens' conscience and an image of the national probity.

. . . . . .

The Englishman is fair and upright, because he is a *person* in the full sense of the word, and because he belongs to a society in which every individual of any value is truly a *person*. In England, thought, feeling, and conduct are less dependent on exterior forces and State authority than in any country. Less than anywhere else acts are dictated by administrative regulations or national automatism. There is very strong public opinion in England, but it is less a routine than the expression of individual judgments. Upon certain essential points these individual judgments fall into order through a process of harmony; upon other matters they diverge, at times, even to eccentricity, and no one finds reason for complaint in that. This independence, tempered by discipline, is the most precious effect of that quality which the English call self-control. The whole economy of education among them tends to develop this self-control, the supreme dignity of the individual to which the nation owes its steady bearing, its moral vigour, and its force of will—the prop and stay of its material force.

In the schools, the moral formation of the individual assumes such importance that for a long time his intellectual training was neglected because of it. In France we have drawn inspiration from their methods; we might still borrow a great deal from them. Instead of keeping the adolescent in leading strings and making him believe that the master is responsible for the group and that any act which escapes his supervision is, for that reason, excusable, the young Englishman is led little by little to depend

upon himself and to find the real judges of his actions within himself, thanks to the direct application of the precepts of a practical code of morals. Nothing is more delicate or more complex than this initiation of an unstamped conscience into the mystery of noble and meritorious conduct. To succeed in this one must have the approved methods of a long tradition, the close and devoted collaboration of the parents and teachers and—what is not an exaggeration—the benevolent conspiracy of the whole nation. Thanks to these methods and influences, the child learns little by little to shoulder responsibilities, to act, in the absence of supervision, as if the advisory or repressive authority were present and to seek within himself the approval or disapproval which lifts or lowers him in his own eyes. The father or schoolmaster prescribes or forbids at a distance without interfering in the acts; they remain in constant moral communication with the child, but without imposing their presence, and without doing anything likely to repress responsibility. At home the child finds guidance and support, but is not reduced to passive obedience. The English schoolboy enjoys a fulness of liberty unknown to his continental comrade, but this liberty is surrounded by rules which continue to keep his conscience and will on the alert. The older boys exercise authority over the younger, and they in their turn, learn to take up the task of commanding. A natural hierarchy is thus formed; it is the image of the social hierarchy without which no refined nation can exist. In each group such traditions develop an "esprit de corps" made up of self-respect and the respect of authority which is just. The sentiment of honour is nourished by the self-esteem of the group, and, outside of the group, by national pride. Repression is rare, but, when necessary, is severely inflicted, because, in the English system, a fault is a breach of trust. Punishment—the symbol of

the immanent law of the world—constitutes the check. But it seldom has to be resorted to.

When the boy grows into a youth, freedom of action increases for him in the moral sphere, but decreases in the material. The English University student is protected against himself by a set of rules which bridle his instincts without lessening his responsibility. The moral aim occupies the entire foreground of higher education, just as it does at the other levels of the English school system. There is no "Bohemia" at Oxford. But there does exist for the meditative student, in leisure hours, a world for musing under the age-old oaks, in the meadow calm on the Cherwell River banks, on the drowsy lawns, and in the sacred walks where many of England's greatest sons were wont to stroll. For the energetic student there are games and rowing and training for big matches. For everyone there exists a means of initiation into civic life in the solemn debates of the Union and of initiation into social life in the numerous clubs which group activities, inclinations, or fantasies according to their natural bias. In that abode of knowledge and of tradition, one breathes an atmosphere of intellectual refinement and moral sanity, all instinct with humanism and piety for the glories of the past.

But whether they have received the aristocratic education of Oxford or the solid moral education of the public or private schools, the English have been shaped with more or less precision into becoming moral persons. Just as in the schools, an "esprit de corps" made of what is best in the national spirit permeates the regiments which have taken their places in the trenches. What a distance there is between this people, nourished consciously with Christian and human idealism, penetrated, even among the humblest, with the sap of moral individualism, and the German people capable of being huddled like a herd into

the vagaries of *Kultur* and the abominations of the doctrine of war as officially prescribed by the Kaiser's General Staff. It is difficult to imagine the English people listening to speeches like the one which the German Emperor addressed to his troops at the time of their departure for the Chinese expedition: "Just as, a thousand years ago, the Huns with Attila their King acquired a name which, even today, makes them appear powerful in tradition and legend, just so the German name must for a thousand years be asserted in such a way that no Chinaman will ever dare look askance at a German." Nor is it easy to imagine the English people accepting the war theory of General Julius von Hartmann: "The combatant has need of passion. All military effort necessitates that the fighter who furnishes this effort be totally free from all annoying and oppressive legal obstacles. . . ." The English and the French cannot overcome their astonishment at this systematic brutifying of a whole nation. The annihilation of the individual conscience cannot be more complete.

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The Englishman whose whole education furthers self-control, is led by the same methods and by the same influences towards independence of thought. Within the family the parents respect the children's opinion as soon as a certain amount of experience, the lessons of school life, and the knowledge acquired by reading permit them to form general ideas and to draw consequences from facts. Authority is not imposed tyrannically; its acceptance is the result of reasoning and proof. Thus is developed in the home itself that spirit of criticism which represents the vital and progressive force of a nation. Very early in the school, methodical discussions or debates give the scholars a chance to put their observations and reflections into practice and to give them that solidity, cohesion, and personal accent which is the life of

independent thought. On a given subject, volunteer speakers undertake to defend the affirmative or the negative in an argument of a few moments' lengths. The argumentation is prepared beforehand but the contingencies of the discussion oblige the opponents to improvise rebuttals or advance new facts more directly adapted to the phases of the debate. At the end those present venture a few short remarks and a general vote decides which of the two parties has succeeded in winning the approval of the audience. This whole process affords an excellent training for intellectual suppleness, classification of facts, presentation of proofs, invention and co-ordination of ideas. At the outset the subjects chosen are commonplace topics; then as the mind ripens and knowledge increases, moral, political, or social problems are broached. At Oxford, the Union is a real Parliament in miniature where more than one future statesman has given promise of that power of thought and speech destined to assure him one of the first places in the House or in the cabinet.

Within the nation, associations of all sorts are formed for the purpose of making inquiries and opening discussion on all subjects interesting the public welfare. Intellectual activity, which should be a characteristic of every free citizen under the parliamentary régime, is, then, a reality. It is not confined simply to the electoral period; thanks to the independence and mental agility which the Englishman acquires from his school-days on, civic life based on club life has assumed an intensity and a continuity to which few members of the community remain strangers. One would have some difficulty in finding an Englishman unable to speak in a meeting, or if need be, to preside over it. The British parliamentary régime does not merely offer the appearance of liberty; it really enlists the personal thought of all, in the full consciousness of their obligations and responsibilities.

And so public opinion is really a converging of free opinion, each party contributing its programme, each group proposing its solution, each individual supporting a certain shade of doctrine, founded on facts of personal observation and upon the particular reaction of his temperament, of his education, and of his intellectual complexion. How far removed is this from the docility of Germany, where in matters of political and State interest, the Government fashions public opinion just as it pleases. Since Prussia and Bismarck have forced the country under a yoke of iron, the military caste has been able, without resistance, to dictate to the people its ambitions for conquest and its instinct for plunder. A pandering press has accomplished its work; the all-powerful army of functionaries has acted upon the timid, through its prestige and through intimidation; the Reichstag, under the appearance of a parliamentary assembly, has assumed more and more the character of a House of registration; the Socialists themselves have rallied to the cause of triumphant imperialism. Since the war began there is scarcely an absurd falsehood which the people have not swallowed with their eyes shut. A French *médecin-major*, released after several weeks of captivity, recently exposed in the following terms the astonishment which the intellectual inertia and artlessness of the German people had caused him:

> It is enough for the powers-that-be to tell them something, through the newspapers or administrative channels, to get them to believe everything. When it was seen that the entrance into Paris was no longer probable, they were simply told this: "The authorities did not choose to enter Paris; it would have been necessary to bombard it and the bombardment of so beautiful a city would have won us a bad reputation; furthermore there is sickness there . . . !"

. . . . . .

This submissiveness in presence of authority is an attitude to which the German people are curbed as early as the school, which increases at the barracks, and which nothing in the life of the town or nation happens to correct. The spirit of the school is a clear indication of the spirit of the nation. Now what is the precise aim fixed by headmasters of German schools? This aim is to exalt the person of the Emperor in whom the all-powerful State is personified. In other countries the teaching of History while serving to throw the national glories into relief, also serves as an opportunity to get the children to understand the movement of civilization and the progress of humanity. Let us examine the manual of history for the *Simultan-schulen* (that is for the primary schools which admit pupils of different creeds) edited at Breslau and sold at seventy pfennig. Shall we find therein, at the beginning, a general appreciation of the formation of Germany and of the European States by which it would be possible to impart to the children just notions about universal history, while leaving to German history a preponderating place? Not at all. The first chapter is entitled "Our Imperial House," and the Hohenzollern who occupies the place of honour is no other than William II. A surprising number of pages, in so short a book are devoted to a biography of the Kaiser, to his youthful doings, to his studies, to his "sayings," and naturally, to his qualities as father of the people and chief of the army. The Kaiser becomes a semi-divine personage, thanks to the gifts which he has received from heaven, and thanks to the intimacy to which his rank and lights entitle him with the Creator himself—the "Old German God." And so is formed that idolatry of the Emperor which maintains a current of mystic ecstasy among the people and which holds German thought and German will mesmerized under the yoke of militarism and State-ism. Far

from the individual conscience being put into touch with eternal humanity by means of the school, it is trained to become the passive instrument of a government of prey. As soon as the child has acquired his elementary knowledge, he is placed in a technical school where his usefulness and productive capacity are developed with a view to the increased profits of commerce and industry—each of which is an essential wheel of war. Between the artificial "heating" of warlike passions and the "drill" of the practical faculties there is no room for reason and sane judgment, that is, for what properly constitutes the man.

The spirit of the English primary school, in harmony with public spirit and the national customs, tends to develop in the child upright and manly independence. It finds its inspiration in idealism which places the universal interests of humanity above national selfishness. English patriotism is not reduced to a savage form of cupidity; it is consistent with sympathy for other peoples, with the principle of right, and with European solidarity. At the beginning of the war the English President of the Board of Education in a circular letter called the schoolmaster's attention to the lofty aim of instruction. We recognize in his words the very principles that France, more than any other nation, has contributed to disseminate in the world.

> We are [says the President] trustees for posterity. The seven million children trusted to our care represent the future of England. . . . At the end of this war, we shall have to rebuild not only the material structure of civilization, but also to reaffirm its spiritual purpose. . . . We shall hand over to our children the principles of national and international policy which emerge from the present struggle, a form of society, we hope, broader and more stable, free from the secular inheritance of hatred and conquest which Europe is now expiating, but at the same time more exacting and demanding

more ample faculties in all, better exercised capacities and a clearer view of the common duties and the common destinies of mankind. . . .

A nation which proposes such a lofty ideal to its teachers is in a fit position really to understand the great grandsons of the men of the Revolution and the sons of Michelet and Victor Hugo. The English and the French are as far removed from the Germans of today as the Athenians of Plato's time from the subjects of the "Great King."

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In the upper degrees of the English University organization, classical culture contributes an element of good taste, tact, and sane reason to the fundamental moral education. The more important schools and the influence of good society both help to fashion that product of centuries of civilization—that masterpiece of the moral effort of a high-minded people—known as the English gentleman. . . . The "gentleman" descends from a long line of ancestors. The founder of the family is often discovered under the armour of some knight of the Middle Ages, who had received the traditions of valour and courtesy at the hands of the French *chevaliers* and whose models had been the companions of King Arthur, celebrated with equal piety by our *trouvères* and by English poets. In the course of time, the knight is succeeded by the courtier of Queen Elizabeth's reign, a good humanist and a valiant warrior, intrepid and generous in battle, a devotee of platonic love, anxious for the esteem of his peers as a hero of Plutarch and for the esteem of his dependents as a good Christian. Then follows the gallant nobleman of the eighteenth century who is fond of intellectual culture and the graces of French politeness, and who appears to advantage in fashionable literary circles, in clubs for serious discussion or in the "guerre en

dentelles" at Fontenoy. With the nineteenth century, the family increases; many of its members dispense with the coat of arms. The character of the gentleman becomes less aristocratic, without losing its noble qualities, and becomes enriched with middle-class virtues. Today, the gentleman is a well-bred man, an example of ease and polished manners which are simply the expression in word and deed of his innate distinction. He is familiar with the great productions of the human mind in antiquity and in modern times, having really assimilated their substance. He is dignified in his habits from self-respect, an enemy of falsehood from horror of all falsehood, moderate without condescension in his opinions, proud without disdain, sensitive without weakness, resolute and firm without wanting in necessary tact, generous and chivalrous from broad-mindedness and magnanimity. The "gentleman" has much in common with the "homme distingué" of whom our French civilization is justly proud. With the Frenchman, the qualities of reason, of proportion and measure, of delicacy, of sociability, and of generous idealism have produced much the same human value as the qualities of will, of the moral sense, of traditional firmness and vigorous individualism in the Englishman. Both are keenly aware of the place which the German—even when saturated with all that *Kultur* can give him—occupies in the scale of civilization. For want of a fitting milieu, of ancient traditions, and especially innate nobleness, German qualities are rarely capable of rising above the practical order of things, and German virtues often remain intimately tinged with clannish or racial egoism. With this people, the man who rises above the common level is the "Specialist" who can succeed by dint of perseverance, minute prevision, and tenacity, in overcoming a given task in fields where genius is equivalent to a long effort of patience.

But if he happens to be outside of his scientific branch, his field as a professional expert, or his industrial section, he is often found to be awkward, ostentatious, and dull. Beyond his particular sphere or his *Fach*, the German scholar or merchant has little or no kinship with men. When war breaks out—war which shatters the thin veneering of restraint and decency—their primeval instincts reappear. That is why the conduct of these people in arms, both officers and men, has been the scandal and shame of humanity. Their thinkers, from the depths of the Universities, have attempted to excuse them by crying aloud to the world. "The German Army has committed no undisciplined cruelty, *Keine zuchtlose Grausamkeit.*" The most atrocious cruelties have in fact "been disciplined," that is, committed by order and methodically. The stain which dishonours Germany is the fact that the officer in her army is not a "gentleman."

A misguided education, an intellect cramped by materialism, the self-intoxications of pride and domineering ambition, and, alas, the brutality of a thinly varnished barbarism, such are the causes which have prevented the German people from learning the noble qualities which Kant and Goethe had tried to teach them, and from welcoming the humanizing influences of the society of nations.

The English belong to another race.

By their customs, their traditions, the rich alluvium of civilization slowly deposited in their soul, their ideal of education and moral excellence, they are profoundly different from those who called them "cousins" before vowing them eternal hatred. The English feel, as we do, that a struggle is taking place in this war between two civilizations and that the triumph of *Kultur* would be the death of human culture.

CHAPTER X

The Spirit of Modern England as Revealed in her Literature

FOR the study of the moral physiognomy of England during the century in which the mediate causes of the war were preparing literature offers us a precious source of information. There can be no question of including the aggregate English literary production; so comprehensive a study would only lead to a tedious analysis, and would, moreover, only indirectly serve our purpose. We shall attain our end by choosing in the nineteenth century a certain number of significant works, the vital and unquestioned influence of which is, in a manner, an indication of the ideas and sentiments which prevail today. We shall pay particular attention to the authors who have interpreted the deep and lasting traits of the English soul and to those who have prepared or developed sympathy for France.

Now if there is, among the beauties and grandeur of English literature, a quality which is pre-eminently distinctive, it is without any doubt the moral quality. More than any other, the English people have always been interested in questions of conduct, and deeply absorbed in the problem of duty. More than any other, English literature, in all phases of its development, has been dominated by the ethical point of view and imbued with the didactic spirit in its highest form, namely that which

attains the innermost recesses of conscience and which counsels the more fundamental and nobler self-sacrifices. Let us call to mind the great names inscribed on the Pantheon of English Letters. In the fourteenth century, the old story-teller Chaucer traces, with a touching and sincere naïveté, the lofty ideal of the doughty knight, valiant in combat and clement in victory. During the Renaissance, Spenser seeks inspiration in the Knight's reverence for honour and in the platonic worship of love, to paint the dignity and nobleness of the ideal court of the *Faerie Queene*. Shakespeare, a powerful realist and a great poet, is admired in England not only for his incomparable dramatic genius but also for his wisdom—for that gift of penetration and reflexion which allows him to express with imagery and splendour the most profound and genuine maxims of human action. Milton, in the twelve cantos of his majestic epic, treats the problem of the origin of evil. Later, when the English novel assumes its modern form in the eighteenth century, it is characterized from the outset by its moral tone. The romantic movement which in other countries is a burst of passion, a clamour of revolt, or a desperate *élan* towards the inaccessible and the infinite, gives birth in England to the sober-minded, sane, and appeasing work of Wordsworth as well as the violence of Byron and the ecstasies of Shelley.

By the purity and serenity of his thought, and by the importance which his moral doctrine assumed, at the critical moment when it appeared, Wordsworth takes rank as one of the guides of the English conscience of today. Ruskin becomes his disciple. The poet and thinker, Matthew Arnold, has collected in a much-read volume, the better and more touching of his lines. The veteran philosopher of liberalism, Lord John Morley, before entering on his career as a man of letters and a

statesman, undertakes a study of Wordsworth as a moralist which now ranks as an authoritative work. The author of the *Lyrical Ballads* and the *Excursion* is, then, one of those who should first hold our attention, because of the considerable value—both intrinsic and indicative—of his works.

A contemporary of the French Revolution and an heir of the generation of philosophers who had reconstructed on a purely human basis the postulates or principles of spiritual life, Wordsworth placed all his hope at first in the political and social renovation by which France seemed to announce to the world an era of happiness and progress. Like most of those who were witnesses of the terrible vicissitudes of that epoch, he lost the faith which he had too confidently placed in institutions and forms of government; he did not lose faith, however, in the regeneration of man by man himself. He turned aside from the delusive struggles of assemblies and armies and having retired to the rustic solitude of the "Lake Country," lived in an inner world of his own, opening his mind to the kindly influences of nature and questioning the simple heart of the peasant. He believed that from the charm of the flowers, the stern grandeur of the cliffs, the mystery of the woods, the peace of the thatched cottage, the sublimity of sweeping horizons emanated an atmosphere of health and moral vigour. He read laws of moderation and justice, of effort and constancy, of devotion and love in the open pages of the great book of nature, learning therein joy from the bird's song, patience from the stream deepening its bed, and law from the planets immutable in their course. His poetry was thus enriched with exquisite touches in which the delicate or splendid aspects of the external world were intimately allied with the tender or whole-souled impulses of the human heart.

Whatever judgment the philosopher may be inclined to

form, in terms of strict criticism, upon this interpretation of the origin of moral ideas, it is none the less true that there exists in such an alliance a source of rich, appealing, and invigorating poetry.

From this source, English nineteenth-century literature has drawn deep emotions and fruitful lessons which by the contagion of idealism and the invading force of beauty have set their mark in the hearts of men. Today as on the first day of their appearance, the stanzas of the *Lyrical Ballads* awaken melodious memories: the murmuring chorus of the fields, counsellor of simple joy, the notes of the cuckoo, messenger of mystery, the distant singing of the harvester telling of human sympathy, the thatched cottage in ruins, still haunted by those who are no more, such remain symbols of kindliness, of things unknown, of tender concern, and of noble appeals to upright and healthy living.

One would have to cite the more beautiful of Wordsworth's poems to give an adequate idea of the force of suggestion, of the influence for good, and of the power of serenity which his works contain. I shall choose but one selection, the theme of which is in keeping with the subject of our study, namely the portrait of *The Happy Warrior*, who accomplishes his duty with courage but who, in the midst of his work of death respects humanity, rectitude, and clemency. The model for this study is in part the brother of Wordsworth, a captain of the merchant-marine who, being gifted like the poet himself with a generous and sensitive soul, had remained a man and a gentleman throughout the trial of the Great War. The Napoleonic wars had transformed England, for a time into a military nation; she was fighting in a case of necessity, as she is doing today, without weakness but respectful of the obligations of moral duty. Her patriotism, founded on honour and moral energy, while urging her to make

supreme sacrifices, at the same time charged her to observe, in the course of the terrible struggle, the spiritual values which go to make up human dignity. This distressful period produced leaders like Nelson and Wellington, who were great men not only because of their military genius, but also because of their noble characters. Nelson's message to the fleet at the beginning of the battle of Trafalgar is not forgotten today. It may sound somewhat cold to us, but in the case of the English, it strikes a deep chord capable of stirring men to supreme sacrifice: "England expects every man to do his duty." It was the same chord that General Foch, one of the great Frenchmen of today, succeeded in striking, at the side of Field-Marshall French, when at the height of the battle of Ypres the English Army, near cut to pieces, was beginning to waver. In the memorable interview between the two commanders, our valorous compatriot, while warranting that the French Army would not budge, had only to make an allusion to the noble traditions of English constancy in order to remove all ideas of retreat. French energy and English stoicism came to an understanding; the two leaders fell into each other's arms and the cause of the Allies was saved. It is in such tragic hours as these that the soul of a nation is truly revealed and that lasting friendships are sealed.

England did not abandon herself with the same confidence to the German alliance at the time when the Napoleonic peril obliged her to co-operate with the King of Prussia. Wellington had a "German legion" under his orders in 1807, when he undertook the defence of Spain against the French invasion. In the correspondence which he exchanged with his mother at that time the following passage is to be found: "I can assure you that in this German legion from the general down to the smallest drummer, it's the same thing. The earth has

never groaned under the weight of bloodier and more infamous rascals. They murder, pillage, and ill-treat the peasants wherever they pass. . . ." This conduct of the German soldiery, in a friendly country, plainly reveals the bottom of their nature. Nothing could be further removed from the spirit of rectitude and generosity of which the English gave proof in this war. And these are precisely the moral qualities which Wordsworth throws into relief in his portrait of the "Happy Warrior."

What a distance there is between the English officer, imbued with the individualist ideal of respect for his own and others' personality, and the German officer who is a blind and cruel instrument of a policy of plunder and a pitiless executor of the doctrine of war by terror! The poet represents his hero as a man resolved to maintain living within himself, under the most difficult circumstances, the will to rise constantly to higher levels of nobleness. . . .

> Whose high endeavours are an inward light
> That make the path before him always bright:
> Who, with a natural instinct to discern
> What knowledge can perform, is diligent to learn;
> Abides by this resolve, and stops not there,
> But makes his moral being his prime care;
> Who, doomed to go in company with Pain,
> And Fear, and Bloodshed, miserable train!
> Turns his necessity to glorious gain;
> In face of these doth exercise a power
> Which is our human nature's highest dower;
> Controls them and subdues, transmutes, bereaves
> Of their bad influence, and their good receives:
> By objects, which might force the soul to abate
> Her feeling, rendered more compassionate;
> Is placable—because occasions rise
> So often that demand such sacrifice;

More skilful in self-knowledge, even more pure
As tempted more; more able to endure,
As more exposed to suffering and distress;
Thence, also, more alive to tenderness.
—'Tis he whose law is reason; who depends
Upon that law as on the best of friends;
Whence in a state where men are tempted still
To evil for a guard against worse ill,
And what in quality or act is best
Doth seldom on a right foundation rest,
He labours good on good to fix, and owes
To virtue every triumph that he knows.

This self-control, this tension of the whole being with a view of persevering, despite temptations, obstacles, and promptings of anger, in the direction of honour, reason, and humanity—these are the qualities of a leader, not only just and humane in his own actions, but also capable of exercising around him the authority which prevents all brutality and excess. There is a long cry from this to the systematic barbarity of the German General Staff which declares through one of its spokesmen, Julius von Hartmann, General of Cavalry: "Violence and Passion, such are the two principal levers of all warlike action!" It is also far removed from the official German doctrine as expressed in the instructions from headquarters to officers, which excuses the most revolting cruelties (such as the killing of prisoners or their use as a living rampart) for the reason "that in war one must act quickly" or (unspeakable cynicism) "that this process has given excellent results!" And a greater difference still separates this English ideal from the practice of the German hordes who not content to kill, burned the wounded alive in a barn as they did at Longuyon, or prevented the doctors and nurses from dressing wounds, as they did during the last eight days of their occupation of Saint-D'é! Words-

worth's noble warrior is not only humane in his moments of composure, before the battle or after the action, he is humane in the very heat of the fight. His chivalrous valour is incompatible with fury and cruelty.

> But who, if he be called upon to face
> Some awful moment to which Heaven has joined
> Great issues, good or bad for human kind,
> Is happy as a lover; and attired
> With sudden brightness, like a Man inspired;
> And, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law
> In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw.

Thus in the full tide of the Romantic movement, at a time when a wave of passion breaks over the world, when either a frenzy of excess or a fever of ecstasy is abroad, England, by the voice of Wordsworth, expresses her attachment to law and duty, and professes her respect for moderation and reason. She is not insensible to what is great in Romanticism, I mean, to its emotional power and enthusiasm; but she applies this *élan ad altiora* to moral idealism. It is for this reason that English Romanticism frequently possesses a high civilizing value. Even when, under trans-Rhenan influences, it inclines towards Germanism, it abandons neither its particular dignity nor its particular generosity.

. . . . . .

Carlyle, who, because of his mystical bent, felt himself drawn towards the German transcendentalists, never allowed himself as they did to wander into the error of subjectivism, either under the form of self-exaltation or under the form of the deification of the race. The Christian, or the universal conception of morals and life which he owed to his solid Scotch education, opened his mind to lights which Schleiermacher, Novalis, Hegel, and others failed to see and to which their compatriots of

today are blinded even more than they were. No one has denounced with more force than Carlyle the habitual vagaries of the ego which views itself with complacency and knows no other guide than the mirage of dreamland and the suggestion of desire. Now, desire is from its very nature insatiable; an individual or a nation who give themselves up to desire condemn themselves beforehand to the disturbances of lunacy. What a piquant and cutting satire of romantic—and Germanic—covetousness is Carlyle's portrait of the "Shoeblack":

> Will the whole Finance Ministers and Upholsterers and Confectioners of modern Europe undertake in joint-stock company to make one Shoeblack happy? They cannot accomplish it above an hour or two; for the Shoeblack also has a soul quite other than his stomach; and would require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation simply this allotment, no more and no less: *God's infinite Universe altogether to himself*, therein to enjoy infinitely and fill every wish as fast as it rose. Oceans of Hochheimer, a throat like that of Ophincus: speak not of them; to the infinite Shoeblack, they are nothing. No sooner is your ocean filled than he grumbles that it might have been of better vintage. . . (*Sartor Resartus*, chap. ix.).

While Carlyle did not perhaps appreciate the extent to which Germany—or at least Prussia—was moving, even in his time, down the slope of cupidity and, because of her romantic infatuation was inevitably approaching a state of self-deification, yet he was by no means slow to criticize his compatriots whenever he caught them wandering, as he thought, beyond the limits of moderation and sobriety.

Nevertheless, taken all in all, Carlyle understood only very imperfectly a few of the elements of the modern spirit. His mysticism, although enlightened by the idea

of renunciation, which he owed to his Christian education, and by the idea of justice, which he owed to the French Revolution, had a tendency to rely too much upon feeling. He was wanting in that breadth of view which is the natural outcome of intellectual sympathy. He was so entirely absorbed in the contemplation of the moral plan of life that he neglected thought. His culture was imperfect: he disdained poetry, was unacquainted with art, and mistrusted reason. France found little grace in his eyes, because her qualities are of an intellectual order.

. . . . . .

Contemporary England has outrun Carlyle. She has become more rationalistic—an evolution which draws her nearer to France. She has cured herself, to a great extent, of her insularity—and that is something which brings her nearer to our conception of humanism. A thinker and a critic of the English social organism, Matthew Arnold, who follows Carlyle chronologically and who perceived the latter's insufficiency, has done a great deal to clear the intellectual horizon of his country. He was one of those men who have understood the qualities of the French mind and who have contributed to the preparation of the union of France and England for the common work of European progress.

The son of a prominent educator, Thomas Arnold, whose name is celebrated in England for the importance he gave to moral development in the schools, Matthew Arnold was a born moralist. In that he was typically English. The novelty and originality of his doctrine consisted in his applying to humane culture the intensity of religious zeal and the ardour for moral improvement which had previously been reserved, almost exclusively, for the lessons drawn from the Bible. In his mind, the Scriptures still represented a precious source of moral truth, since they expressed with moving sincerity and

simple yet majestic poetry man's eternal yearning after love and virtue. But he felt that the time-honoured insistence of the Puritans (that is of the middle-class, which has become in the nineteenth century the very body of the nation) in placing the Old Testament before the New was not without danger. He was afraid (what has come to pass in Germany) that the hardness of the Old Law would accentuate the roughness of the Saxon temperament and that the Hebraism of the prophets would encourage Germanism in its harsh, narrow, and inhuman tendencies. Furthermore, was not the Old Testament the Jewish law for the exclusive use of the Jewish people, with a decided shade of contempt for the Gentiles? And if it be admitted that it was one of the historical necessities of the political and social development of Israel, it was no doubt an unfavourable influence in modern civilization.

We see only too clearly today, by the example of Germany hypnotized by the worship of her "Ancient God"—a strange combination of Jehovah and Wotan—how legitimate were the fears of Matthew Arnold. He sought, then, to give preference to the New Testament; for its characteristics of universality and humanity surely render it worthy of becoming the true Evangel of the fraternity of nations. He undertook to establish the enlightening value of the teaching of Christ by pointing out its place and part in the evolution of civilization. Christianity, in his view, represents the moral force, the highest and most effective impulse of the soul, enlightening and vivifying the intellectual effort of the ancient and modern worlds to understand the Universe and human nature. As a disciple of Plato, he believed with his master, that love must inspirit dialectics; acquainted with the works of Pascal, he understood that both the heart and the head have their assigned task in

the search after truth and as guides of conduct. His doctrine represented a conciliation of humanism and Christianity. Reason, and reason alone, thought he, surely cannot reveal the profound secret of things; for beyond the science of nature, beyond history, and beyond philosophy, there exists faith in a supreme order, which in one of its aspects is the law of the mind, and without this faith man is tossed about aimlessly or falls headlong into error, mistaking his own fragile solutions for absolute truth and mistaking alas! his cupidity or ferocity for the suggestions of good. Nor is it transcendent imagination that, alone, can enlighten us; since the mysterious faculty of intuition, so precious and so indispensable as an interior light and as a force of idealism, is after all only a confused yearning which does not guide us, hour by hour, in presence of pressing perplexities varying with the individual, the circumstances, the milieu, and the moment. And so the source of human wisdom is neither exclusively reason nor exclusively imagination, but a combination of both, reason illuminated by the flash of imagination, and imagination guided by the prudence of reason; in other terms, this source is a natural faculty developed by effort, which Matthew Arnold calls "imaginative reason."

The labour of effort, reflexion, knowledge, such is the task which the English moralist imposes on mankind; at the same time, by the ardour of his exhortation, he reminds man of the beauty of the faith of Christ in infinite love. Knowledge, he urges, does not merely consist in the pursuit of the laws of matter through which the nineteenth century unfortunately tends to confine all mental activity. He does not disdain science; he recognizes the forces of resistance and of creation which the conquest of nature has contributed to life; he is aware of the precision, amplitude, suppleness, and penetration which scientific laws and methods have added to truth. Nevertheless,

about 1870, at the time when he expounded his doctrine (which present circumstances would not alter), it seemed to him especially necessary to direct the intellectual effort of his contemporaries towards that particular form of knowledge capable of nourishing moral ideas and of laying the foundation of a firm and lofty conception of right. Hence he recommends the study of Letters, *Litteræ humaniores*, those spiritual monuments of human thought, standing out across the ages, selected by the choice and admiration of the best judges, tested by time and magnified by the piety attached to things of the past. Matthew Arnold is an advocate of the study of the classics, in which he sees, as we in France do, the intellectual nourishment pre-eminently suited to the *élite*, through whom its benefits are extended to all ranks of the nation.

England has never been deficient in the culture of the classics. Matthew Arnold himself, a former student of Oxford, is well aware of the honour in which the great men of Greece and Rome have ever been held in that sanctuary of noble thoughts and generous enthusiasms. He proposes, however, to renew and to fortify the study of the classics by presenting them not as mere depositaries of common wisdom but as representatives of a stage of human thought in the course of an incessant progress towards more light. He recommends the historical and rationalist point of view for the formation and the enlightenment of imaginative reason. One should extract the essential thought contained in each literary work or epoch or form of civilization, point out its defects and shortcomings, the profound causes of the decadence of empires, and infuse new life into each study by adapting it to the needs of contemporary thought. The teachings of the great writers of antiquity should be completed by the teachings of the masters of European thought who have contributed to the development of Occidental civilization

under the influence of Christianity. Thus, from the ancient and modern humanities combined, is evolved an intellectual ideal and a European code of morals composed of the contributions of all epochs and of all countries and unified by man's powerful and indestructible aspiration towards good. Such is the ideal of "culture," rich in its diversity, warm in its sympathies, and ready to welcome all ideas verified by reason, which England and France are defending today against the encroachments of *Kultur* (that is to say against the German idea, which is materialistic and mystic, mechanical and despotic, narrowly and fiercely national). Nothing prevents this cosmopolitan type of culture from assuming a character in keeping with the mental complexion, the traditions, and the glories of each particular people. For instance, while Matthew Arnold knowingly leads English humanism towards the moral interpretation of a masterpiece, we, in France, are naturally inclined to extract its intellectual value, its principles of reason, of balance, of psychological truth and of beauty. But goodness and truth and beauty form an inseparable trilogy. Whoever approaches the study of this trilogy through one of its terms, cannot fail, sooner or later, to encounter the other two during his progress. It is to this trilogy of supreme human value that Anglo-French civilization is ardently and passionately attached —even to the sacrifice of life itself.

What we discover at the base and at the summit of Matthew Arnold's philosophy is idealism. We find it at the base, since its starting-point is moral intuition and that spiritual yearning which tends towards the perfection and consummation of the soul's destiny; we find it at the summit since the goal of his philosophy is truth—truth varying with each epoch, adapted to new forms of thought and social organization, but essentially conformable to the noble aspirations of humanity, ever since civilization

has been expressed, for thirty centuries past, by the voice of great thinkers. Now, it is also true that Hegel's philosophy makes use of the name of idealism and Hegel's philosophy is the source of contemporary German *Kultur*. But English idealism and German idealism are so different in nature that it is important to anticipate any confusion which might result from an identity of terms. Hegel defines his idealism realistically, and that is precisely where the branching of the roads takes place. For Hegel, the idea exists in the mind only as bound up with actual facts, is conceivable only through tangible reality or manifests itself only through the study of those tendencies which manifest themselves in tangible reality. Thereupon Teutonic mysticism and national fanaticism intervene and the consequence is to mistake for absolute truth what is merely German. The idea of the State, for example, is not, from Hegel's standpoint, a rational form of society the elements of which would be liberty as the contributive part of the ancient Greeks and the English, justice as the contributive part of the French, and discipline as the contributive part of the Germans. His idea of the State is the Prussian State deified, transformed into a mystic entity, enthroned in the Heavens, whence it imposes its principles of despotic authority and brutal force on Germany, until ready to impose them on the world by universal war. German idealism, despite its dialectic value and its successes in minor points, results in monstrous consequences because misguided by German pride, misled by German ambition, and blinded by German narrowness, it stands aloof from humanity with naïve and perverse obstinacy.

Matthew Arnold has devoted his great work of criticism more especially to emphasizing the permanent benefits of Greek thought, to tracing the general lines of Goethe's thought—that great German whose lessons

Germany is denying today—and to pointing out the advantages which England would derive from a more intimate commerce with French thought. Matthew Arnold does not confine himself to unlimited praise of France. He draws our attention to certain truths which we might meditate with advantage to ourselves. He upbraids us for what he considers, to some extent, as a deficiency in the sense of conduct. Not that he believes the French nation really debased; but he recognizes in certain cases, particularly in the relations between sexes, a certain looseness which he considers harmful to the general moral health. Public opinion is an accomplice—at least by its silence. Literature sometimes reveals a regrettable indulgence. Fortunately (and in this he abandons himself unreservedly to his sympathy) taken as a whole, the French possess a delicacy of perception and a sense of measure which check them on the slope of excess. In the province of the mind, these qualities become incomparable and confer on the French nation, within the society of European nations, a leading rôle of the highest importance in the development of civilizing forces.

The French, says Matthew Arnold, are worthy of stirring the emulation of other peoples for the high esteem in which they hold ideas. Thought, as cultivated by the French, is universal thought which does not belong exclusively to their country nor to a particular time but which strives to steer clear of national prejudice and to embrace with ready comprehension the past and the future of humanity. Thanks to its general applications, to its speculative daring, to its humane generosity the French Revolution, despite momentary discredit due to its immediate political consequences, has a right to sympathetic attention. Matthew Arnold is too English not to estimate at their full value the English qualities of practical sense, of traditional prudence, and of attach-

ment to the spirit of compromise. But he is too enlightened not to understand that these traits of British character need to be corrected by an infusion of certain rational principles and stimulated by a leaven of logic and intellectual activity. He is also too just not to observe that France (even the France of 1875) had learned much in the school of experience; that without disowning her enthusiasm or general ideas, without deserting her idealism, she had tempered her fundamental tenets and no longer believed that abstract truth could be realized entirely and immediately in the field of fact. Thanks to the moderation introduced into these tenets by this new practical wisdom, France has reached a degree of social development capable of becoming a model for other nations.

It is in France, remarked Matthew Arnold, that the distances between classes is the least perceptible; the principle of equality, proclaimed in 1789, has born its fruit. Not only is France a stranger to castes, not only are the comforts of life more equitably distributed than in any other country, but intellectual culture, in France, has sown a richer and larger harvest than elsewhere. France furnishes the admirable example of a country of which the middle-class—that is the great majority of the nation—is truly cultured in the universal and humane sense of the word.

. . . If we consider the beauty and the ever-advancing perfection of Paris,—nay, and the same holds good, in its degree, of all other great French cities also, . . . if we consider the theatre there, if we consider the pleasures, recreations, even the eating and the drinking, if we consider the whole range of resources for instruction and for delight and for the conveniences of a humane life generally, and then if we think of London, of Liverpool, of Glascow, and of life in the English towns in general, we shall find that the advantage of

France arises from its immense middle-class making the same sort of demands upon life which only a small upper-class makes elsewhere. . . .[1]

Since these lines were written, England has begun to improve in the very direction earnestly advocated by Matthew Arnold. To realize this equality—no doubt relative—the effects of which, in France, are so favourable to refinement, intellectual and artistic development, and to sociability, that is to the humanizing of the mass of the nation, it was needful to set up a system of legislation tending to limit, in the future, the accumulation of riches in the hands of a few, and, on the contrary, to favour the dissemination of competence, and to multiply the number of small fortunes. England has entered upon this reform. It was necessary, too, that secondary schools should be founded for the middle-class, alongside of the great aristocratic schools like Harrow and Eton, which, for centuries, have dispensed classical culture to the sons of the older families. This reform also England has accomplished or is accomplishing. Matthew Arnold, nominated Inspector General of Public Education, had already visited our Lycées and gathered from them certain precious suggestions. One of his successors, Mr. Cloudesley Brereton, attended one of our classes of philosophy for a year and is now director of Secondary Education in the department of Public Education in England. He is in entire sympathy with the ideas of Matthew Arnold and with our French ideal. Then again a certain number of our *Docteurs ès lettres* have been made professors of French literature in British Universities, and each year sees an increase in the number of English students, future professors, who enroll in our higher

[1] Matthew Arnold. *Mixed Essays*, p. 165.

institutions of learning. Reciprocally we are sending to England every year a larger number of our young men and women to round out their special English studies and to assimilate the spirit of the country, which, by its solidity and seriousness, so happily completes the quickness and *élan* of the French mind. Certain societies, such as the *Entente-Cordiale*, the Franco-English Guild, the *Association franco-écossaise* and our admirable *Alliance Française*, organize an exchange of visits and establish currents of intellectual penetration in both senses by means of lectures. The two literatures judge each other reciprocally in a more and more equitable light; they are more and more inclined to borrow from each other certain subjects and ideas, elements of true local colour, and research material for social study. In short the intellectual union of the two countries is being brought about through mutual knowledge and sympathy.

. . . . . .

A great writer of the Victorian period, the novelist and poet, George Meredith, has done a great deal to lead his fellow countrymen away from insularity towards the broad and free horizon of European Culture. Meredith knew France well and loved her sincerely; our logic, our taste for rational clearness, our thoughtful idealism, in particular, seemed to him worthy the emulation of the English, just as the French in turn might find help in the moral steadfastness and truthfulness of the latter. In the cruel days of 1870, when England, believing us guilty, stood silently aloof in the hour of our trial, Meredith spoke. He wrote an ode *To France* in which as a true friend, he took note of the faults responsible for our misfortune but at the same time expressed his confidence in the fundamental excellence of our qualities. This prophetic poem, read by our English friends today as a means of tracing the vital sources of Anglo-French sym-

pathy, is also worthy of being known in France. The pictures of war which he evokes have, alas, become once more events of actual interest. As for the severity of the judgments, we can stand it since we have learned to criticize ourselves most sharply. As for the praise and admiration and the faith in our genius, we may accept them with pride; they confirm our sentiment of piety for the valour of our race and fortify the modest and sober confidence that we have once more placed in our own efforts.

Meredith's first word is an expression of heartfelt sympathy for the misfortune of France, for the immense void which her fall has produced:

> We look for her that sunlike stood
> Upon the forehead of our day,
> An orb of nations, radiating food
> For body and for mind alway.
> Where is the Shape of glad array;
> The nervous hands, the front of steel,
> The clarion tongue? Where is the bold proud face?
> We see a vacant place;
> We hear an iron heel. . . .

Then after a greeting to France, the evangelist of liberty, to the France of philosophy and of the Revolution, the poet evokes a sombre vision of the Second Empire with its years of frivolity, of vanity, and imprudence:

> O she that made the brave appeal
> For manhood when our time was dark,
> And from our fetters drove the spark
> Which was as lightning to reveal
> New seasons, with the swifter play
> Of pulses, and benigner day;
> She that divinely shook the dead
> From living man; that stretched ahead

Her resolute forefinger straight,
And marched toward the gloomy gate
Of earth's Untried, gave note, and in
The good name of Humanity
Called forth the daring vision! she,
She likewise half corrupt of sin,
Angel and Wanton! can it be?
Her star has foundered in eclipse,
The shriek of madness on her lips;
Shreds of her, and no more, we see.
There is horrible convulsion, smothered din,
As of one that in a grave-cloth struggles to be free.

But France cannot die; indestructible, she is destined to endure sufferings which torture, but do not kill. The more intensely a nation is devoted to higher things, the more she feels offences against her dignity and honour and the cruelty of the conqueror's brutality. Such is the fate of France:

Mother of Pride, her sanctuary shamed:
Mother of Delicacy, and made a mark
For outrage: Mother of Luxury, stripped stark;
Mother of Heroes, bondsmen: thro' the rains,
Across her boundaries, lo the league-long chains!
Fond Mother of her martial youth; they pass,
Are spectres in her sight, are mown as grass!
Mother of Honour, and dishonoured; Mother
Of Glory, she condemned to crown with bays
Her victor, and be fountain of his praise.

Is that all? Has France emptied to the dregs the cup of bitterness? Not yet. For France knows and understands. She knows that the acts of nations like the acts of individuals leave an aftermath of inevitable consequence. She has been a conquering nation. But she allowed fancy and caprice and love of pleasure to get the

better of her wisdom. She knows full well she must pay ransom for days of error. And so it is France herself, because of her lucid intelligence, who punishes France most cruelly.

Is there another curse? There is another:
Compassionate her madness: is she not
Mother of Reason? she that sees them mown
Like grass, her young ones! Yea, in the low groan
And under the fixed thunder of this hour
Which holds the animate world in one foul blot
Tranced circumambient while relentless Power
Beaks at her heart and claws her limbs down-thrown,
She, with the plunging lightnings overshot,
With madness for an armour against pain,
With milkless breasts for little ones athirst,
And round her all her noblest dying in vain,
Mother of Reason is she, trebly cursed,
To feel, to see, to justify the blow;
Chamber to chamber of her sequent brain
Gives answer of the cause of her great woe,
Inexorably echoing thro' the vaults,
''Tis thus they reap in blood, in blood who sow:
'This is the sum of self-absolved faults.'
Doubt not that thro' her grief, with sight supreme,
Thro' her delirium and despair's last dream,
Thro' pride, thro' bright illusion and the brood
Bewildering of her various Motherhood,
The high strong light within her, tho' she bleeds,
Traces the letters of returned misdeeds.
She sees what seed long sown, ripened of late,
Bears this fierce crop; and she discerns her fate
From origin to agony, and on
As far as the wave washes long and wan
Off one disastrous impulse: for of waves
Our life is, and our deeds are pregnant graves
Blown rolling to the sunset from the dawn.

The chastisement is cruel, but it is fruitful. From pain bravely supported, from suffering accepted because its causes are understood, is born regeneration. France will rise again; her past proclaims it and her reconquered virtue gives assurance of this renaissance.

. . . the Gods alone
Remember everlastingly: they strike
Remorselessly . . .
. . . And the painful Gods might weep,
If ever rain of tears came out of heaven.
Viewing the woe of this Immortal. . . .

. . . . . .

Behold, the Gods are with her, and are known.
Whom they abandon misery persecutes
No more: them half-eyed apathy may loan
The happiness of pitiable brutes.
Whom the just Gods abandon have no light,
No ruthless light of introspective eyes
That in the midst of misery scrutinize
The heart and its iniquities outright.

. . . . . .

And so goes out the soul. But not of France.

. . . . . .

She snatched at heaven's flame of old,
And kindled nations: she was weak:
Frail sister of her heroic prototype,
The Man; for sacrifice unripe,
She too must fill a Vulture's beak,
Deride the vanquished, and acclaim
The conqueror, who stains her fame,
Still the Gods love her, for that of high aim
Is this good France, the bleeding thing they stripe.

. . . . . .

They lie like circle-strewn soaked Autumn-leaves
Which stain the forest scarlet, her fair sons!

And of their death her life is; of their blood
From many streams now urging to a flood,
No more divided, France shall rise afresh.
. . . . . .
Immortal Mother of a mortal host!
Thou suffering of the wounds that will not slay,
Wounds that bring death but take not life away!—
Stand fast and hearken while thy victors boast:
. . . . . .
Do thou stoop to these graves here scattered wide
Along thy fields, as sunless billows roll;
These ashes have the lesson for the soul.
'Die to thy Vanity, and strain thy Pride,
Strip off thy Luxury: that thou may'st live,
Die to thyself,' they say, 'as we have died
. . . . . .
Nor pray for aught save in our little space
To warn good seed to greet the fair earth's face.'
O Mother! take their counsel, and so shall
The broader world breathe in on this thy home,
Light clear for thee the counter-changing dome,
Strength give thee, like an ocean's vast expanse
Off mountain cliffs, the generations all,
Not whirling in their narrow rings of foam,
But as a river forward. Soaring France!
Now is Humanity on trial in thee:
Now may'st thou gather humankind in fee:
Now prove that Reason is a quenchless scroll;
Make of calamity thine aureole,
And bleeding head us thro' the troubles of the sea.

The confidence, expressed with so much nobility, in the force of resurrection and unfailing genius of France, honours its author as well as those to whom it is addressed. In Meredith's beautiful poem, French and English idealism reaches a common understanding for the honour of the two nations and the honour of humanity.

These noble words are as real today as they were forty-five years ago; they symbolize the intimate union of two great civilizing peoples in an effort to forward the great work of progress, of spiritual dignity and peace.

. . . . . .

Expressions of sympathy for France have been many since the *Entente Cordiale* has removed the conflict of interests and eliminated the misunderstandings which divided England and France. Among the many signs of esteem and friendship which have come to light in the literature or press, I shall choose the most significant and the most beautiful: the poem published by Rudyard Kipling in the *Morning Post* of June 24, 1913.

Kipling is little known in France as a poet. His vigorous lines, strongly coloured and of a boldly marked rhythmical design, are written in a language drawn from the pure sources of the Saxon element, and for that reason little accessible to the foreign reader. The translation of this poem has not been attempted, probably because the French version without the idiomatic savour of the terms and the lyric swing of the metre would lose the strong accent of the original. It is none the less true that Kipling is the greatest contemporary poet of England.

Interpreter, in his poetry and short stories, of English patriotism, at a time when a crisis of imperialism, a few years before the Transvaal expedition, rendered national spirit passionate in character, Kipling has celebrated the courage and care-free spirit, the daring and cheerfulness of the British soldier and sailor. Going back to the past of the race, he has associated the bold exploits of the gentlemen of Elizabeth's time with the spirit of initiative and sacrifice which nowadays guides and upholds the pioneers of colonial conquest. In our own time as in past centuries, the Englishman who fights for the expansion of the Empire is actuated not only by a violent desire

for action, but also by the magic mirage of stirring adventures and distant horizons; and so Kipling has interpreted the English dream-world. The administrator and the colonist follow on the footsteps of the soldier. Both devote themselves to their task with a deep feeling of the moral obligations dictated by the law of honour, of righteousness and justice. And so Kipling has poetized the English sense of duty.

The events of 1900 and 1904, followed by the reconciliation with France and by the appeasement of the violent and aggressive sides of British patriotism, were a surprise to Kipling. He had to think over matters for some years before finding his bearings. But there were enough poise, self-control, and true humanity in his creed of heroism to bring him to an understanding of the greatness of the task imposed on England by the unquenchable ambition of Germany. He, the poet of English military honour, was well qualified to understand the nation most nobly obedient to the laws of honour in her severe struggle against Europe and so often against England. When Kipling, after a long silence, took up his pen again, it was to express the esteem in which he had learned to hold France.

In their conflicts of former times, the two enemies of bygone days have given proof of sufficient respect for human dignity, for themselves, and for their opponents, to be able, when their quarrel was over, to seal a loyal friendship. The reconciliation of the French and English is all the more sincere because they have acted straightforwardly in their contests. The very resistance of which they have given proof without duplicity or meanness has seasoned them for the national trials which the future holds in store for them. A great, common danger is threatening on the horizon; let them unite their valour and rectitude to safeguard their existence and the peace

of the world. Such is the theme of the noble ode *To France*. The loftiness of the subject gives gravity to the inspiration, eloquent fulness to the style, harmonious and sustained cadence to the verse.

TO FRANCE

Broke to every known mischance, lifted over all
By the light sane joy of life, the buckler of the Gaul,
Furious in luxury, merciless in toil,
Terrible with strength that draws from tireless soil,
Strictest Judge of her own worth, gentlest of man's mind,
First to follow Truth and last to leave old truths behind,—
France, beloved of every soul that loves its fellow-kind!

. . . . . .

Ere our birth (rememberest thou?) side by side we lay
Fretting in the womb of Rome to begin our fray.
Ere men knew our tongues apart, our one task was known—
Each must mould the other's fate as he wrought his own.
To this end we stirred mankind till all Earth was ours,
Till our world-end stripes begat wayside thrones and powers,
Puppets that we made or broke to bar the other's path—
Necessary, outpost folk, hirelings of our wrath.
To this end we stormed the seas, tack for tack, and burst
Through the doorways of new world, doubtful which was first,
Hand on hilt (rememberest thou?) ready for the blow,
Sure, whatever else we met, we should meet our foe;
Spurred or baulked at every stride by the other's strength.
So we rode the ages down and every ocean's length.

. . . . . .

Where did you refrain from us or we refrain from you?
Ask the wave that has not watched war between us two.
Others held us for a while, but with weaker charms;
These we quitted at the call for each other's arms.
Eager toward the known delight, equally we strove,
Each the other's mystery, terror, need, and love.

To each other's open court with our proofs we came.
Where could we find honour else or men to test our claim!
From each other's throat we wrenched, valour's last reward,
That extorted word of praise gasped 'twixt lunge and guard.
In each other's cup we poured mingled blood and tears,
Brutal joys, unmeasured hopes, intolerable fears,
All that soiled or salted life for a thousand years.
Proved beyond the need of proof, matched in every clime,
O companion, we have lived greatly through all time.

. . . . . .

Yoked in knowledge and remorse, now we come to rest,
Laughing at old villainies that Time has turned to jest;
Pardoning old necessity no pardon can efface—
That undying sin we shared in Rouen market-place.
Now we watch the new years shape, wondering if they hold
Fiercer lightnings in their hearts than we launched of old.
Now we hear new voices rise, question, boast, or gird,
As we raged (rememberest thou?) when our crowds were stirred.
Now we count new keels afloat, and new hosts on land,
Massed like ours (rememberest thou?) when our strokes were planned.
We were schooled for dear life's sake, to know each other's blade.
What can blood and iron make more than we have made?
We have learned by keenest use to know each other's mind.
What shall blood and iron loose that we cannot bind?
We who swept each other's coast, sacked each other's home,
Since the sword of Brennus clashed on the scales of Rome,
Listen, count, and close again, wheeling girth to girth,
In the linked and steadfast guard set for peace on earth.

. . . . . .

Broke to every known mischance, lifted over all
By the light sane joy of life, the buckler of the Gaul,
Furious in luxury, merciless in toil,
Terrible with strength that draws from tireless soil,
Strictest judge of her own worth, gentlest of man's mind,
First to follow Truth and last to leave old truths behind,—
France, beloved of every soul that loves its fellow-kind!

England has shown some reluctance in the past in recognizing the value of our rational idealism with its marks of generous daring and universality. Being herself attached to facts, traditions, and to compromise which every-day reality imposes, she was not without suspicion with regard to a system of thought which transcends facts, outruns experiences, and disdains the dulness of circumspect action. The French Revolution with its disorders and the Napoleonic era with its ambition for conquest had put her on guard against abstract speculation which captivates the mind, but which, if yielded to without restraint, leads enthusiasm astray. The fluctuations of our political history from the Restoration to the Second Empire, the tumultuous demonstrations of the crowd, and the imprudent blundering of those in power disposed her to hold fast to the severe opinion which Burke had formed of us.

Since 1870, England has seen France acquire an ever clearer sense of reality and apply herself to the great work of moral and material upbuilding with a perseverance and thoughtfulness which have surprised the world. The Third Republic has continued to progress towards stability; the direction of our foreign policy has greatly strengthened the confidence of our friends and the wholesome respect of our enemies; our colonial administration has shown us to be leaders of men; our financial system is, with the English system, among the most solid in existence; our army has proved to be the great instrument of resistance against the aggression of the Barbarians. Our national character has matured; we have learned how to organize our political parties with a view to an effective programme; we are less emotional, less changeable, less apt to disorderly explosions; the spirit of association, a corollary and mainstay of the spirit of liberty, has been constantly and beneficially developed in all branches of

our activity. It is this progress and these successes which have impressed the English.

Their esteem for us is not one of the least important reasons which has induced them to favour the reconciliation of the *Entente Cordiale*. Seeing that we are capable of tempering our principles and of disciplining our enthusiasm, they have learned to appreciate our idealism at its real value. In it they now see a happy complement of British practicality. The German savage materialism has finally led them to understand, by antithesis, that our creed of abstract truth is the living ferment which prevents realism from degenerating into ruthless greed. In the field of ideas, henceforth, they and we may join hands. Mr. Clutton Brock has expressed this thought with eloquent sympathy in a famous article of the *Times* which we have the right to consider as the intellectual manifesto of English friendship.[1]

Among all the sorrows of this war, there is one joy for us in it: that it has made us brothers with the French as no two nations have ever been brothers before. There has come to us after ages of conflict, a kind of millennium of friendship; and in that we feel there is a hope for the world that outweighs all our fears, even at the height of the world-wide calamity. . . . Behind all the misunderstandings, and in spite of the differences of character between us, there was always an understanding which showed itself in the courtesies of Fontenoy and a hundred other battles. When Sir Philip Sidney spoke of France as "that sweet enemy," he made a phrase for the English feeling of centuries past and centuries to be. . . . We said that the French were frivolous, and they said that we were gloomy. Now they see the gaiety of our soldiers, and we see the deep seriousness of all France at this crisis of her fate. . . .

[1] Literary Supplement of the *Times*, October 1, 1914. The Recteur of the University of Paris specified that the translation of this "Address to France" should be read in all Lycées.

Now we feel that France is fighting not merely for her own honour and her own beautiful country, still less for a triumph over an arrogant rival, but for what she means to all the world; and that now she means far more than ever in the past. . . . The Germans believe that they have determined all the conditions of modern war, and, indeed, of all modern competition between the nations, to suit their own character. It is their age, they think, an age in which the qualities of the old peoples, England and France, are obsolete. They make war after their own pattern, and we have only to suffer it as long as we can. But France has learned what she needs from Germany, so that she may fight the German idea as well as the German armies; and when the German armies were checked before Paris there was an equal check to the German idea.

Then the world, which was holding its breath, knew that the old nations, the old faith and mind and conscience of Europe were still standing fast and that science had not utterly betrayed them all to the new barbarism. Twice before, at Poitiers and in the Catalaunian fields, there had been such a fight upon the soil of France, and now for the third time it is the heavy fate and the glory of France to be the guardian nation. That is not an accident; for France is still the chief treasury of all that these conscious barbarians would destroy. They know that while she stands unbroken, there is a spirit in her that will make their Kultur seem unlovely to all the world. They know that in her, as in Athens long ago, thought remains passionate and disinterested and free. Their thought is German and exercised for German ends like their army; but hers can forget France in the universe, and for that reason her armies and ours will fight for it as if the universe was at stake. . . . Whatever wounds France suffers now, she is suffering for all mankind; and now, more than ever before in her history, are those words become true which one poet who loved her gave to her in the Litany of Nations crying to the earth:

"I am she that was thy sign and standard-bearer,
Thy voice and cry;

She that washed thee with her blood and left thee fairer,
The same am I.
Were not these the hands that raised thee fallen and fed thee,
These hands defiled?
Was not I thy tongue that spake, thine eye that led thee,
Not I thy child?"[1]

This eloquent eulogy gives us the best of reasons to hope that the Franco-British co-operation is henceforth established on solid foundations with a view to the definite triumph of the civilizing forces created in the course of ten centuries of history on the banks of the Thames and the borders of the Seine. England brings a measured, well-disciplined, solidly realistic, and highly humane conception of liberty and civic duty; France offers her lofty, generous, and imperishable ideal of inalienable right and eternal justice.

[1] Swinburne, *The Litany of Nations.*

CHAPTER XI

Conclusion: What the English have Done and what they are Doing.

I HAVE set forth the latent causes of the conflict which set Germany—a nation of prey, hungry for colonies, seacoasts, naval bases, and supremacy—against England, an old imperial nation, mother of commerce and mistress of the seas. I have pointed out the secret causes of an ever-widening abyss existing between these two countries. Germany allowed herself to be blinded by an unprecedented development of her material riches, and, after having organized a terrible war-machine at the expense of the destruction of liberty and the individual conscience, cynically evoked the right of force. England, on the other hand, being too confident, perhaps, in her security, lived in the hope of peaceful progress, and faithful to her secular traditions, cultivated this very liberty and individualism and, finally, having been won over to ideas of duty and humanity, sought to civilize weaker peoples, to extend parliamentary liberty to all English-speaking groups, and to live with her European neighbours on a footing of good understanding, of mutual concession and sympathy. In keeping with the conciliatory tendency of her foreign policy, England did her utmost up to the very last moment to maintain peace. In keeping with her sense of right, with her respect for inter-

national probity, with her concern for the balance of power in Europe, she resolved to go to war only when she could no longer entertain doubts as to the danger which threatened her and threatened civilization. Since the momentous evening of August the fourth, 1914, the Franco-English Alliance has been consummated and is becoming day by day more effective. The question naturally arises what have the English done? what are they doing? what will they continue to do?

During three tragic days, from the hour of Germany's declaration of war against France up to the odious violation of Belgian soil, England left France in painful uncertainty as to her intentions. Despite the urgent appeal of the head of the French Government to the British Prime Minister, despite the personal intervention of M. Poincaré with King George, England withheld her decision. Later, when it became evident that to the formidable industrial development of Germany, it was necessary to oppose the industrialization of all the resources of the Allies for the purpose of war, England was slower than we in applying herself without reserve to the intensified manufacture of cannon and munitions. Still later, when the resisting force of our enemies, sheltered by underground defences, proved that to dislodge them it would be necessary to attack with an increasing mass of battalions fed by fresh reserves, England hesitated at first to adopt the measures destined to allow her to lend us the assistance of all her men fit for service.

Yet after all, every decision that the situation necessitated and that we expected of her, was finally taken with a loyalty and devotion to the common cause which those who know her have never doubted, even in the hours when the facts seemed to speak against her. How then is it possible to explain this waiting, these half-measures, this caution with regard to those who hesitated or were

refractory, and this general timidity in the matter of prejudices, interests, and obstacles?

From what we know of the moulding forces of English history, of the national character and the spirit of the institutions, it is difficult to admit on the part of the leaders and ruling classes, any indifference, or weakness, or lack of duty. Conditions peculiar to England, certain traits of the psychology of her people, certain habits become an integral part of her life, and a certain acuteness of the social question created a situation which demanded on the part of the responsible heads prudence united to decision, and suppleness joined to firmness. The knowledge of this state of things will explain the attitude of the Government, the necessary graduation of measures of exception, and—as an inevitable consequence—the relative slowness in the initiation of all the productive and fighting forces of the country. This knowledge will dispel the doubts which certain severe critics (having in mind the immense sacrifices of France) have formed; it will also permit us to appreciate, to its full extent and value, the powerful effort of Great Britain.

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The English people were fortunate enough during the nineteenth century not to see their history darkened by a grievous disaster like the crisis of 1870 which put into the hearts of the French bitterness and suffering and lasting aversion for an ever-dangerous, unjust, covetous, and brutal neighbour. England was living without cruel recollections, without disquieting apprehensions and unpleasant emotions. Safe in her island behind the shelter of her fleet, she gave herself up without reserve to commercial and industrial activity and to the task of organizing her Empire. The people were but little interested in European politics. They contemplated somewhat distantly the rivalries of the "continent" as distant events

capable of exciting their sympathy or disapproval but not of affecting them in their deeper feelings. Guaranteed by their isolation, they knew little of war outside of colonial expeditions, limited in scope, without serious effect on the country's internal life and conducted by a professional army. During the last fifteen years, while still under the shock of the mishaps of the Transvaal War, they thought of nothing else but peace, being determined to devote all their energies to the solution of internal problems, which the recent demands of the wage-earners and proletariat rendered more urgent and complex. Three generations of men, in the happy island of Albion, had escaped the alarms and horrors of war; the last generation, in its military enterprise of South Africa, had promised itself not to be responsible for letting loose the dogs of war. The German peril, of which well-advised statesmen and thoughtful men perceived the imminent and dangerous reality, did not trouble the masses. The representatives of democracy (who made it their business to reflect the opinions of their constituents) frowned on the idea of preparation for war, being satisfied to secure the traditional increase of the fleet and the means of sea defence. Both the Radical Party and the Labour Party were pacific.

The European war suddenly exploding in the midst of this calm, due to the tranquil confidence of some and the militant optimism of others, resounded like a thunderclap in a serene sky. Those who had control of the country's destinies, recovered quickly and grappled with the necessities of the hour with clear and firm resolve. I do not doubt that the Government, as soon as Germany refused to co-operate in a European Congress, became aware of the full extent of its duty. The people, however, were not prepared to accept the idea of war: it was necessary to wait until a flagrant breach of faith and a direct attack on the security of England should open the eyes of the

nation. The invasion of Belgium was this act. Twenty-four hours after the refusal of Germany to reply to the English summons, Sir Edward Grey launched a declaration of war; he was unable to do so before.

The reasons which explain the delay of England from the first to the fourth of August, 1914, also explain her relative slowness to enter the struggle body and soul, in sacrificing her peace-time habits, her insular placidity, and her love for individualism and liberty. She needed ten months to get to the point of directing all the power of her industrial production towards the manufacture of war material; one year, before she thought of taking precautionary measures against the numerous Germans doing the work of spies and leaders of revolt on her soil; twenty-two months, before making up her mind to apply conscription in the recruiting of the army. Meanwhile, during the first weeks, France had mobilized all her civil population; their heroic constancy barred and held the torrent of attack. Invaded, decimated, and sorely wounded, she stiffened her resistance in an admirable effort of will, of intelligent initiative and sacrifice, to rival her terrible enemy in the intensive manufacture of arms and munitions. Could England have followed her example more promptly? The point is controvertible and can only be solved in the full light of history. What is certain is the fact that the English Government had serious difficulties to surmount. It had to be cautious with the people, who from the beginning were not ready for any supreme decision. Precipitation might have imperilled everything. By cautious dealing, by prudence, and by gradual preparation for certain measures of decisive gravity, the cabinet has, no doubt, prevented a catastrophe. The English temperament, the state of public opinion, and the nature of popular habits and customs justifies this point of view.

The Englishman is slow to imagine. He does not foresee with sufficient quickness the possible consequences of facts; he does not react instantly and ardently in contact with difficulties as the impetuous and sensitive Frenchman does. The Englishman must have the tangible perception of real things and the massive shock of powerful emotions before the equipoise of his sensitiveness is overturned. His motto is: Wait and see what is coming. His force does not consist in the sudden tension of the will and muscles which produce a vigorous impulse but in long resistance and tenacity. His legendary coolness is the faculty of conserving the regular rhythm of his life when under trial, in times of crisis and in face of danger. As an individual, he keeps up, in the most perilous situation the quiet movement of his daily life; as a unit of the whole people, he follows tradition even when circumstances upset everything round him. The English soldier, in the trenches of Flanders, finishes dressing himself under bombardment or takes the time to swallow the last slice of bread and butter of his five o'clock tea before charging in an attack. The English people showed something of this cold-bloodedness in their attitude towards the war at the beginning. The Government took the first necessary steps; men with a sense of duty or of adventurous spirit enlisted *en masse* in the ranks of the army; England was represented in the war by her fleet and her expeditionary corps to a larger extent than she had led her Allies to expect. As for the rest, she thought she could take her time. . . . "Wait and see what is coming." It must be said in her favour, that, during the first six months, no European nation foresaw the extent of the effort which Germany's resistance would necessitate. France rose to the occasion; she has surprised the world by the promptness of her decisions, the effectiveness of her material organization, and the

vigour of her moral determination. England, however, did not remain long behind; each energetic measure adopted representing a victory won by clear thinking and foreseeing patriotism over the nation's happy-go-lucky security and over-confident routine.

Questions of business profits have played their part—I mean that these interests were not sacrificed any too willingly or quickly to the higher necessities of the State's salvation. For months, England, while uninvaded and mistress of the sea, believed she could conserve her commercial and industrial activity almost untouched. "Business as usual" was the watchword. All classes shared this responsibility. The merchant class held to its profits, even when at times they were the fruit of indirect traffic with the enemy through neutral countries. The workingmen were unwilling to abandon the privileges which the social struggle of late years had secured them, even at the risk of placing the arm- and munition-output in a bad position with regard to the German production.

Little by little this untimely attachment to the habits or advantages of peace-time yielded to the advice given on certain solemn occasions by the members of the Government, to the objurgations of the big daily press and, also, it must be recognized, to the painful lesson of facts. The obstinacy of Germany in wishing to strike England in her vital activities, her useless cruelty against women, children, and inoffensive citizens stirred the hearts of the English with feelings which were unknown at the beginning of the war: patriotic indignation and anger against a malicious enemy. Under all these influences, the irreducible individualism characteristic of the English mind, gave place more and more to a feeling of national solidarity. The moral energy which had won France from the first day but which had developed in

only a few English consciences, the sacrifice of one's self, of one's interests, and liberties in the defence of the country and the general welfare continued to gather strength every day, until finally a series of bold and vigorous special laws bound into a single sheath all the energy, resources, and will of the nation.

The rôle of the Government and of the cabinet members most determined and most generously devoted to the cause of the country, was one of the important factors of England's awakening. Undoubtedly she committed errors and blunders; but her intentions were good and her truthfulness above all suspicion. The responsible leaders, daily increasing the scope of their plans and the intensity of their action, accomplished really great things without which the heroism of France and courage of Russia would have been in vain. It is this ever-increasing collaboration, this generous participation in the common task which I propose to trace in its general lines.

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Immediately after the declaration of war, the entire Home-Fleet, units of the first line and reserves, battleships and light cruisers, destroyers, torpedo-boats, and submarines, with full crews, was at its post of observation and combat in the North Sea and the Channel. During the period of uncertainty, when negotiations were proceeding, a great naval review had been held at Portsmouth —a "providential Review" as it was called—which had grouped under the shelter of the Isle of Wight the four hundred vessels of all classes destined to defend England in European waters. The mobilization, then, was an accomplished fact. The formidable power of this floating rampart sufficed to intimidate Germany whose fleet, ambitiously constructed at a sheer outlay of millions, prudently sought shelter in the port of Cuxhaven, in the Kiel Canal and the Baltic, behind the defences of Heligo-

land and behind long series of mines. The Home-Fleet, deprived of the sea-fight which it sought, devoted itself with patience and vigilance to its rôle of protection. The English expeditionary corps began to land in France as early as August the ninth. This was the commencement of an incessant movement of transports, of freighters loaded with war material, and of hospital ships, which, during periods of varying intensity, almost daily, ploughed their way across the Straits of Dover. It is well known that not a German cruiser even among the most rapid has risked an attack on these transports or their escorts, and that the German submarines, even since they made use of Zeebrugge have not succeeded in torpedoing any ship loaded with material or troops. The *Sussex*, simply a ferry-boat, was not sunk. Certain patrol groups, however, have been mortally struck: the cruisers *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*, and the battle-ship *Formidable*. Such losses are inevitable. As for the treacherous and odious attacks of the German submarine against the *Amiral-Ganteaume*, the *Falaba*, the *Lusitania*, and others, these are unspeakable crimes, simply acts of black piracy on the part of their authors, which the British fleet, not being able to foresee, could not prevent.

In the fogs, night and day on the *qui-vive*, the English fleet has accomplished its task of scouting and guarding with constant vigilance. Beside the fleet, English fishermen, on their fishing smacks, have carried out the dangerous task of mine-dragging with as much courage as skill, in a constant struggle, without thought of life, against the cowardly practice employed in violation of all maritime laws of sowing floating mines and of letting them loose blindly against warships and merchantmen, either belligerent or neutral.

The British Sea-Power—with the help of our Fleet, co-operating in about the same proportion as the English

expeditionary corps in the early work of our army—has won for England and for ourselves the liberty of the seas. This was an immense undertaking because of its difficulties and consequences, the meaning of which cannot be too much emphasized. By its means not only have the shores of Great Britain been made invulnerable, but our coasts as well have been protected against incursions which might have destroyed our ports and perhaps against landing expeditions which might have ravaged our most fertile provinces. Thanks to it, not only has England been saved from famine, but we ourselves have been able to keep up our communications freely with over-sea countries. Without it, would it ever have been possible for us to make good our lack of military preparation, our inferiority of industrial production, and the deficit of our economical resources? Would we have been able to import horses from Argentine or Canada, wheat and cotton from the United States, frozen meat from Australia and Uruguay, cloth stuffs from Lancashire, steel from the Midlands—in short the raw materials and manufactured and chemical products, indispensable in an "industrial war"—from all countries capable of producing?

By the month of October, 1915, thanks to the earlier victory of the Marne, our armies were safe, but we had lost nine-tenths of our iron-ore, 60% of our coal mines, and 76% of our steel output; of the 127 blast furnaces in activity, 95 had fallen into the power of the enemy. The men who drew us out of this situation, by a miracle of energy, intelligence, and organization are worthy of being placed with the great men of France, in the front rank of history; they have caused factories and workshops to spring from the earth and have given France an armament-power ten times superior to what we judged sufficient in time of peace. This second victory would not have

been possible if England had not guaranteed us free communication with America which procured us iron, and with Scotland and Wales which furnished us coal.

Our colonies would have offered objectives, almost without defence to high-speed German cruisers, if these latter had not been hunted down by British flying squadrons. Instead of Tsing-Tao being put in a state of siege, our colonies of Indo-China would have been attacked, since our *Dupleix* and *Montcalm* were less strong than the English *Monmouth* and *Good Hope*, sunk by the German *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, before these latter in turn were destroyed by a second English attack. Our colonies are intact; on the other hand, the German colonies—their South-west Africa and their East Africa of which they were so proud, after the conquest of Togoland and the Cameroun—have fallen into the hands of the Allies.

Security in the home waters and in the distant oceans, full opportunity to attack the German colonies, and certainty of being supplied with all that they lack, such are the inestimable advantages—one may even say decisive—which have been secured to the Allies, thanks to the English fleet's sea supremacy.

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The British sailors' spirit of daring and sacrifice have won them some noteworthy successes.

On August 28, 1914, in a bold raid, a squadron of cruisers appeared suddenly in the bight of Heligoland and attacked the German cruisers and destroyers moored in these waters. Two of the German units were sunk and a third burned. Under the fire of the forts and enemy's ships, the English rescued German sailors from drowning. The British ships withdrew without serious injury. What a difference there is between an exploit of this kind through mine-fields and in the neighbourhood of a port powerfully defended, and the enterprise undertaken the 16th of

December, by German crusiers against the open towns of West Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby in which the bombardment killed and wounded 567 civilians. One is an act of war; the other is an application of the system of murder and terror, through which German militarism, both on land and sea, is in the act of earning an ugly name for itself. In a second attempt made by some German cruisers less favoured on this occasion by the fog, the English fleet replied brilliantly. An immediate and rapid pursuit forced the aggressors to steer for home; and one of the finest ships of the squadron, the *Blücher*, was sunk by British shells. When, in the spring of 1916, the German ships made a third attempt, they were unable to get within gun-shot of the coast and dared remain only twenty minutes opposite their goals, Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Finally, when, goaded to action by the dissatisfaction of the German people, the vaunted High Sea fleet made bold, in June, 1916, to leave the shelter of its harbours and mine-fields, hoping to pounce upon the British cruisers unawares, it was so gallantly met and gripped by Admiral Beatty's lighter squadron, that the battle-ships had time to.come up and join the fray. The German fleet was so badly bruised (in spite of the lying bulletins of the German Admiralty to the contrary) that it has never since dared to take to sea again.

Submarines escape discovery more readily; that is why these boats, acting as pirates, have been able to attack so many merchantmen and fishing smacks, sinking them frequently without warning and sometimes pushing their cruelty to the point of preventing, by their artillery, the approach of rescue boats. Finally they have surpassed their own sinister exploits in bringing about, by the catastrophe of the *Lusitania*, a disaster, the horror of which was only equalled by the wholesale massacres of the civil population of Belgium, and the cold-blooded execution

of hostages, by batches, in France. England is silently applying more and more effective measures against this unspeakably ferocious institution of collective murder.

The Home-Fleet had the opportunity of co-operation with the land forces in October and November, 1914, when its powerful artillery was of great assistance in the battle of the Dunes and helped to stop the German rush for Calais. In 1915 and 1916 flat-bottomed monitors, armed with powerful cannon, bombarded Ostende and Zeebrugge several times and, with the help of hydroplanes damaged the German defences of the Belgian coast.

While these events were happening along the coasts of England and Flanders, British squadrons in distant seas were not inactive. Over the vast stretch of the ocean, they pursued pirate cruisers and passenger-boats armed for filibustering. Despite the perfection of German plans made long before the opening of hostilities and despite the complacency of certain neutral States, these corsairs were run down one by one in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in the Indian Oceans. A small English squadron did not hesitate to join combat with a more powerful German group at Coronel off the coast of Chile. The *Monmouth* and *Good Hope* battered at long range went down with all aboard. On December the eighth, however, the same German cruisers were discovered by a new British squadron off the Falkland islands, and had to fight on more equal terms: The *Scharnhorst*, the *Gneisenau*, the *Leipsig*, and the *Nürnberg* were sunk; the *Dresden* escaped, but was destroyed two months later by a vigilant English patrol. Later, the *Kronprinz-Wilhelm-der-Grosse* and the *Emden* were destroyed, the *Koenigsberg* was "bottled up" and the *Eitel-Friedrich* forced to intern in a United States port. There are no more German corsairs on the seas. The English losses, in merchant-ships, however painful, amount to

only a small fraction of the total tonnage of the United Kingdom. In spite of the German piratical method of sea warfare, few of the thousands of ships which serve to supply England and maintain her trade have changed their sailing dates; the transportation of the troops to or from India, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada has been effected without impediment. In a word, England has secured with triumphant mastery the maintenance of order on the seas.

By the beginning of the year 1915, the safety of the oceans having been definitely established, a certain number of naval units became free for an important operation which had been decided at a meeting of allied ministers at Paris. February the twenty-sixth an Anglo-French fleet entered the Dardanelles and undertook the methodical bombardment of the German-armed forts, which defended the sea route to Constantinople. Despite heavy weather, floating mines, and cannon, the operation was pushed with a daring and a coolness which promised rapid success, when, in the narrow part of the Strait between Chanak and Kilid-Bahr, torpedoes discharged from the shores, struck the French battle-ship *Le Bouvet* and the English battle-ships, *Irresistible* and *Ocean*. The French were the more cruelly tried; in three minutes the *Bouvet* sank carrying down the entire crew who faced death with heroic courage. The forcing of the Straits had to be postponed until an Anglo-French landing corps could be brought to the Gallipoli peninsula to co-operate with the action of the fleet.

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While thus conducting simultaneously active operations, coast-guard duty, and corsair hunting, the English fleet was also busy cutting Germany from her means of supply by sea, while the French fleet in the Adriatic was operating in a like manner against Austria. Respectful of the rights

of neutrals and of international conventions, the Allies intercepted nothing but contraband of war for a period of seven months. Not till after Germany had begun torpedoing all the merchant ships within reach of her submarines without inspecting the nature of their cargo and frequently without hailing them at all, did the Allied fleets receive the mission, following an "Order in Council" issued by the English Government, March 11, 1915, to establish a complete blockade, that is to put a stop to importation and exportation by sea. The execution of this blockade was effected in keeping with international law and the tacit prescriptions of humanity: it has nothing in common with the illegal and cruel exploits of the German submarines.

Contrary to the false and selfish complaints of Germany, the blockade is not directed against non-combatants, but against the provisioning of the army and against the economic and industrial power of our enemy, upon which is chiefly based this force of resistance. If the women and children suffer from a certain scarcity of food-products (which has never reached the proportions of sheer want) it is because Germany has sacrificed the interests of civilians to the needs of her troops and has refused to furnish guarantees which would have allowed the provisioning of the non-combatants to the exclusion of the army. Germany who is seeking to excite the pity of neutral States had no pity for Belgium, or the provinces of Northern France, or Poland, or Servia whom she has fleeced and stripped of all they possess and of all they produce. For a long time she furnished herself with what she needed through neutral States, until the moment when England determined, after almost inconceivable forbearance, to watch the economic relations of Holland and Sweden with their powerful neighbours while France undertook to see to the correct behaviour of Switzerland.

In this way the blockade—without ceasing to be conducted with respect for the legitimate rights of neutrals and the laws of international intercourse—has been drawn tighter and has become continually more effective. In August, 1915, cotton which is used to make explosives was declared contraband of war. In January, 1916, the commerce of the neutrals was organized through the medium of societies of merchants for the different countries concerned, in such a way that only legitimate exchanges not destined to serve the interests of our enemies were authorized. With necessary severity—since illegitimate trafficking still continued—the "rationing" of the neutrals had to be finally resorted to and this meant the reduction of their imports to the average rates of normal years. Thanks to these measures the cynical and sanguinary nation which had begun the vast conflict, martyrized Belgium, trod Servia underfoot, sown the sea with murder and the earth with fire and destruction, and invented the most treacherous and savage means of combat, found herself after two years of war, with a shortage which exercises its influence on the financial and industrial centres and which will constitute, after the first defeats, an element of demoralization, the first stage of retribution. It is thus that the English sea-power permits the Allies to stretch the blockade barrier around the Central Powers and to compensate the military inferiority in which their attachment to peace had placed them, as well as to prepare for decisive victories.

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The above *résumé* indicates what has been done or what is being done by the English fleet valiantly supported by the French fleet in the Mediterranean. We expected nothing less of the English in the department in which they have held the first rank for three centuries. But what have they done on land where owing to tradition,

to fear of militarism, and a feeling of insular security they have refused to follow the other nations in the race for armament? On land, they knew they could play, at first, only a secondary part; they had promised to do nothing beyond that. This secondary part, they played most valiantly from the start. Since, they have undertaken in a sincere spirit of solidarity with regard to their Allies, to increase their military power to an extent that their opponents had not foreseen and that their friends had not dared to hope for. What England has done and is doing today to create a numerous army in all its parts and to throw it in time on the battlefields, will be, when the facts are well known, one of the subjects of universal surprise. England has furnished this effort by means peculiar to herself and very different from those employed by France who is obliged by certain historical and geographical fatalities to hold important military forces in constant readiness. These means have their inconveniences, but the French, as friends and allies, ought to recognize their grandeur which is in keeping with the moral value of the English people as revealed at all epochs, in their civilization, customs, literature, and individual qualities.

The conferences which had taken place between the English and French General Staffs before the war had anticipated, in case of an attack against France and of the violation of Belgian soil, the transportation of an expeditionary force of 120,000 men which England had rendered available thanks to the reorganization of her "territorial" army (that is of the corps of volunteers destined to defend British territory). It was this expeditionary force, "the despicable little army of mercenaries," as William II. called it, which disembarked from the ninth to the sixteenth of August on our Western coasts under the orders of Field-Marshal French. It drew up under the fortress

of Maubeuge and received the mission to form our left wing when we advanced to meet the German army along the front Dinant-Charleroi-Mons. The forces against which the allied army had to contend outnumbered everything that the most carefully deduced calculations could anticipate. The English Army in particular had to support at Mons the furious assault of Von Kluck who was leading a flank movement destined to oblige the Allies, unless reinforced, to retreat. The English fought one against three for five days, suffering heavy losses but holding out as long as it was humanly possible to do so. When the retreat was decided upon, they retired in good order and succeeded in retarding the enemy's advance; their cavalry, in particular, accomplished a series of brilliant feats of arms in the forest of Compiègne. When the order was given by General Joffre to assume the offensive and "to die rather than give ground," they played their part in the battle of the Marne flanked by two French armies. After ten days' battle, and after the final precipitation of the German defeat, the English contingent took up an entrenched position on the banks of the Aisne in the neighbourhood of Soissons: and then, later, a position north of Ypres, at La Bassée.

The qualities of which they had given proof in the course of these terrible weeks were those which honour the British soldier in history: coolness, tenacity in resisting, and impassiveness in the face of death. Less ardent in attack, less capable of *élan* and audacity than the French soldier, the English soldier showed on this occasion his traditional stoicism. With surprising firmness, under a hail of shells, he waited until the storming masses of the Germans were within a hundred yards; then he cut them down under a deadly fire regulated as in practice at the butts. The retreat under the irresistible pressure of superior forces was effected by echelons, in perfect order,

very few wounded soldiers, guns, or wagons being abandoned to the enemy. The contempt of death shown by these regiments equals the heroism of Waterloo and Balaklava: instance the cavalry regiment, which after swimming the Aisne under the fire of the enemy, sabred the gunners at their pieces, instance also at the critical moment of the battle of the Yser, the army which, counting 27,000 men at the outset, returned less than 5000 bayonets strong.

The expeditionary corps which, despite its feeble effective forces thus lent us appreciable assistance, was not composed of "mercenaries," as it pleased the Kaiser to announce in derision, but of professional soldiers (similar to our "colonials") with a staff of officers belonging to the important aristocratic families and the élite of the middle-classes. If this corps did not virtually represent the English nation, it already represented the English spirit not only in its firmness and calm courage but also in its dignity and fairness. Against an adversary frequently savage and treacherous it disdained to employ the contemptible artifices which it saw employed against itself and to answer inhumanity with inhumanity. The English remained chivalrous so as not to fall beneath themselves. But their imagination redoubled their courage. The story of the treachery and cruelty of which they were victims aroused among their countrymen a wave of anger which in a few weeks transformed a defensive war, accepted as a necessity, into a war of national patriotism.

What was happening in England during the early vicissitudes of the campaign in France? Now the English people might have entrenched itself behind the selfish point of view of territorial defence. They had fulfilled their engagements with regard to Belgium and France; their fleet was mistress of the seas, protecting the coasts of France as well as those of Great Britain; they were

generous with their funds as they had always been in the crises of history in which the balance of power had been in jeopardy. Nothing obliged them to do more than reinforce their "territorial" army to oppose a landing in the unlikely case in which Germany might succeed in forcing the barrier of their fleet. They might, perhaps, even turn an ear to certain base suggestions of interest (as Germany, who knows something of Machiavelism, did not fail to insinuate) and make the calculation that the longer the war lasted, the more time they would have to supplant German commerce in the markets of the world. While Europe was weakening and ruining herself, Albion, being almost entirely in possession of her resources in men and money, would gain an advantage over her neighbours which could no longer be wrested from her. This insinuation was poisonous; but above all it was absurd, for, even supposing that England should lose less than the others, the slowing down of her activities would be prejudicial to her. What did England do?

England had never possessed a national army: her young men were not used to the noble but heavy burden of conscription; yet, in the midst of war, despite the technical and economical difficulties about to be encountered, despite the sacrifices about to be demanded of her citizens, she resolved to constitute an army which, in number, value, and armament might be favourably compared with the allied armies, and hasten by its intervention the final decision. The enterprise, as one may imagine, was gigantic. To cause the appearance, within a few months, of three million men capable of playing their part without inferiority in modern warfare despite the absence of traditions and of extensive military organization; to form leaders for these improvised battalions, not only resolute but scientifically instructed; to maintain manufacture, equipment, rifles, cannon, munitions, and the indispensable

means of transportation, was a task which perhaps England, alone, thanks to her economic and industrial resources and to her reserves of physical and moral force, could carry to a successful issue. To accomplish this she was neither obliged by previous engagements nor by absolute necessity. She acted without hesitation—no doubt because in doing so she was insuring herself in view of the final victory and of the destruction of German militarism —but also (she announced simply and loyally) to permit France to husband her forces and to come out of the struggle with enough vitality to reconquer her place in Europe as a great nation. That we shall never forget.

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First of all, men were necessary. England had enough confidence in the spirit of duty and sacrifice of her citizens to expect the recruiting of her new armies from voluntary enlistment. Obliged to become for a time a military nation, she did not wish to dispense with the principles which the régime of liberty had fixed in the island. This determination which would have been perilous for any other nation galvanized the forces of the country. On August the twenty-third, after the battle of Charleroi, the English Army was increased by 100,000 men; on the twenty-eighth, after the fall of Namur and the threatened investment of Antwerp, the House of Commons voted a second levy of 100,000 men. The rapid advance of the invading army across France revealed the full power of the German war machine, the force of which neither England nor we ourselves had correctly judged: England faced this stern reality with calm. She increased to (1,000,000) a million the number of volunteers to be called in 1914. After the victory of the Marne and the desperate struggle of the two opponents to outflank each other to the west, when the battle front lengthened unceasingly until the line of trenches ran into the sea, and

when it appeared that men were wanted and still more men to resist the German onslaught and later assume the offensive . . . then England decided that a second million of volunteers should be called in 1915, which, with the "regulars," the "territorials" and the native auxiliaries raised the number of men under the British flag to three millions. To these forces should be added the 200,000 Canadians and the 150,000 Australians and New-Zealanders which sufficient reserves were to maintain constantly at the same level.

The country replied to the appeal of the Government in a splendid spirit of abnegation. The recruiting stations opened throughout the entire country were besieged by long files of men of all conditions between eighteen and forty years, impatient to have themselves enrolled on the army lists. This stream had to be canalized and the enlistments organized by stages. The names of those who were recognized fit for service were recorded and they were assigned a date on which to appear when their turn should come. A continual current of recruits was thus formed, at the rate of 30,000 a week. It was impossible to equip, arm, and train a greater number of men at the same time.

The first to present themselves were the young men of the upper-classes and the workingmen.

There were regiments from Cambridge and from Oxford (in which the Prince of Wales served in the ranks before being attached to the General Staff), from Eton and Harrow and the other schools. Among the workingmen, particularly among the miners, there was great enthusiasm. It will be readily understood why the first examples came from the richer and the poorer classes: neither was prevented by considerations of a material order. The rich did not have to concern themselves about straightened circumstances which their momentary absence or

death might occasion. The poor knew that the State would provide for the needs of their family. For the volunteers of the middle-class, the case was more complex; they had no capital with which to make good the loss of income from their work, and in their situation the Government allowance was insufficient. One can understand that they deliberated longer than the others.

With all these volunteers, to whichever class they belonged, it is important to note that the decision was a moral act, a fact which does high honour to the English conscience. Let us try and imagine—the legal obligation not intervening here to impose its categorical imperative—the state of inner struggle into which many were thrown. In presence of material possibilities, such as the loss of a situation or the decline of a business, and of moral possibilities such as the pain of a cruel, maybe final, separation or the suffering of those most cherished, should a man sacrifice himself to his country? These problems, just as painful in England as in our country where they are solved beforehand by legal necessity, put a question to the conscience of every Englishman and had to be settled freely by him.

Moral solidity of character and individual force of conscience gave birth to numerous and enthusiastic cases of devotion. When one reflects about the moral obstacles which the English have surmounted, considering they were friends of peace, ill-prepared by their past for military effort, authorized to believe themselves in safety on their island under protection of their fleet, one will recognize that the movement of voluntary enlistment was a great and glorious achievement. National vitality carried the day against the softening influences of prosperity and peace. National honour did not permit England to remain inferior to her rôle as a great nation when not only her future but the future of Europe was at stake.

Public opinion intervened to support and stimulate individual will. From the outset clubs were formed which, after having set an example, covered the country with posters and appeals which pursued the lukewarm and the wavering as an obsession. Some needed time before they were stirred and ready to follow the example of the first volunteers. The English temper, which is not ardent and spirited like ours, but slow in getting under way, has need of being struck a series of vigorous blows. That is why the English Press Bureau published after each action the list of losses, of which the afflicting totals far from discouraging men only urged them to action. The German atrocities, the cruel treatment inflicted on British prisoners, the sinister exploits of their pirates at sea, the raids of the Zeppelins, poisonous gas and jets of flame—all such savage acts which one may say were not only crimes but also mistakes on Germany's part—echoed most painfully in the hearts of Englishmen, and became the best possible recruiting agents for the enrolment. At the beginning of the war sports went on as usual and the great matches continued to attract and stir the crowds. But under the pressure of events and public opinion, leading sportsmen understood that their place was not on the athletic field but at the front, with the result that battalions of cricketers and footballers were formed. The women, too, made noble use of their influence; there was scarcely an English girl who did not have it understood that she would never bestow her affection on a coward. During the first year of the war volunteers joined the army as fast as the Government was able to provide for their incorporation.

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The gigantic development of war operations put the Allies more and more under the obligation of organizing all their men and resources so as to be able, by constantly

filling in the gaps of their initial "preparation," to dominate finally their redoubtable enemies by the number of battalions and the abundance of war material. England had said at the outset: the forces of the Allies will continue to grow thanks to the advantages which the supremacy of the sea secures them. She was about to apply herself towards making this growth of forces, without which there could be no victory, the direct object of her will and effort. The first step was to conceive a fitting organization for the employment of all men obtainable where they would be likely to render the maximum service. The demand for men was divided between the army which had to have another million men and the war industries which had just been placed under the directing and centralizing authority of the State for the intensive production of munitions. The best solution would have been to have recourse to that comprehensive method of reckoning and utilization of all valid men known as conscription, which France's example has proved to be compatible with democratic liberty. The English Government, while reserving the right to make use, if need be, of this extreme means, drew back before so sharp and categorical a rupture with the most cherished forms of liberty in the country. For the English the absence of obligatory military service is not only one of those traditions from which they separate with repugnance; it is also a thing to be proud of—a thing which gives the "islander" a privileged place among Europeans and what is more, a guarantee—as it appears in the light of the history of nations—against any attempt at oppression. Without obligatory military service England had conquered enemies as formidable as Philip II., Louis XIV., and Napoleon; voluntary enlistments had always sufficed not only for sea defence but for land defence as well and had many a time permitted England to take her place

with the continental armies which had struck the decisive blows. In the course of three centuries of history there had been formed in the mind of the nation one of those intuitive convictions which have the force of instinct; that, thanks to the privilege of liberty, English moral individualism has always called in action in times of danger the sacrifices necessary for the salvation of the country. That this conviction is not erroneous, the magnificent movement of 3,000,000 voluntary enlistments distinctly proves. No other country in the world probably could have furnished the spectacle of so great an amount of spontaneous devotion to public welfare and of so splendid an offering of young lives voluntarily made to the cause of national defence.

But the conditions of this war are not those of previous wars. France has levied the totality of her men fit for service; Russia is drawing from the immense reservoir of her populations all the men she can equip and arm. England could not do less. For this supreme effort, an appeal to the sentiment of duty was no longer sufficient. In every nation there exists an element of amorphous individuals, neither good nor bad, who may become good if a firm will—that of the State—takes the helm of their vacillating consciences. There exists also an irreducible fraction of ill-will, selfishness or doctrinal obstinacy, rebellious to all persuasion. The point in question was to reach precisely these two elements; their importance was estimated at 3,000,000 men between the ages of eighteen and forty-one.

The Government leaders set about preparing the country, in the course of the summer of 1915 (when the Russian retreat had just shown the new and obligatory extension of the war) to the necessity of a stronger military effort. The word conscription was pronounced several times not as a measure which the Government

thought of taking, but as an extreme measure which it *might be forced to adopt.* The needs of further industrial organization furnished the opportunity in the month of July, of taking a preliminary step: the census of the strong and active population. There was nothing alarming in this measure; men and women were listed between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five. It was evidently not a question of taking a first step towards enforcing compulsory service. Nevertheless the idea of intensifying recruiting was not absent from the minds of the Government leaders. Their intentions were soon to be made evident.

For the application of new methods a new man was necessary—a statesman and diplomat who would handle not so much the military difficulties of army organization as the civil difficulties of the relations with parties, authorities, and groups for the purpose of finding means both sufficiently conciliatory and firm enough to obtain better results in recruiting. Lord Kitchener ceded the new rôle to Lord Derby.

The task of the recruiting minister was a double one; first to get into close enough touch with the men to awaken in them the voice of conscience which had remained deaf to general appeals; second, to classify the recruits according to an order which should take into account age, technical serviceableness, and personal situations, that is to encourage all men of goodwill by securing for them the guarantees of logic and justice. It was to be, then, an administrative organization as well regulated as a plan of universal service—without the obligation. The method which was to permit individual contact with the men for registration was furnished by the procedure used in the elections. The recruiting campaign took on the aspect of an electoral canvas. Volunteer agents (men already registered) belonging to all trades,

all parties, and all social classes, visited people in their homes and made use of such means of persuasion as are more particularly effective with the English; personal reasons, general reasons based on the opinion of a leader or group or party, moral pressure in the name of "loyalty," either patriotic, political, religious, or athletic, and sometimes material pressure in the name of an employer, of the local authority or of the State as protector. The canvassers had to overcome not only a tendency to less promptness in paying the blood-tax, but frequently quite legitimate hesitations. Did not so and so find himself paralysed by a case of conscience, since he was deterred from performing the more remote duty by some nearer duty at home? Was not another held back by certain financial troubles, or certain commercial obligations, or by the fear of ruining the future of his business, or of being outstripped by a competitor? The agents of Lord Derby applied themselves to reducing these objections, to guaranteeing moratory delays, and to obtaining business settlements and securities for the duration of the war.

The formation of "groups" aided considerably in the success of the Derby plan. The men were distributed, according to age, strength, family status, in classes to be called successively—thus guaranteeing the enlistment of the older men after the younger, and reserving the auxiliary occupations for the least fit. The distribution into groups was completed by the Premier's solemn promise that the married men would leave only after the unmarried men had first been drafted. A thorough inquiry undertaken by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry, ever since the manufacture of cannon and munition had become a State enterprise and had united and centralized thousands of workshops, had specified the trades and professions indispensable to the industrial preparation of the war and for the continuation of the

economic life of the country. The "starred" men were requested to enlist as the others, but were to be mobilized at the factory or workshop or other place of occupation marked "reserved": a badge indicated that they were doing their duty as soldiers in a civil function. To settle the delicate question of ascertaining whether such and such a person belonged effectively to the category marked "reserved" or was authorized by his age or professional skill to form part of the percentage stipulated in each special trade, local courts were established which offered full guarantees of competency and impartiality.

The system appears complicated. Yet, in reality, the admirable activity of the municipal authorities and the traditions of corporate and personal initiative established long ago in that individualistic and decentralized country, permitted, in two months, from October 15th to December 15th to ascertain the military situation of nearly 3,000,000 men able to be drafted, or exactly 2,950,514 of whom 428,853 were refused for reasons of health.

Lord Derby in his report and Lord Kitchener in his communication to the House of Lords, were authorized to announce that the system of voluntary engagements had given satisfactory results and that the country had replied to the Government's appeal with a zeal which did honour to its lofty sentiment of patriotic duty. Lord Derby's statistics, however, showed that the married men had enlisted under the flag in greater numbers than the unmarried men. The remainder of the refractory bachelors amounted to 651,160. Was the country willing to accept the fact that the men who had assumed the social responsibility of heads of a family and who bore the heaviest social burdens, should sacrifice themselves for those who, without charges or responsibilities were evading military duty as well? The Premier had already replied to this fear by engaging his word; seeing that the

number of unmarried men not enlisted was far from being negligible both from the military point of view and with regard to the civic principles at stake, his promise ought to be kept. The Government, therefore, resolved to introduce into the House of Commons a conscription bill, limited and temporary, for bachelors between the ages of eighteen and forty-one, or widowers without children.

It would seem that the importance of the moral and national reasons which had determined the decision, that the gravity of the circumstances and the pressing necessity of the war should have assured the success of the bill without discussion. This was not the case; a rather lively opposition came from a small group of uncompromising Radicals and from the representatives of the Labour party. The capital fact, however, which stood out from a political struggle lasting three weeks, was the restricted and feeble character of the opposition, the ease with which it was reduced, and the impressive enthusiasm of the nation offering the Government, almost unanimously, the decisive support of the national will, stirred with patriotic honour, steadfastly faithful to the cause of the Allies, and sweeping away all resistance in a splendid movement of self-assertion and firmness. What dominated the whole debate was that the authority of the ministers, responsible for the new attitude of the cabinet, enabled them to defend their views—without deviating from the tact and circumspection proper to "leaders" of a parliamentary majority—supported by the warm approbation of a nation finally enlightened, unmistakably warned of the danger and obligations incumbent on it and resolved to do its patriotic duty as well as its duty to Europe.

The Under Secretaries of State, Henderson, Brace, and Roberts, who had at first offered their resignations to the Prime Minister, consented to reconsider their decision. The argument of Mr. Asquith: "that conscription, not

limited but universal, concorded, in France, with the most liberal democracy" did not remain without effect. The words of General Seely, former Secretary of War, in command of a brigade at the front: "that all France had eyes turned towards their friends of England and were expecting from them the encouragement of a virile decision," did not fail to arouse people to action. In what fortress, then, were the last resistances entrenched, since it was neither lack of patriotism, nor misunderstanding of the situation, nor cowardice in the presence of duty? This fortress still untaken was no other than class-conflict. The trade-unionists, suspicious of a middle-class government, feared that under colour of conscription, even limited and temporary, this middle-class would prepare a more comprehensive and durable measure which, during the war, would result in industrial conscription, and, after the war, would leave England under the régime of permanent obligatory service. The excess of zeal shown by the Conservative party which exerted itself for universal conscription had really harmed the Prime Minister whose intentions had never been to strangle the traditional prerogatives of the British citizen. He wished simply to effect a compromise with a view to a definite need, following the best English political method: the voluntary enlistments had given results which had done honour to the patriotism and national sense of duty; they had responded to the desiderata of the Secretary for war during the first sixteen months; the only point now in question was to adopt the measure necessary to encourage a decision among the last group of men willing to enlist but held back by a legitimate family attachment, by furnishing them guarantees against the selfishness of certain unmarried men. Between the first and second reading of the bill Mr. Asquith gave his word: first, that the conscription would in no way affect the régime of

industrial production which should remain under the status of free-contract; second, that the obligatory service of unmarried men was a temporary measure, necessitated by the regrettable luke-warmness of a restricted category of citizens whom the law wanted only for the duration of the war. A private conference of the Government leaders with the delegates of the Trade-Unions, at Westminster, succeeded in dissipating all misunderstandings. The Workingmen's party, whose object was, more particularly, to affirm its importance in the Councils of the State and to strengthen its legislative conquests, had no intention whatever of pushing its resistance to the point of obstruction. In short the refractory minority which totalled a tenth of the votes at the first reading of the bill, dropped considerably at the second, and fell to nothing after the third.

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The conscription of the unmarried men was to give 500,000 more men to the English armies. The married men registered according to the Derby system, had no further reason, it would seem, to postpone joining their army corps. The Government, then, had cause to compliment itself on having solved the problem of recruiting while trespassing as little as possible on the traditional liberty of English citizens.

However, contrary to expectations, new difficulties arose. The registered married men discovered that numerous bachelors were "in ambush" in the reserved occupations. The medical examination had been done hastily, allowing many able-bodied men to pass through its meshes. Besides, should the choice be left to certain married men, unscrupulous or cowardly in the face of duty, to go on with their business and "save their skin" while the more scrupulous, the more devoted and better citizens were to risk their lives for their benefit?

The idea of the injustice of the volunteer system had entered most people's minds. It was gaining ground. The tragic reality of the war had given birth to a desire for *equality*, an idea which had been unknown in England during centuries of civil and social conflict. The conservative press, which, since the beginning of the war strongly advocated energetic measures and a vigorous and bold prosecution of the war, began to speak openly of universal and obligatory service. The *Times*, the *Morning Post*, the *Daily Mail* advanced certain political and military arguments hard to refute. The moral reasons in favour of conscription were presented in vigorous terms by the *Observer*. The married men's cause of complaint was not restricted to the unmarried men or to any particular class of people, but was against the system itself, a monstrous system which allowed the least worthy to exploit the patriotism of the most worthy, inflicted a punishment on the most devoted, granted a reward to desertion, and conferred the advantage of an exceptional profit of neglect of duty.

It is not a secret that in the cabinet, Mr. Lloyd George spoke earnestly in favour of decisive action which he considered as indispensable and which after twenty-two months of war, he said, the country would accept if presented without weakness. Outside events played their part in the matter. The week from April the 25th to May 1, 1916, was a dark week for England. In quick succession she learned of the Dublin revolt, the bombardment of Yarmouth by a German squadron, a series of Zeppelin raids over the eastern coast, and the fall of Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia, despite the heroic resistance of General Townsend. These ordeals, as usual, had no other effect than to strengthen the courage of the British. Far from abandoning themselves to vain regrets or manifesting any weariness, they screwed up their

resolution to do everything, were it ever so contrary to their traditions and the spirit of their institutions in time of peace, which would place them in the best position to win the war.

Mr. Asquith tried a last compromise. He stated the definite needs of the army according to the computations of military experts and moved the adoption of a bill of "conditional conscription" for the married men: if, within a month, 50,000 married men had not enlisted, and if, every week after this limit, voluntary enlistment did not furnish 15,000 men, till the total number of 200,000 were reached, universal compulsory service would automatically be established.

On April 27, 1916, a memorable sitting took place in the House of Commons. After energetic and decisive speeches of M. Carson, in the name of the Conservatives, and of M. Walsh, in the name of the Labour party, the majority seemed suddenly to take in the gravity of the situation. The members, who, just before the sitting, were still bitterly discussing in the lobby and cavilling at every provision of the Bill, were carried away, under the influence of the resolute speeches of the outsiders, by a powerful wave of patriotic enthusiasm. They claimed the drastic measure that the Government was still holding back. . . . On May 3rd, the final determination was come to: a Bill for universal military service was passed by an overwhelming majority.

Thus England, the pacific, the liberal, the individualistic nation, entered the path where the régime of armed peace, imposed by Germany, had long before driven France, who, from the beginning of the war, had drawn upon her whole resources of man-power and borne the most exacting sacrifices.

Voluntary enlistment had caused the English Army to grow from the twenty-six divisions of the time of peace,

to seventy divisions. With the sailors and the colonial contingents, but excluding the auxiliary troops of India, it amounted to 5,000,000 men. Conscription was now about to furnish the army, in one month, with a reserve of 700,000 men, and the door was left open for additional calls if military necessity were to demand it.

It is not too early to appreciate the value and fighting qualities of the volunteer army. Those whose instruction was the most complete, the "territorials," who had drilled every Saturday in peace time and had taken part in the general manœuvres, have been at the front since October, 1914. They have shown in the trenches, not only the qualities of resistance that one may expect from every British soldier, but they draw from their ardent patriotism new-found powers of *élan*—much to the admiration of our troops who know something of such qualities. The splendid charge of the London Scottish during the first battle of Flanders will be remembered. The official account of an "eyewitness" relates with what death-daring courage the volunteers charged by the side of the regulars in the attack of Neuve-Chapelle and Hill 60. The Canadians fought magnificently at Ypres; the Australians and the New Zealanders faced death unflinchingly in the unfortunate Gallipoli campaign. We may then have confidence when the time comes for a general advance, the British Army with the French and Belgian armies will throw the Teutonic hordes back with a vigour that will leave little room for doubt in Germany as to the value of "sportsmen" under fire.

The English modestly belittle their part in the war in order to do fuller justice to the immense and admirable effort of our troops. And just as we admire the excellent work of their fleet, so they are insistent in their admiration for the great victory, due to the French Army, which forced back the barbarian onslaught at that new battle

of the Catalaunian Fields. The English newspapers are outspoken in their generous and sincere praise of our leaders, our soldiers, and the French nation. We are deeply moved by it. We must remember too that while the battle-front held by the British Army represents a relatively small portion of the long line of defence from the North Sea to the Vosges, it was the most imperilled and most violently attacked sector in October and November, 1914 (not to speak of other events later). Ypres, defended chiefly by the English, was witness of the most frightful carnage that had to be registered before the battle of Verdun. It was there, too, the Field-Marshal's army gave proof of the most undaunted endurance and courage. Let us remember, too, that the English are not only fighting in Flanders but in Mesopotamia, in Egypt, in East Africa, and, with us, in the Cameroon and in the Balkans. By January, 1916, their losses announced by Mr. Asquith had amounted to 128,138 dead, 68,016 disappeared, 353,283 wounded. Before the end of the year their total losses were considerably over a million. Such cruel figures permit us to judge of the importance of their effort. For this powerful assistance, so much the more precious because it was spontaneous and because it surpassed all our hopes and expectations, we express our heartfelt gratitude to the English nation.

During his stay in France, the English soldier has been found to be as honest, kind, and obliging in private life as he is courageous, steady, and chivalrous in danger and action. Quartered in our villages, "Tommy" has shown himself to be disciplined, respectful of property and persons, unobtrusive, modest, and *bon enfant.* As a guest of our peasants, he has taken part in the work of the farm and the field; our good housewives will not forget his readiness to render service; our little ones will remember his playfulness, his indulgence, and his kind

smile. We have forgotten the slander of a "perfidious Albion!" The prejudices against British *sans gêne* are disproved! Franco-British friendship, sealed in blood on the battlefield, has been cemented not less surely by ties of sympathy and gratitude, by amenities natural to two courteous and refined races, by considerate behaviour towards each other, and by fraternity in common efforts and hopes.

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The financial mobilization proceeded with the same momentum and with the same decision as the military mobilization. To meet the expenses which were bound to be heavier than those of other belligerents, since it was a question of creating an army, England did not hesitate to resort to two extreme measures: increased taxation and loans. The self-possession and self-sacrifice of her citizens brought about a willing acceptance of the first increase. The economic resources and the patriotic enthusiasm of the country assured the full success of the second. The bill relating to additional taxation was boldly introduced *before* the first loan. The Government had been encouraged to adopt this measure by the citizens themselves who demanded action through the press and through public meetings. The income tax although high already was doubled; in October, 1915, it was announced that it would soon reach half of every citizen's income. For two loans aggregating nine billions, the Government successfully appealed in September and October, 1914, to those with savings. Then in January, 1915, a great "unlimited loan" was floated throughout the United Kingdom. For days together great sums of money continued to flow into the treasury of the Bank of England; the savings of the people were received in the post-offices in exchange for small certificates of ten or twenty shillings. In three weeks, the loan reached the gigantic total of fifteen

thousand millions. The Prime Minister in announcing the result of this appeal to the nation asked for the power to dispose of a considerable part of it "for the present or future Allies of England."

Great Britain's determination to fight to the extreme limit of her forces for the powers of civilization and peace against aggression and barbarism could scarcely be emphasized by a more significant and generous action. "The victory," Lloyd George had said at the outset of the war, "will be decided by the group of alliances which will be able to throw into the struggle the last man and the last shilling." England had just taken the necessary measures to secure for herself and friends the advantage of the last billion.

In a like spirit the private generosity of her people, for which England is well known, responded to the needs of the hour. Thousands of Belgian refugees were welcomed, lodged, and cared for in the homes of private persons. Voluntary contributions were raised for the Belgians who were in sore need in their own country by reason of the German domination, for the British wounded, for the Allied wounded, and for the Servians and the Poles. As early as February 20, 1915, the *Times* subscription had reached a million pounds sterling. We should be particularly grateful to our English friends for their generosity towards the French victims of the war. They have sent us automobile-ambulances, transportable hospitals with their appurtenances and personnel, and the Violet Cross service for the horses. The Quakers have come to France with a staff of hygiene experts to disinfect the regions transformed into human slaughter-yards, and of architects to rebuild ruined villages. English farmers have sent our peasants grain seed and stock for breeding. The "French Relief Fund" contributes regularly to our *Secours National;* a kindly thought of theirs was the

tactful assistance given to those unfortunate and indirect victims of war time—actors and artists. The colonies have followed the example of the Metropolis. Australia, in particular, sends several hundred thousand francs a month for the food-supply fund of the Belgians.

Finally English generosity and English admiration for the valour and constance of France inspired our friends on July 7, 1916, with the idea of a "French Day," when collections were made in all the towns and villages of the United Kingdom for an immense subscription in favour of our relief societies and institutions of charity. On the same day, the mayors of all the towns signed manifestoes of friendship and respect addressed to the President of the French Republic.

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This sacrifice of money and of oneself—this supreme effort to bring victory to the cause of the Allies—does not come from any one class or any one party, but from the whole nation. In England so seriously divided by political differences on the eve of the war all the parties have become reconciled: as we have seen in France, she too has brought about "the sacred union."

During the first weeks the socialists hesitated. They did not understand that England had to adjure her pacific tenets and shed her blood for an obscure difficulty come to pass in the far-away Balkan peninsula. The doings of the German Army, the complicity of the trans-Rhenan socialists in the militarism of the Kaiser and the Junkers soon had the effect of causing them to see the war in its true light. The House members of the Labour party rallied to the common cause, excepting the *ultras* of the Independent Labour party under the leadership of Ramsay McDonald—a handful of Utopists whose influence was negligible. Among the women, even the wild enthusiasts—I mean the suffragettes—who had lately

drawn attention by their forceful opposition to the Government, going as far as acts of violence, destruction of property, and arson, rallied to the cause of national defence. Miss Pankhurst, the heroine of the "hunger-strike," publicly disapproved of the four English women who yielded to the manœuvre, financiered by Germany, of a Women's Peace-Congress at The Hague. Among the intellectuals, certain Cambridge professors who admired German science, after having launched a manifesto in favour of peace, solemnly retracted their declarations; they made up for their initial attitude by offering the hospitality of their Colleges to the exiles of the University of Louvain.

The news of the metal workers' strike in the Clyde workshops in March, 1915, and of the Miners' strike in Wales in July was learned in France with a mixture of surprise and alarm. Let us hasten to say that these conflicts, no doubt serious and disturbing because of their sharpness and possible effect, were quickly brought to a close. The fact, however, that they could happen shows that in a part of the population, men's thoughts and wills were not yet concentrated on the supreme task of national defence with that insistence and devotion capable of sacrificing personal interests to the interests of the whole people. The fact that, in both cases, the intervention of a member of the cabinet enjoying the confidence of the country was sufficient to bring about a mutual understanding, and, above all, to induce the workingmen to respond without reserve to the patriotic appeal of their representative, proves that their spirit was loyal, that their thoughts were honest, and that there was simply need of dissipating these untimely mists of social disturbance by a clear word or two.

It must be recognized that the English liberal method which continues peace-time processes in time of war has its

drawbacks. Making an appeal to the conscience alone, counting solely upon the forces born of a sense of duty and of will for good, exposes one in critical times, to inevitable deceptions: it is to England's honour that such a method is possible within her boundaries; no other nation would dare rely upon the rectitude and moral energy of her people to the point of considering unwritten obligations just as valid as the imperative stipulations of the law itself. Nevertheless there is some loss. If, in times of trouble, certain shocks and conflicts of ideas and opinions take place, as they sometimes do, then the losses may spread to entire classes of citizens. That is what happened in certain recent circumstances from which England has only just extricated herself. The mine-owners, on the one hand, and the workmen, on the other, both yielded to the old-time spirit of emphasizing above all else the profits of the former and the economic and social claims of the latter, and both neglected the new duty of abnegation and self-denial and sacrifice of which the rest of the country was furnishing the example. Both groups, finally enlightened as to their obligations—thanks to the urgent and pressing arguments of a responsible leader of the State—recovered themselves, and their dispute once settled, placed themselves entirely at the disposal of the Government for the tasks of national defence.

We in France—who saw the unanimous and magnificent *élan* of all the French—ask ourselves as to the wherefore of all this obstinacy—were it only momentary—in holding so closely to one's rights and interests when a great wave of patriotism should have swept away all paltry sentiments. It was not lack of patriotism. These very capitalists had subscribed heavy sums a few days before for national relief work, and had demanded, on their own initiative, an increase of taxes. These very workingmen had offered their services as volunteers and had remained in

the mine only upon the insistence of the authorities alarmed at the threatened exhaustion of the country's manual-labour power. What explains the attitude of both groups is a series of causes relating to the psychology, to the traditions, and recent history of the English people.

The English, whose imagination is slow and whose thought is solid and weighty, are the least variable and adaptable of all peoples. The acts of their national life never result from a sudden illumination which inundates the mind, but from the persistence of well-established movements and habitual reactions. Transformations with the English are slow and gradual: they are determined by precedents and evolve in harmony with tradition. From that is derived the English nation's power of progress along channels traced by its instinct and acquired speed. From that also, its power of resistance when unforeseen circumstances happen to elbow it out of the well-defined channel. The German menace of the last fifteen years and the German aggression of August, 1914, had to assume their character of violence and brutality, with which we are acquainted, before the English reply was ready to manifest itself in a rapid and energetic manner. Against an unheard-of provocation England reacted by an unusual counter-stroke of revolt and indignation. Let us not be surprised that at the bottom of the wave of indignation the movement was slower. Individualism, distrust of government meddling, repugnance for the constraints of mechanical discipline are characteristic of English public life ever since the fall of the Stuarts and the overthrow of Cromwell's dictatorship. In recent times individualism has assumed the form of organized association for the defence of corporate interests. Nor let us be surprised that this momentum continued, in part, to manifest itself. What is remarkable is the fact that its effect should have been so limited and that the

people as a whole should have so spontaneously and nobly anticipated the responsibilites, duties, and burdens necessitated by the new situation.

The Government made up its mind immediately; the upper-classes adapted themselves to the circumstances with decision and generosity; in the ranks of the masses, large numbers were led away by example and by the urgent suggestion of the instinct of preservation. There remained a fraction, of a heavier cast of thought and of a lower tone of emotion, who had to be in direct contact with the peril in order to be stirred. These latter allowed themselves to be carried along by habit, without paying attention to the "force of inertia" apt to become attached to the habit. For a century England had not known any national danger. As far back in her history as one wants to go, the superiority of her fleet, the courage of her sailors, the coolness of her commodores had always been sufficient to secure her immunity. There was no sign among her people of that secret anxiety which sounded a dull note of alarm in French life even in the midst of peace. There was none of that latent emotion, ready to burst into an impetuous fever of anger and action, which caused us to make up our minds in a flash to accept the sacrifice of property and life and to direct our entire energy towards the unique goal of defence and victory. Indeed, after having set up the rampart of her fleet against the attack of the German fleet, and having adopted measures without precedent in her history, to increase her army to the level indicated by the new European peril, England believed she could resume the normal course of her existence, do business as usual, recuperate by means of her exports the losses of her commerce, and concern herself with the social conflicts which had become with her one of the aspects of collective vitality. *As usual* was for a time the motto which the English very seriously proposed

to adopt to mark their self-possession during a universal crisis and their determination to hold out until the final solution. This self-possession among some looked very much like indifference or guilty selfishness. The public statements of the leaders, the objurgations of the press, the protests of public opinion opened their eyes, aroused in them certain generous sentiments lying dormant, and led them to understand that every citizen whether at work in the factory or fighting at the front ought to face the exceptional circumstances by an exceptional sacrifice of individualism to the common necessities.

It was in the field of social conflict that the apparent neglect of patriotic duty manifested itself for a time because it is in that field that English individualism, in late years, has taken root with the most pronounced determination. England, "mother of liberty," has preceded all other liberal nations in the creation of institutions guaranteeing individual independence, justice, and *self-government;* but she has not passed through a *social* revolution like the Revolution of 1793, brought about by our forefathers. The land, and—since the development of general commerce and industry—the wealth of the country have remained the monopolies of a small group of people. While in France the equality of conditions has reached such a degree that the middle-class forms by far the most numerous element, in England there is still a gulf between the upper and lower classes. This flagrant inequality was accepted by the English people in the course of the nineteenth century with relative calmness. The Trades-Unions struggled foot by foot for higher wages and better conditions of work, but without revolutionary intentions, without violence, and without chimerical hopes.

Socialism with its theories and absolute doctrines and its train of aggressive designs and imperious desires began

to spread throughout the Labour Unions towards 1885 and has since made incessant progress there. The plans of total reconstruction and the vast ambitions and bitter conflicts which introduce a tone of unknown harshness into the social battle were henceforth the events of the hour in the United Kingdom. Reciprocally, the resistance of employers became more energetic. Such was the state of mind rampant in the Clyde workshops and in the coal mines of Wales at the end of the eighth month in the former case and of the eleventh month in the latter case. The ability of the Government, intervening as arbitrator, consisted in obtaining mutual concessions which were to last as long as the war without engaging the future. In a spirit of prudence the Government secured a guarantee against possible refractory cases in the form of an emergency law (which fortunately did not have to be applied). In a spirit of patriotism the leaders succeeded in finding the right words to allay individual fears and to arouse feelings of sincere devotion to the mother-country. The eloquence and popularity of Lloyd George accomplished what remained to be done. The machinists enrolled to the number of 100,000 strong in the arm- and ammunition-factories, created under State control. The miners abandoned the working-hours limit and their right to rest every other day. In short the strike was averted.

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England proved herself equal to the necessities of the European situation, thanks to her moral bearing, her spirit of sacrifice, and the concentration of her energies in face of danger. Does she deserve the same praise in the matter of the administrative competency of the authorities and the management of the industrial and technical resources? What we know of the recruiting of the new army and of its excellent training excludes any idea of doubt about England's splendid efficiency in

improvising, not only by sheer force of devotion, but also by sheer force of method. There has been a good deal of discussion recently about the question of armament and munitions. Criticisms have been made on this point by the English themselves. The Government made no attempt to dissimulate the insufficiency of its previsions and executive measures. But in reality immense difficulties had to be overcome. In the course of war operations certain needs became apparent which none of the belligerents, Germany included, had measured to their full extent. England had not prepared a system of requisitions beforehand because she was not organized militarily. At first she attempted to distribute government supply orders to private firms, in the belief that the productive power of English industry would suffice for the enormous task imposed by the extensive output of war material and munitions. Certain errors became evident in this system while at the same time it appeared, according to the lessons of the battlefield, that an unlimited consumption of munitions was the sole means of economizing human life. For instance the number of shells used in the single combat of Neuve-Chapelle surpassed the consumption of artillery projectiles during the entire Transvaal campaign. When the press intervened and demanded the increased output, the Government had already taken measures to requisition not only the metallurgic establishments but all of the workshops transformed into arm- and shell-factories.

The liberty which it had been thought possible to accord private initiative, according to England's traditional method, had resulted in disadvantages. The work was not only distributed under poor conditions of economy, of total production, and rapidity of manufacture but a certain jealousy and self-interest had interfered with the machinery of management and a regrettable lack of zeal

had characterized the workers. Individualism, such a powerful stimulant for intensifying the forces of action when organized and directed, had produced its bad effects through want of co-ordination and inspiration. Experience had demonstrated that tradition ought to make room, in the case of urgent need, for exceptional measures adapted to circumstances.

The English Government did not hesitate. For fear lest the new measures curtailing liberty of action and private profit might appear a circuitous attempt, on the part of the Radicals, to realize their own political programme under pretence of "public safety," the cabinet was reformed. The most eminent and competent members of the Conservative party were asked to collaborate in the cabinet with the Radicals. The new ministry—really national—undertook the industrial mobilization of the United Kingdom with a view to the intensive production of arms and munitions.

A new department was created—that of munitions, which was entrusted to Lloyd George. An emergency law regulated the sale of alcoholic liquors (which was chiefly responsible for the slackening of the workingmen) and gave the executive the power of inflicting fine and imprisonment in case of strikes (which was declared illegal unless first submitted to the arbitration of the Government). The firmness and tact of Mr. Lloyd George settled the delicate question of war profits: all above a legitimate profit, based on the average of the last three years, should be divided equally between the owner, the workingmen, and the State. On this condition the wage-earners agreed to the curtailing of their acquired rights and consented to a change of place or trade according to the needs of production. The new organization was, then, a real voluntary conscription applied to the industrial needs of modern warfare.

Today the foundries and iron works of England, Scotland, and Ireland are working up to the limit of their productive capacity under the control of the State. The State, moreover, has created sixteen arm- and munition-factories under its own direction; ten others were to be created later, Mr. Lloyd George stated, "for a special purpose—determined after an understanding with the French Minister, M. Thomas, at Boulogne,—from which the Allies are expecting important results." France and England were soon to be in a position to equal and perhaps surpass Germany in the intensive production of projectiles and explosives.

England, then, has not fallen below what her past as a great industrial nation permitted us to hope for. Not only has she satisfied the needs of her army in the field, almost entirely created *a novo*, but she is manufacturing cloths, harness, machines, military wagons, and munitions for the Allies. At this writing, our own production of cartridges and shells has increased 900 %, the English production in the same time has grown 2000 % and is going to reach 3000 %.

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It appears, then, that England has shown herself efficient in the very field which constitutes the unique superiority of Germany, namely the organization of the national resources with a view to collective results. Indeed the necessities of modern civilization, the progress of science, and the technical arts had already commenced to transform the methods of production in England before the present war spurred her will to the utmost to draw the maximum advantage from her economic forces. The term, "efficiency," used to express the new quality required under the new circumstances, was not coined for the needs of the present moment. For several years before the war, England had echoed with appeals for efficiency.

An eminent writer, Mr. H. G. Wells, had set himself the task of diffusing this doctrine.

If England still has some distance to travel in a direction which lengthens in proportion as science and its applications progress and as the masses, better instructed, become more capable of co-ordinated activity, it is also true that she has taken an eminent rank among nations organized with a view to powerful production. She is *efficient.* She proved it at the opening of hostilities, by undertaking exactly what she was able to do at the outset and what she would be able to do in the near future. "Our resources," said Lloyd George, "will continue to grow. We shall become stronger in numbers, better provided with cannon and munitions, better supplied with the necessaries of life, more and more powerful financially, while at the same time the resources of our enemy will decrease." After the battle of Belgium, the battle of the Marne, the battle of Flanders, the combats at Beauséjour and Neuve-Chapelle, Mr. Winston Churchill was able to state with reason that "the war had just begun."

England is *efficient* because she has been able to increase her production in proportion to her needs. She is efficient because she is patient: her volunteers enrolled for three years, her commissariat officers in France leased quarters for ten years. She is efficient (our "*généralissime*" is well aware of the fact) because she knows how to husband her men and graduate the use of her resources. Finally she has discovered—and France with her—that *efficiency* is not limited, as the Germans believed, to precision of material "clock-work" and to the organization of everything according to the regular swing of a machine, but also consists in judgment, self-possession, the sense of historical realities and of human realities: in a word, precisely those psychological values which Herr von Bülow disdains.

England and France possess the constancy and courage which the feeling of a just cause confers. They make *efficiency* the servant of moral values. If I have succeeded in the plan which has directed this study, it has been made clear that the English, considered as a people, since the origin of their history, have enjoyed that moral pride which makes the aristocratic government, the administrative tyranny, and the mechanical discipline of the German model insupportable in their eyes; a noble idealism which causes them to place liberty in the front rank of the benefits of life; that sense of fairness which makes them desire the independence and prosperity of the peoples worthy of contributing, by their virtues, to the progress of civilization, and by their national individuality, to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. To safe-guard these conquests of human dignity everywhere on British soil and on the soil of countries imperilled by German barbarism, they rose as a unit, deaf to the tempting bargain by which it was thought to buy their neutrality; they will fight on still until the goal is reached: the dearly-won but glorious goal toward which reason and conscience are pointing.

As individuals, they possess by tradition, education, racial gifts, and the strong structure of the social *milieu*, that energy, self-reliance, and self-control which they sum up in the very expressive word: *character*. With their men, whether soldiers, officers, travellers, or leaders of the nation and with their women, mothers or wives, nurses or workingwomen, propagandists of military duty or organizers of charity, there will be no faintness of heart. Day by day, England is making a powerful effort and bearing a burden of expense and vast undertaking in order to contribute, over and above the naval aid which was understood, an unforeseen military aid which will be of capital importance. If the war must needs be long,

we may count upon her, despite the severity of the ordeal, to show no signs of lassitude.

This war [said Mr. Asquith] is a national war. We shall persevere to the end, until entire reparation has been made to Belgium, until France has recovered her lost provinces and her security, until Europe has been delivered of the nightmare of armaments, and the world of the monstrosity of Prussian militarism.

The friendship of England and France is indissoluble, because it is established on esteem, respect, intellectual and moral sympathy, and enthusiasm for the same ideal. This reconciliation of two great nations through forgiveness of injuries and justice rendered in each case to noble, civilizing qualities is one of those epoch-making events, rich in promise, destined to enlighten the future. The Alliance will endure through the reciprocal moderation of the two nations, through their trustfulness, their veneration of right, and through their love of peace.

There exists today a splendid symbol of the Anglo-French union: it is the spectacle of 20,000 French-Canadians, loyal subjects of England and faithful children of France, our brothers by race and tongue and the brothers of British citizens by attachment to English liberty, who have come voluntarily to fight in the ranks of the Allies for the defence of the British Empire and the deliverance of the sacred soil of France. The generosity of their double loyalty, their devotion even unto death to both foster-lands announces an era of sympathy, loyal friendship which in the long years to come will set firm root in French and English hearts, and which no harsh wind of discord will ever destroy.

Let this symbol live in our memory as the sign of an alliance which is not only a brotherhood of arms, but also a communion of hearts! His Majesty King George IV

receiving the French Parliamentary delegation, addressed them in these words of welcome: "I am glad to be united to the great Republic by an intimate alliance based on mutual confidence, an alliance which, I hope, will last always." We accept with enthusiasm the promise of the words. The two great nations are journeying henceforth hand in hand, united by a lasting friendship destined to be the surest guarantee of the peace of the world.

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